Summary
In McCully v. McCully, 175 Miss. 876, 168 So. 608, the Court's attention was not addressed to and did not discuss what should appear on the probated account, but its attention was addressed to and it discussed, in this connection, only when the statute of limitations begins to run on a claim of this character, which it correctly held was at the death of the person whose estate was sought to be held liable therefor.
Summary of this case from TALBERT v. ELLZEY ET ALOpinion
No. 32118.
May 25, 1936.
1. INSANE PERSONS.
Insane person or his estate is legally obligated to pay for necessities furnished such person in good faith under circumstances justifying their being furnished.
2. INSANE PERSONS.
Wants of insane person which are personal to body and mind are "necessaries" within rule requiring insane person or his estate to pay for necessaries furnished him in good faith.
3. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
Where relatives, who received aged insane aunt into their home, obligated themselves to support aunt indefinitely, without fixed time for payment therefor, statute of limitations did not commence to run against relatives' claim against aunt's estate until aunt's death.
4. INSANE PERSONS.
Relatives who received aged insane aunt into their home, and thereafter supported and cared for aunt, held entitled to reimbursement from aunt's estate, upon her death, for taxes paid by relatives on aunt's property as well as for board, nursing, clothing, care, and attention.
APPEAL from chancery court of Winston county. HON. T.P. GUYTON, Chancellor.
W.A. Strong, Jr., of Louisville, for appellants.
As to appellee's contention that this claim is barred by the statute of limitations, the record conclusively shows by the testimony of every witness introduced that the appellants furnished the deceased board, lodging and clothing, did her washing and nursed her from year to year expecting to be compensated for same at the death of the said Fannie Cooper for the reason that the said Fannie Cooper owned no property of any kind except said four hundred and eighty acres of land which was only worth fifteen hundred dollars and for the further reason that the said Fannie Cooper was insane and had no guardian from March 15, 1921, until December 1, 1932.
Those having reasonable and fairly well substantiated claims for board or services furnished a decedent should not be treated with any less consideration before our courts than others.
Tarver v. Lindsey, 137 So. 93.
It is well settled that the executed contract of an insane person for necessaries stands on the footing of a similar contract by an infant, and that an insane person is liable for necessaries furnished to him in good faith, and under circumstances justifying their being furnished.
14 R.C.L. 586; 32 C.J. 739, sec. 523.
A claim against the estate of a near relative for board, lodging, and services should be allowed if supported by a contract, either expressed or implied.
Gaulden v. Ramsey, 85 So. 109; Tarver v. Lindsey, 137 So. 93.
When compensation for services is not to be made until a certain date or the happening of a certain event, full compensation may be recovered by law for all services performed prior to that date, as the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the time so fixed.
Ellis v. Berry, 110 So. 211; Gaulden v. Ramsey, 85 So. 109; Whitehead v. Kirk, 61 So. 737, 62 So. 433.
We respectfully submit to the court that the payment of taxes falls within the same rule as the payment of other necessities, especially is this true in the case at bar for the reason that the record shows that the appellants, Susie and Arthur McCully, are only charging the estate with six hundred ninety dollars for taxes paid by them on the lands belonging to the deceased and they charge themselves with two thousand sixty-three dollars and fifty cents which they realized from the sale of timber and agricultural products during the period of approximately eleven years that the deceased lived with appellants, which shows that the payments of these taxes was of a great advantage and benefit to the said deceased and equity and good conscience would require that they be reimbursed for the payment of same.
We respectfully submit that the payment of taxes should be charged against the estate, but if this is not true, then certainly the taxes should be charged against the revenues derived from the lands of the deceased as the taxes were necessary expenses incurred in preserving the estate in order to realize any revenue for same.
The record in the case now before this honorable court conclusively shows that the implied contract upon which appellants base their claim was a continuous one from year to year with no time fixed for its termination except the death of the said Fannie Cooper and therefore the statute of limitations was inoperative until the termination of the contract, which was the death of the said Fannie Cooper which occurred on the first day of December, 1932, and appellants filed their claim on the thirteenth day of August, 1935, two years and nine months after the death of the said Fannie Cooper, and was approximately five months after an administrator qualified for her estate. We most earnestly insist that no part of appellants' claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
Gaulden v. Ramsey, 85 So. 109; Gulfport Fertilizer Co. v. McMurphy, 75 So. 113.
Z.A. Brantley, of Louisville, for appellee.
We call to the court's attention that this is a case in which the appellants failed to make out their case and the chancellor had all the facts both for the claimants and the objectors and after hearing all the facts found against the claimants and in favor of the objectors, and we further state to the court that the chancellor could not have found otherwise from the record in this case. The testimony discloses that the appellants and the present administrator being brothers and sisters had charge of four hundred and eighty acres of land belonging to the said Fannie Cooper, deceased, worked said lands and sold all the timber therefrom and applied proceeds to their personal use and now ask this court to give them the proceeds of the sale of the lands to the exclusion of all the other heirs.
To render an insane person liable for necessaries they must have been furnished with intent to charge therefor and not as a mere gratuity.
32 C.J. 739, sec. 523.
The right to recover for necessaries has been denied where the insane person resides as a member of his family with the person who seeks to collect for benefits conferred upon him.
14 R.C.L. 586, sec. 41.
A person who voluntarily pays taxes assessed on the lands of another in which he has no interest to protect will not be subrogated to the lien of the government, in the absence of an agreement for subrogation. Thus a person advancing money to an owner of land for the payment of a tax or assessment against the land is not entitled to subrogation to the lien of the tax or assessment.
25 R.C.L. 1367, sec. 49.
This is dealing with a sane person and it seems to us that it would be much stronger when one paid taxes for a person who is insane and could not object to the payment.
25 R.C.L. 1369, sec. 51; Section 2290, Code of 1930.
We also call the court's attention to the case of Lovize v. Lynch, 115 Miss. 694, 76 So. 629, dealing with the very question here involved. We think this decision absolutely settles this entire case.
We do not concede that any part of the claim of the appellants herein should be allowed but under no stretch of the imagination can the claimants be awarded any part of their claim unless it is from August 15, 1932, until December 1, 1932, being three and one-half months at thirty-five dollars per month or the sum of one hundred twenty-two dollars and fifty cents and in addition thereto the items of taxes listed for the year 1932 in the sum of seventy dollars making total of one hundred ninety-two dollars and fifty cents and this item depends upon the date of the receipt covering the taxes for 1932, which original receipt is in the hands of the Supreme Court.
In December, 1932, Fannie Cooper died intestate, and some time thereafter F.D. McCully qualified as administrator of her estate. An account probated against her estate by the appellants was contested by persons interested therein, and the account was disallowed.
Fannie Cooper was insane and almost physically helpless. In 1921 the appellants received her into their home and thereafter supported and cared for her. She owned a tract of land from which a small revenue was derived. The taxes on this land were paid by the appellants.
The probated account sets forth a monthly charge of thirty-five dollars a month for board, nursing, clothing, care, and attention (which the evidence discloses is reasonable), and the taxes paid on the land, and was credited with the revenue derived from the land. The evidence does not disclose that the account should be credited with more than appears credited thereon. Fannie Cooper was an aunt of the appellants, and they were among her legal heirs. The appellants, not being competent witnesses, did not testify, but the evidence discloses, without conflict therein, that, when they received Fannie Cooper into their home and commenced to support her, they were under the impression, as were also several others of Fannie Cooper's heirs, with whom they entered into an agreement, that by doing so the appellants would be entitled thereby to receive the land as compensation for this support.
One of the objections to the probated account is that part of it is barred by the statute of limitations.
As Fannie Cooper was insane, no express promise of hers to compensate the appellants for supporting her was offered. Nevertheless, they are entitled to such compensation, for an obligation is imposed by law on an insane person, or his estate, to pay for necessaries furnished him in good faith under circumstances justifying their being furnished. 32 C.J. 739, 14 R.C.L. 586; Fitzgerald v. Reed, 9 Smedes M. 94; Gross v. Jones, 89 Miss. 44, 42 So. 802. This obligation is the same as that imposed on an infant. Wants of an insane person, or of an infant, that are personal to body and mind, are necessaries within this rule. The only question that could be said to be open in this connection is whether the taxes here paid on Fannie Cooper's land are also within it. In Epperson v. Nugent, 57 Miss. 45, 34 Am. Rep. 434, the payment of a fee to an attorney who had represented an infant, without a guardian, in a litigation, thereby preserving the infant's estate, was held to be within the rule. The same reason for holding the payment of taxes here to be within it applies with equal, if not greater, force; for, had the taxes not been paid, the land might have been lost to Fannie Cooper, and her only source of revenue thereby destroyed. Cf. Woolbert v. Lee Lumber Co., 151 Miss. 56, 117 So. 354.
It cannot be here said that the appellants supported Fannie Cooper without any intention of charging her therefor. They expected to be compensated out of her estate by becoming the owners thereof at her death. It is manifest, therefore, that they did not intend to support her without compensation therefor; and the fact that they expected to, but cannot, obtain the land itself as compensation for her support, should not bar them from being paid therefor of its proceeds.
A portion of the account would be barred by limitation if the period therefor began on each item as and when it was supplied. But such is not the case. The obligation assumed by the appellants when they received Fannie Cooper into their home was to continuously support her, with no time fixed for the termination thereof or for payment therefor. The statute of limitations, therefore, did not begin to run until the termination of that implied contract, which, here, was at her death. Gaulden v. Ramsey, 123 Miss. 1, 85 So. 109; 37 C.J. 853. This includes the payment of taxes which were paid as a contribution to the support and maintenance of Fannie Cooper.
The decree of the court below will be reversed, and a decree will be rendered here approving the account as probated, and the cause will be remanded.
Reversed and remanded.