In Wallace v. Knoxville's Community Development Corp., 568 S.W.2d 107 at 110, this court found that the appellants, who were challenging the constitutionality of a statute, "did not properly proceed below" by failing to give notice to the Attorney General. See also Neill v. Neill, (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) Appeal No. 02A01 — 9109-GS-00201, 1992 WL 41697 at *6 (Tenn.App. March 6, 1992) ("Since appellant [the party challenging the constitutionality of the statute] did not properly proceed below, we will not consider this issue.") Similarly, in McDaniel v. General Care Corp., 627 S.W.2d 129 (Tenn.App. 1981), this court found that the party seeking to challenge a statute was "not at liberty to raise the constitutional question at this stage of the proceeding." Id. at 133.

A final judgment from which relief is available and otherwise appropriate shall not be set aside unless, considering the whole record, error involving a substantial right more probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the judicial process.McDaniel v. General Care Corp., 627 S.W.2d 129, 133-134 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1981). The erroneous exclusion, or admission, of evidence in a bench trial does not, standing alone, justify a reversal of the trial court's judgment.

These requirements are mandatory; in the absence of Harless' compliance therewith, the issue of the relevant statutes' constitutionality is not properly before us. SeeCummings v. Shipp, 3 S.W.2d 1062, 1063 (Tenn. 1928); McDanielv. General Care Corp., 627 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Tenn.App. 1981); Wallace v. Knoxville's Community Dev. Corp., 568 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tenn.App. 1978). Rule 24.04 provides that "[w]hen the validity of a statute of this state. . . is drawn in question in any action to which the State or an officer or agency is not a party, the court shall require that notice be given the Attorney General, specifying the pertinent statute, rule or regulation."

The medical testimony regarding injuries sustained by Kirkland and which caused his death is consistent only with appellant's reported fight with Kirkland in which appellant knocked Kirkland down, "punched his lights out," hurt him "real bad," and left him "in pretty bad shape . . . laying on the side of the road, more or less to die," thinking "I had killed him." Although appellant actually left Kirkland alive, his act was credited by the medical testimony as at least contributing to Kirkland's death and, thereby, he would be responsible even though there were other concurring Page 627 S.W.2d 129, 134 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979); Gonzales v. State, 505 S.W.2d 819, 820 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974). Under all of the evidence, then, the jury was entitled to conclude there was no reasonable hypothesis other than appellant's guilt. Parenthetically, we note that in citing Smith v. State, supra, in support of his contention that the evidence is insufficient to establish the corpus delicti, appellant says, "This case must also be read to speak to intention to injure or kill another person and that here such conduct alone did not evidence intent to kill."