So long as the lines are compatible with road traffic they are viewed simply as adaptations of traditional highway uses made because of changing technology: United States v. Oklahoma Gas Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 206, 209, 63 S.Ct. 534, 535, 87 L.Ed. 716, 719 (1943) (applying Oklahoma law); Mountain States Tel. Tel. Co. v. Kelly, 93 Idaho 226, 459 P.2d 349 (1969); Mall v. C W Rural Elec. Coop. Ass'n, 168 Kan. 518, 213 P.2d 993, 996 (1950); Hall v. Lea County Elec. Coop., 78 N.M. 792, 438 P.2d 632, 635 (1968); In re Grand River Dam Auth., 484 P.2d 505, 512-13 (1971); Lay v. State Rural Elec. Auth., 188 S.C. 32, 188 S.E. 368, 370 (S.C. 1936); McCullough v. Interstate Power Light Co., 163 Wn. 147, 300 P. 165, 166 (1931). The easement acquired by the public in a highway includes every reasonable means for the transmission of intelligence, the conveyance of persons, and the transportation of commodities which the advance of civilization may render suitable for a highway.

In the instant proceeding there was condemned and taken the entire fee simple of the land constituting the street; that is to say, the underlying fee of the adjoining property owners, the right of way in the street belonging to the county, which comprises every right in the street including the right to give franchises for the erection and support of such power line poles and wires as those of the appellee. McCullough v. Interstate Power Light Co., 163 Wn. 147, 300 P. 165 (electric power line); Brandt v. Spokane I.E.R. Co., 78 Wn. 214, 138 P. 871, 52 L.R.A., N.S., 760 (power line to service electric powered street railway). The amount of damages awarded is not controverted by appellant.

Cater v. Northwestern Telephone Exchange Co., 60 Minn. 539, 546, 63 N.W. 111 (1895) ("No such structures [as telephone and telegraph lines] can be put in the highways except by authority of the state, and then only for a public use."); Vertex Holdings, LLC v. Cranke, 217 P.3d 120, 126 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008) ("[A] private use of [a public road] easement is … an additional servitude requiring consent of and compensation to parties owning the fee interest below the roadway."); 46 S. 52nd St. Corp. v. Manlin, 398 Pa. 304, 314, 157 A.2d 381 (1960) ("[A] purely private use of the public highway with no reasonable benefit to the public generally not only may be prevented by the municipality, but is not even permissible."); McCullough v. Interstate Power & Light Co., 163 Wash. 147, 150, 300 P. 165 (1931) (holding transmission of electricity for distribution among consumers is a public use and proper use of highway, and noting that jurisdictions that held transmission of electricity was not proper use of highway did so because those jurisdictions did not consider it a public use); Hark, 127 W. Va. at 595, 34 S.E.2d 348 ("A public easement lawfully acquired cannot be broadened to include a private and exclusive right."). Nelson believes that two Kansas Supreme Court decisions undercut this conclusion.

By analogy to cases involving public highways, installation of fiber optic cable along a railroad right of way is an incidental use that imposes no additional burden on the servient estate. See McCullough v. Interstate Power Light Co., 163 Wash. 147, 148, 150-51, 300 P. 165 (1931) (installation along public highways of poles and wires for carrying electricity is an incidental use for public highways and poses no additional burden on servient estate). Fiber optic cable lines have an element of public benefit, and their installation is not inconsistent with the public use to which railroad rights of way are dedicated.

"The restrictions upon its use are only such as are calculated to secure to the general public the largest practicable benefit from the enjoyment of the easement, and the inconveniences must be submitted to [by abutting owners] when they are only such as are incident to a reasonable use under impartial regulations." State ex rel. York, 184 P.2d at 581-84 ( quoting 4 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 1437 (2nd ed.); McCullough v. Interstate Power Light Co., 163 Wn. 147, 300 P. 165, 166 (1931); and Omaha Council Bluffs St. Ry. Co. v. City of Omaha, 114 Neb. 483, 208 N.W. 123, 124 (1926)). [¶ 20] It must be remembered that every member of the public has the right to use a public easement for its intended purposes, and that public road easements, unless otherwise restricted, include the secondary rights described herein.

Id. (citing Fisher, 658 P.2d at 129; Carter v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 63 N.W. 111, 112-113 (Minn. 1895); McCullough v. Interstate Power Light Co., 300 P. 165, 166 (Wash. 1931)). The Florida court was persuaded:

x v. Hinton, 84 W. Va. 239, 99 S.E. 478; Frazier v. East Tenn. Tel. Co., 115 Tenn. 416, 90 S.W. 620; Friscoville Realty Co. v. Police Jury, 127 La. 318, 53 So. 578; Hall v. C. W. Rural Elec. Coop. Assn., Inc., 213 P.2d 993; Hershfield v. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 12 Mont. 102, 29 P. 883; Hobbs v. Long Distance Tel. Tel. Co., 147 Ala. 393, 41 So. 1003; Irwin v. Great So. Tel. Co., 37 La. Ann. 63; Johnson v. City of Chattanooga, 191 S.W.2d 175; Jones v. Dallas Ry. Co. (Tex.), 224 S.W. 807; Julia Bldg. Corp. v. Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo. 258, 57 Am. Rep. 398; Karcher v. Wheeling Elec. Co., 94 W. Va. 278, 118 S.E. 155, 30 A.L.R. 1044; Kentucky W. Va. Power Co. v. Crawford, 229 Ky. 254, 16 S.W.2d 1041; Kirby v. Citizens Tel. Co., 17 S.D. 362, 97 N.W. 3; Lay v. State Rural Elec. Authority, 182 S.C. 32, 188 S.E. 368; Leppard v. Central Caro. Tel. Co., 205 S.C. 1, 30 S.E.2d 755; Loeber v. Butte Gen. Elec. Co., 16 Mont. 1, 39 P. 912; McCann v. Johnson County Tel. Co., 69 Kan. 210, 76 P. 870; McCullough v. Interstate Power Light Co., 163 Wn. 147, 300 P. 165; Nazworthy v. Illinois Oil Corp., 176 Okla. 37, 54 P.2d 642; Northeastern Tel. Tel. Co. v. Boston Terminal Co., 182 Mass. 397; Ober v. City of Minneapolis, 179 Minn. 495, 229 N.W. 794; Paquet v. Mt. Tabor Street Ry. Co., 18 Oregon 233, 22 P. 906; People v. Eaton, 100 Mich. 208, 59 N.W. 145; Roaring Springs Townsite Co. v. Paducah Tel. Co., 109 Tex. 452, 212 S.W. 147; Rugg v. Tel. Co., 66 Vt. 208, 28 A. 1036; Scranton-Pascagoula Realty Co. v. Pascagoula, supra; Snyder v. Ft. Madison St. Ry. Co., 105 Iowa 284, 75 N.W. 179, 41 L.R.A. 385; Stanolind Pipeline Co. v. Winford, 176 Okla. 47, 54 P.2d 645; State v. Murphy, 134 Mo. 548, 31 S.W. 784; State v. Walla Walla County, 184 P.2d 577; State v. Weber, 88 Kan. 175, 127 P. 536; Telegraph Co. v. Bullard, 65 Vt. 334, 27 A. 322; United Elec. Light Co. v. Baliso Constr. Co., 315 Mass. 313, 52 N.E.2d 553; United States v. Oklahoma Gas Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 206, 87 L.Ed. 716. III. An abutting owner of residential urban property may not lawfully c

A power line across a road right-of-way is not an additional burden for which compensation is allowable to the adjoining landowner. McCullough v. Interstate Power Light Co., 163 Wn. 147, 300 P. 165; Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich. 212, 22 Am. Rep. 522; Omaha Council Bluffs St. R. Co. v. City of Omaha, 114 Neb. 483, 208 N.W. 123; Query v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 178 N.C. 639, 101 S.E. 330, 8 A.L.R. 1290, 1293; State ex rel. York v. Walla Walla County (Wash.), 172 A.L.R. 1001; 25 Am. Jur., Highways, Sec. 171 p. 466; Vol. I, Elliott's Roads and Streets (4th ed.), pp. 495, 559; Vol. IV (Revised), McQuillin on Municipal Corporations (2d ed.), Sec. 1437 p. 134.

". . . includes every reasonable means for the transmission of intelligence, the conveyance of persons, and the transportation of commodities which the advance of civilization may render suitable for a highway." McCullough v. Interstate Power Light Co., 163 Wn. 147, 300 P. 165. "The restrictions upon its use are only such as are calculated to secure to the general public the largest practicable benefit from the enjoyment of the easement, and the inconveniences must be submitted to when they are only such as are incident to a reasonable use under impartial regulations."

The very nature of the business of furnishing electric energy determines that the use to which the condemned property is to be put is a public one. Under our present way of living, electricity is essentially necessary in order to enable our citizens to carry on their every day activities and pursue their accustomed manner of living. State ex rel. Chelan Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 142 Wn. 270, 253 P. 115, 58 A.L.R. 779; Brady v. Tacoma, 145 Wn. 351, 259 P. 1089; McCullough v. Interstate Power Light Co., 163 Wn. 147, 300 P. 165; State ex rel. Willapa Electric Co. v. Superior Court, supra. The judgments of the trial court are correct, and its orders of public use and necessity are affirmed.