Conversely, when the custodial statements are a result of interrogation (or conversation designed to elicit a response) by an agent of law enforcement, such statements are inadmissible unless the accused received a Miranda warning prior to questioning. Lewis v. State, 1998 OK CR 24, ¶ 37, 970 P.2d 1158, 1171; McCaulley v. State, 1988 OK CR 25, ¶ 9, 750 P.2d 1124, 1127; McCubbin v. State, 1984 OK CR 37, ¶ 16, 675 P.2d 461, 465-66. ¶ 9
private citizens. McCubbin v. State, 1984 OK CR 37, ¶ 16, 675 P.2d 461, 465. It is only when the State actively engages in prior arrangements with an informer to obtain desired information in contravention of constitutionally protected rights that the sanction of suppression of the evidence is applied. Id. Second, Ms. Holt's testimony was cumulative.
To my view, the trial court acted appropriately when it refused to permit this and ruled that under these circumstances the defendant's prior statement that he was present at the scene when the murder was committed would be admissible for the narrow purpose of contradicting the alibi. See, e.g., St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 217, 7 L.Ed.2d 240, 82 S.Ct. 289 (1961); United States v. Brandom, 479 F.2d 830, 835 (8th Cir. 1973); FTC v. Dilger, 276 F.2d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 1960); McCubbin v. State, 675 P.2d 461, 465 (Okla.Crim.App. 1984). I would not countenance allowing alibi testimony of this nature to go uncontradicted by the defendant's own words.
We agree that the exclusionary rule based on constitutional considerations, was not impacted in this case. McCubbin v. State, 675 P.2d 461 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Hayes v. State, 667 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. App. 1996); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1995). However, Garner argues that section 415.504(4)(c)3, required DeFilippo to advise him of his right to an attorney and warn him his statements could be used against him in proceedings brought by the Department to protect abused children.
In support of his proposition, he cites Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964) and United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980). He also directs our attention to McCubbin v. State, 675 P.2d 461 (Okla. Cr. 1984). The principles established by these cases are not applicable in the present case.
Moreover, the voluntary statements made by the appellant to the news woman, who was a private citizen, are not protected by the exclusionary rule. See McCubbin v. State, 675 P.2d 461, 465 (Okla. Cr. 1984). Insofar as trial counsel elicited testimony concerning the weapons seized during appellant's arrest, the objectionable evidence was cumulative and we cannot say that it was verdict determinative on this record. See Mahorney v. State, 664 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Okla. Cr. 1983). Nor can we say that the appellant was unfairly prejudiced by the admission of the fingerprint card.