Benjamin v. McConnell, 9 Ill. 536 (1847); see also Cummings v. Illinois, 50 Ill. 132 (1869) (party suing joint and several obligors must choose to sue all or only one, not an intermediate number). Cf. McCullough v. Schuberth, 79 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Ill.App.Ct. 1948) (noting abolition of "sue one or sue all" rule). This severity was a particular concern for joint tortfeasors.
( Pease v. Chicago Crayon (1908), 235 Ill. 391, 85 N.E. 619.) Where objection to nonjoinder of parties is not made until the final stage of a proceeding, it will receive little favor, and in such case, to be of avail, it must appear that decree or order will have the effect of depriving the party omitted of some material right without a hearing. ( McCullough v. Schuberth (1948), 334 Ill. App. 333, 79 N.E.2d 754; see also Boddiker v. McPartlin (1942), 379 Ill. 567, 41 N.E.2d 756; Chicago, Burlington Quincy R.R. Co. v. Commerce Commission ex rel. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (1936), 364 Ill. 213, 4 N.E.2d 96.) However, as the statute points out, consideration of objections is within the sound discretion of the court hearing the matter.
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, sec. 24 (1959). [8, 9] Where an objection of nonjoinder of a necessary party is first raised after judgment, it will be denied unless such denial will have the effect of depriving the party omitted of material rights without a hearing, Boddiker v. McPartlin, 379 Ill. 567, 41 N.E.2d 756; McCullough v. Schuberth, 334 Ill. App. 333, 79 N.E.2d 754, or unless the interest of the omitted party in the subject matter of the suit is so interconnected with the interests of the other parties that his presence is an absolute necessity. Oglesby v. Springfield Marine Bank, 385 Ill. 414, 52 N.E.2d 1000; Gulick v. Hamilton, 287 Ill. 367, 122 N.E. 537. Royal's presence as a party was not at all necessary to a determination of this suit. The rights of defendant were in no way prejudiced by Royal's absence. Defendant did not claim that it had made any payment to Royal or that it had in any way made any deal with Royal involving the claim which plaintiff here makes.
Since she could bring actions against the defendants seriatim, or at the same time in separate suits, she is entitled to join them in a single action, introduce all her proof, and submit the entire case to the jury under appropriate instructions. See Swift Co. v. Dollahan, 2 Ill. App.2d 574, 595; McCullough v. Schuberth, 334 Ill. App. 333, 336; see also Freeman v. Regan, 332 Ill. App. 637, 651. [17] Kopmann contends he was prejudiced because Counts I and IV were submitted together to the jury, in that the jury was confused by plaintiff's inconsistent positions as to liability.
Wanless v. Peabody Coal Co., 294 Ill. App. 401, 408; Moreen v. Estate of Carlson, supra; Anderson v. Biesman Carrick Co., supra. This is not to say, however, that a plaintiff may not be required to elect between inconsistent counts such as for example as where plaintiff's cause of action depends upon an election of remedies, such as between rescission of a contract on the one hand and affirmance thereof on the other. McCullough v. Schuberth, 334 Ill. App. 333, 336. But that is not the case here.