Based on the competing claims, it announces a result that validates one set of propositions about the land. See C. FREEMAN, FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS, § 1353 (1925); cf. BHP Petroleum Co. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. 1990); Bell v. Ott, 606 S.W.2d 942 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McCurdy v. Morgan, 252 S.W.2d 264 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1952, no writ). This court has jurisdiction.
Venue in a case brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act has been said to be controlled by the "nature and dominant purpose of the suit, as shown by the petition." Garrison v. Morrow, 300 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex.Civ. App.eaumont 1957, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (quoting McCurdy v. Morgan, 252 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1952, no writ)). Reviewing the record for evidence that the "cause of action" Texas Beef asserted in the Randall County suit accrued there, we note that a cause of action embraces every fact necessary to be shown in order to recover.
A suit to cancel an oil and gas lease has been described as a suit to quiet title. McCurdy v. Morgan, 252 S.W.2d 264 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1952, no writ); Thomason v. Ham, 210 S.W. 561 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1919, writ ref'd). Although he must base his action on the strength of his own title, the plaintiff in a suit to quiet title does not have to prove superior right to the property by tracing his title to the sovereignty.
We hold that it does. Bituminous Casualty Corporation v. Commercial Standard Insurance Company, 639 S.W.2d 25 (Tex.App. — Tyler 1982, no writ); Amoco Production Company v. Texas Electric Service Company, 614 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ). We follow the Bituminous and Amoco cases, not unmindful of the Texarkana court's contrary decision in Community Inns Franchise, Inc. v. Plummer, 379 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana 1964, no writ), and Judge Norvell's yardstick in McCurdy v. Morgan, 252 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1952, no writ), that the general venue exceptions of Article 1995 are applicable in declaratory judgment actions only where the "nature and dominate purpose of the suit," that is, the subject matter of the suit, is one covered by the exception. Actions for declaratory judgment are sui generis, and rights under the enabling statute are to be liberally construed.
In considering the matter of venue in declaratory judgment actions, it is the nature and dominant purpose of the suit as shown by the pleadings that determine whether the venue issue is fairly within the exception. McCurdy v. Morgan, 252 S.W.2d 264 (Tex.Civ.App. .--San Antonio 1952, no writ). Plaintiffs' petition shows the nature of their suit is a request for a determination of the rights of the parties under the two contracts, and that the dominant purpose is to secure a declaration that 'said contracts do not purport to cover cotton produced from said farms with micronaire range over and above 3.5.' If in fact the trial court impliedly found, consistent with plaintiffs' pleaded dominant purpose to secure the declaration, that there is no contract requiring plaintiffs to deliver the cotton Molsen demanded, then plaintiffs failed in their burden to prove the existence of a contract which could be breached by Molsen.
In cases brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Art. 2524--1, V.A.T.S., it is the 'nature and dominant purpose of the suit,' as shown by the pleadings that control venue. McCurdy v. Morgan, 252 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1952); Garrison v. Morrow, 300 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont, 1957, dis. w.o.j.). As already stated, the nature and dominant purpose of the suit was to enforce appellant's obligation to pay the correct amount of royalties in accordance with the lease.
When he alleged that because of certain acts of the appellant, or failure to act, the appellee's profits from such coverriding royalty interest had been lessened, he alleged injury and damage to appellee's interest in that land. We hold that this pleading alleged a suit for damages to land, on the authority of Frost v. Standard Oil Co. of Kansas, Tex.Civ.App., 107 S.W.2d 1037; Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Monroe, Tex.Civ.App., 129 S.W.2d 454. The trial court did not err therefore in holding that Subsection 14 of Article 1995 applied and was correct in overruling appellant's plea of privilege.' See also McCurdy v. Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 252 S.W.2d 264, which was a declaratory judgment case; and Liles v. McDonald, Tex.Civ.App., 63 S.W.2d 886, which was a suit to cancel a royalty deed allegedly procured by fraud. In both cases Subdivision 14 was held to control the matter of venue.
Although this is a suit for declaratory judgment to construe a will it is similar to a suit to quiet title or to remove cloud from title. McCurdy v. Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 252 S.W.2d 264. If appellee has the right to convey fee title Kalmbach, as purchaser in the contract of sale, has an equitable title in the property dating from the execution of the contract.
Appellants say that said statement is dicta and is not controlling here. They say that the holding in Smith v. Rampy is not in point; that it was a suit by Rampy against Smith and other to recover damages for breach of contract and in trespass to try title; that the contract alleged to have been breached was held not to constitute a partnership; that under the contract Smith was to receive an interest in production only if production were obtained; that production was not obtained and therefore Smith never had any title to support an action of trespass to try title and, therefore, the suit was only to recover damages. Appellants cite McCurdy v. Morgan et al., Tex.Civ.App., 252 S.W.2d 264, wherein it was held that the mere fact that a suit was for a declaratory judgment did not prevent it from being a suit to recover land under Section 14, Article 1995. We agree with this holding.
In cases brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, as this one was, it is the 'nature and dominant purpose of the suit, as shown by the petition,' that controls venue. McCurdy v. Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 252 S.W.2d 264, 266. And, as already stated, this is essentially a suit "for the recovery of land" and, in effect, one "to quiet title to the land."