Opinion
No. 2D20-2845
06-15-2022
Chad MCDANIEL, Appellant, v. Laura Alise MCDANIEL, Appellee.
Eric J. Stuedemann of Salty Law, P.A., Bradenton, for Appellant. Eileen H. Griffin of Griffin & Associates, P.A., Brandon, for Appellee.
Eric J. Stuedemann of Salty Law, P.A., Bradenton, for Appellant.
Eileen H. Griffin of Griffin & Associates, P.A., Brandon, for Appellee.
ATKINSON, Judge.
Chad McDaniel (Father) appeals the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, contesting, among other issues, his income utilized in the calculation of child support. We reverse and remand for further proceedings because the trial court incorrectly calculated the Father's income from 2018, 2019, and 2020 for the purposes of determining current and retroactive child support. There was no competent, substantial evidence that the per diem amounts that the trial court included reduced the Father's living expenses. There were also errors with the calculations of the Father's income for 2019 and 2020, which we explain below.
The parties were married in 2011. They have four minor children between the ages of four and ten. The Mother was a veterinarian. The Father worked for a utility construction and maintenance company. His position required him to travel to various office locations, including Port Charlotte, Ft. Myers, and Bowling Green. He testified that the per diem payments he received from his employer were "to decrease the cost for me to travel." As the Mother conceded at oral argument, the trial court erred in calculating the Father's 2019 income by failing to utilize the correct monthly total of $6,286.21. Neither party was able to provide an explanation for how or why the trial court arrived at what the parties agree is an inaccurate figure, but we trust that it can be remedied upon remand.
The trial court also erroneously included amounts listed on the Father's 2018, 2019, and 2020 earning statements as "per diem" pay in calculating the Father's income for child-support purposes. Gross income includes "[r]eimbursed expenses or in kind payments to the extent that they reduce living expenses ." § 61.30(2)(a)13, Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphasis added).
The Father testified that the per diem reimbursements covered gasoline and hotel stays when he was required to travel between his employer's offices. The Father's testimony did not indicate that these amounts in any way reduced his normal living expenses. And there was no other evidence to support the inclusion of the per diem amount in the Father's income. Because no competent, substantial evidence was presented establishing that the per diem payments resulted in a reduction of his everyday living expenses, it was improper for the court to have included those amounts in the Father's 2018, 2019, and 2020 income. See Lauro v. Lauro , 757 So. 2d 523, 525–26 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (reversing the final judgment of dissolution because per diem compensation "for expenses incurred when [the husband] is away from home, including food, telephone[,] and laundry," did not reduce the husband's living expenses under section 61.30(2)(a) 13).
The Father also contends that the trial court made an error in calculating his 2020 income. The earning statements upon which the trial court relied included "year-to-date" totals. The Father argues that the trial court should instead have utilized his "current" net pay total and calculated a per diem figure based upon that amount. Because the "current" net pay total on the statement dated January 5, 2020, excluded January 1, 2020, through January 4, 2020, the trial court did not necessarily err by relying upon the year-to-date figure when calculating the Father's 2020 net income. However, as the Father correctly contends, the trial court erred by dividing the year-to-date figure by twenty-six days because the year-to-date total already represented the Father's net pay for the entire thirty-one days of the month of January.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
SLEET and SMITH, JJ., Concur.