Opinion
8:22-cv-01477-BHH-JDA
05-22-2023
James Roosevelt McCray, Plaintiff, v. Shepherd, Associate Warden, Defendant.[1]
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment and Plaintiff's motions to amend/correct the Complaint. [Docs. 45; 49; 55.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action in May 5, 2002, asserting a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. 1.] Defendant filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on October 6, 2022. [Doc. 45.] The next day, the Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the summary judgment/dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. [Doc. 46.] Plaintiff's response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment was entered on the docket on October 24, 2022. [Doc. 48.] On October 28, 2022, and December 5, 2022, Plaintiff filed motions to amend the Complaint. [Docs. 49; 55.] Defendant filed responses in opposition to Plaintiff's motions, and Plaintiff filed a supplement and additional attachments. [Docs. 51; 56; 59; 62.] The motions are ripe for review.
A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). Accordingly, this action was filed on May 5, 2022. [Doc. 1-2 at 1 (envelope marked as received by the prison mailroom on May 5, 2022).]
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint related to the sole remaining Defendant in this case, Associate Warden Shepherd. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff originally named four Defendants in this action. [Id. at 2-3.] However, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Defendants Francisco Collazo and MajorSecurity Home [Doc. 18], and the Court dismissed Defendant South Carolina Department of Corrections [Docs. 23; 57].
Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of former-Defendant South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). [Doc. 1 at 2, 5.] At the time he filed the Complaint, Plaintiff was housed at Lieber Correctional Institution [id. at 2]; however, Plaintiff has since changed institutions and is currently housed at Broad River Correctional Institution [Docs. 41; 44 (most recent notices of change of address)].
Plaintiff alleges he was stabbed by his roommate on September 3, 2021, and then he requested protective custody. [Doc. 1 at 5.] Plaintiff contends that Defendant “violate[d] [his] protective concern[s]” when he “put her name on” his protective concern and she “was the chairperson at [his] protective concern hearing on 10/18/21.” [Id.]
Plaintiff contends he has been in lock up since September 4, 2021, with no disciplinary charge to be placed in restrictive detention. [Doc. 1 at 6.]
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant denied his request for protective custody “because she was involved.” [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff requests “justice,” that his time be dismissed or shortened, and money damages. [Id. at 6.]
Plaintiff alleges that his injuries result from being stabbed by his roommate seven times on September 3 through 4, 2021, and from being struck in the face by former Defendant Collazo on March 2, 2022. [Id.] Plaintiff also contends that he has back pain from force that was used “in the wrong way” in February 2022. [Id.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
Some of the claims in this action are asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin[ ] by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Motion to Dismiss Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Lab'ys, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court “need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts” nor “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may rely on only the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cnty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
With respect to well-pleaded allegations, the United States Supreme Court explained the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citations omitted); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) (“[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than a bare averment that the pleader wants compensation and is entitled to it or a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action.”).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. The plausibility standard reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)-the pleader must plead sufficient facts to show he is entitled to relief, not merely facts consistent with the defendant's liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”'” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). Accordingly, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
Motion to Amend Standard
A party may amend its pleading once before trial as a matter of course “21 days after serving it, or . . . if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). “In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). “The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. “A district court may deny a motion to amend when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, the moving party has acted in bad faith, or the amendment would be futile.” Equal Rights Ctr. v. Niles Bolton Assocs., 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 2010); see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (noting that leave to amend may be denied for “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.”).
DISCUSSION
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment
Defendant argues, in part, that the Complaint fails to state a claim against her. [Doc. 45 at 1, 8-9.] The Court agrees.
As stated, Plaintiff's sole allegation against Defendant is that she “violate[d] [his] protective concern[s]” when she was the chairperson at his protective custody hearing but her name was also on his protective concern form as someone involved. [Doc. 1 at 5; see also Doc. 1-1 at 2.] From the allegations in the Complaint, it is not entirely clear what constitutional right Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated. To the extent he claims that Defendant violated his right to protective custody, “[p]risoners have no right under the Constitution to be held in either protective or minimum custody.” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). Therefore, Plaintiff's constitutional rights were not violated when he was denied protective custody.
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff's allegations can be construed as claiming that Defendant failed to comply with prison policy and therefore deprived him of his due process rights, his claim is without merit. Violations of state prison policies cannot support a due process claim. See Burnett v. McKie, No. 9:17-cv-01582-MGL, 2018 WL 783653, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 8, 2018). Further, Plaintiff has failed to identify any implicated property or liberty interest to support a due process claim; nor has he alleged facts showing the conditions of his confinement after he was denied protective custody constitute an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. As the Fourth Circuit has explained,
“To state a procedural due process [claim], a plaintiff must [first] identify a protected liberty or property interest and [then] demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law.” Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). Put differently, a prisoner claiming a violation of his right to procedural due process must show: (1) that there is a “state statute, regulation, or policy [that] creates such a liberty interest,” and (2) that “the denial of such an interest ‘imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.'” Id. at 248-49 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 . . . (1995)). An inmate who fails to satisfy these two requirements “cannot ‘invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.'” Id. at 248 (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 . . . (1976)).Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 253 (4th Cir. 2017) (most alterations in original). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible due process claim because he has failed to allege facts to satisfy either requirement of a due process claim.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's failure to place him in protective custody violated his Eighth Amendment rights, he has failed to state a claim for relief. Corrections officers have “a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners” because “[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 834 (1994) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Inmates also “have an Eighth Amendment right to be protected from malicious attacks, not just by other inmates, but also from the very officials tasked with ensuring their security.” Thompson v. Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 109 (4th Cir. 2017). However, “not every injury suffered by a prisoner at the hands of another translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety.” Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, for liability to attach, a plaintiff must satisfy a two-part test consisting of both an objective and a subjective inquiry.
First, the plaintiff “must show that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the plaintiff must show that the prison official had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which, in this context, consists of “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 133. The prison official must “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “[A] factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. In the end, “the test is whether the [prison officials] know the plaintiff inmate faces a serious danger to his safety and they could avert the danger easily yet they fail to do so.” Brown v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, because the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was stabbed by his roommate on September 3, 2021, before his October 18th protective custody hearing, nothing in the Complaint alleges that Defendant would have known at the time Plaintiff was stabbed that his roommate posed any particular threat to Plaintiff. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was aware that Collazo posed a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff before Collazo struck Plaintiff in the face [see Doc. 1 at 6 (indicating that Plaintiff “put LT Collaz[o] on [his] protective concerns back in 10/18/21”)], the Complaint's allegations are insufficient to permit a reasonable inference that Defendant had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff and disregarded that risk, cf. China v. Marksberry, No. 5:13-cv-00091-JMC, 2014 WL 4402806, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 4, 2014) (“The mere fact that [the defendant] knew about [the plaintiff's] allegations through a grievance and denied that grievance . . . does not demonstrate he was aware of a ‘pervasive and unreasonable risk' requiring him to act or else be held liable.”). Plaintiff's allegations are too conclusory to state a failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment. As such, Defendant's motion should be granted and the Complaint should be dismissed.
Additionally, even if the Court were to consider evidence beyond the pleadings and treat Defendant's motion as one for summary judgment, the summary judgment record includes Plaintiff's protective custody forms, which show that Plaintiff listed Defendant and Collazo as employees involved on his protective concerns evaluation form. [Doc. 48-1 at 2.] His inmate voluntary statement, signed the same day as the protective concerns evaluation form, provides further information about these employees' involvement. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff's allegations of their involvement in the incident leading to his protective custody request are that they “took [his] weapon[]s before [he] move[d] in the room with” his roommate who stabbed him. [Id.] An allegation that Collazo took away Plaintiff's weapons in prison is not enough to establish that Collazo posed any substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff to survive summary judgment on a failure-to-protect claim. Moreover, the protective concerns evaluation form shows that Defendant approved Plaintiff's request to remain separated from his roommate who had stabbed him. [Id. at 2.] Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant responded unreasonably to any risk of harm to Plaintiff. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (“[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk.”). For these reasons, Defendant would be entitled to summary judgment if the Court were to treat the motion as one for summary judgment.
Likewise, to the extent Plaintiff asserts that Defendant denied Plaintiff's protective custody request in retaliation for her name being included on his protective custody form, Plaintiff's allegations are too conclusory to state a retaliation claim. See Adams, 40 F.3d at 74-75 (holding that a plaintiff must allege specific facts supporting a retaliation claim and that bare assertions of retaliation are insufficient to state a claim); Joyner v. Patterson, No. 0:13-cv-2675-DCN, 2014 WL 3909531, at *7 (D.S.C. Aug. 11, 2014) (summarily dismissing a retaliation claim and noting that the plaintiff had provided nothing more than bare assertions and speculation that an action was retaliatory but that such naked allegations were insufficient).
Additionally, because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendant violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Defendant is also entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-66 (2014) (stating that for qualified immunity to attach to a defendant, either the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff fail to demonstrate the violation of a constitutional right and/or the right was not clearly established at the time of the violation). Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed for the reasons stated, the Court declines to address Defendant's remaining arguments.
Plaintiff's Motions to Amend/Correct the Complaint
In his motions to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to add Bryan P. Stirling, SCDC's director, as a defendant in this case. [Docs. 49; 55; see also Docs. 56; 62.] However, as Defendant argues, Plaintiff has failed to provide any substantive argument or allegations regarding why Stirling should be added as a defendant, nor has Plaintiff provided a proposed amended complaint. [Docs. 51 at 1-2; 59 at 1.] The Court finds that amendment to add Stirling as a defendant would be futile because Plaintiff appears to want to add Stirling as a defendant by virtue of his position as director of SCDC rather than because of any personal involvement by Stirling with respect to Plaintiff. [See Docs. 49 at 1 (stating that “the person who is liable for defendant['s] action is name[d] ‘Bryan P. Stirling,' [h]e is the agency [d]irector”); 55 at 2 (“Bryan P. Stirling is the director of [SCDC], so it's not doubtful to includ[e] Bryan P. Stirling as a defendant in this case.” (internal quotation mark omitted)); 62 at 1 (“‘Bryan P. Stirling' is the director of [SCDC] and over the defendant ‘Ann Shepherd' who is a[n] employee for ‘Bryan P. Stirling.'”). However, because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 claims, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978), a defendant is liable in his individual capacity only for his personal wrongdoing or supervisory actions that violated constitutional norms, see Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (setting forth elements necessary to establish supervisory liability under § 1983). Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Stirling had actual or constructive knowledge of subordinates engaging in pervasive or widespread conduct that posed a risk of injury to Plaintiff; accordingly, amending the Complaint to add Stirling as a defendant would be futile because it would fail to state a claim against Stirling. See id.
Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff has submitted documents to the Court as an attempt to add allegations regarding incidents that happened after Defendant filed her motion for summary judgment [see Docs. 49-3 at 1 (discussing force allegedly used on Plaintiff on October 24, 2022); 56-1 (grievance form regarding October 24th incident)], allowing Plaintiff to amend his Complaint at this stage of the litigation to add claims unrelated to the original Complaint would be prejudicial to Defendant.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendant's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment [Doc. 45] be GRANTED and that Plaintiff's motions to amend/correct the Complaint [Docs. 49; 55] be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.