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dismissing appeal of temporary restraining order because it is generally not appealable
Summary of this case from Smith v. Midfirst BankOpinion
No. 10-08-00005-CV
Opinion delivered and filed July 30, 2008.
Appeal from the 413th District Court, Johnson County, Texas, Trial Court No. C2007000683.
Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. sued Rose McCullough, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Devon obtained a November 19, 2007 temporary restraining order against McCullough but, before seeking and obtaining a temporary injunction, nonsuited its case. McCullough appeals.
McCullough filed a counterclaim after the filing of Devon's nonsuit; it thus was not pending at the time of the nonsuit. See BHP Petroleum Co. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838, 840-41 (Tex. 1990); TEX. R. CIV. P. 96, 162.
McCullough appears to be appealing the TRO. The only other order in the record is the order granting Devon's nonsuit, which, ipso facto, McCullough cannot appeal.
A temporary restraining order is generally not appealable. See In re Nat. Resources Conservation Comm'n, 85 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Tex. 2002). We therefore notified McCullough that unless she identified an appealable order or judgment and showed grounds for continuing the appeal, we would dismiss it for want of jurisdiction. She has filed a response, but it fails to identify an appealable order or to explain why the TRO in this case is appealable. Because the TRO entered on Devon's nonsuited petition is not appealable, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See id.; TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
We also deny McCullough's many requests for appointment of counsel because of her indigence. There is no right to appointed counsel in a civil case such as this one. See Gibson v. Tolbert, 102 S.W.3d 710, 712-13 (Tex. 2003). All other pending motions are dismissed as moot.