November 21, 1972.C.D. Hopkins, Jr., Esq., of Charleston Heights, forAppellant, cities: As to the State's improperly introducingevidence of crimes not charged at a trial and it's being prejudicialerror to allow an alleged victim of an assault andbattery by Defendant to testify as to the assault and batteryupon her person, not charged, while in a neck brace: 247 S.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 709; 191 S.C. 212, 4 S.E.2d 1; 239 S.C. 258, 122 S.E.2d 622. As to the Defendant'sbeing entitled to separate trials on each indictment for separateoffenses committed at or near the same time and placeif prejudicial: 249 S.C. 14, 152 S.E.2d 235. As to theCourt's violating the best evidence rule in allowing evidenceof serial numbers of bills without introduction of bills: 326 S.E.2d 736. As to the mother of accused invalidly consentingon behalf of Defendant for search of son's room andhome: 346 F.2d 915; 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685; 421 F.2d 1186. As to note allegedlywritten by Defendant being improperly allowed in evidencewhen no proof of handwriting of Defendant was submitted: 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934. Messrs. Robert B. Wallace, Sol. and A. Arthur Rosenblum,Asst. Sol., of Charleston, for Respondent, cite: Asto the State's introduction of evidence of crimes not chargedat trial not being prejudicial and allowance of alleged victimof an assault and battery by Defendants to testify as tothe assault and battery upon her person, not charged, whilein a neck brace was not prejudicial: 239 S.C. 258, 122 S.E.2d 622. As to the Defendant's not being entitledto separate trials on each indictment for se
Appellant was retried in 1999; that trial ended in a mistrial when the jury could not agree. This is appellant's third trial. Generally, when offenses charged in separate indictments are of the same general nature involving connected transactions closely related in kind, place, and character, the trial judge has the discretion to order the indictments tried together, but only so long as the defendant's substantive rights are not prejudiced. State v. Sullivan, 277 S.C. 35, 282 S.E.2d 838 (1981); State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290, 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974); McCrary v. State, 249 S.C. 14, 152 S.E.2d 235 (1967). We have found prejudice where the defendant was jointly tried on charges for which the evidence would not otherwise have been admissible under Lyle.
Gen., James C. Anders, Sol., and Dennis Bolt, Asst.Sol., of Columbia, for Appellant, cite: As to the trial court'shaving erred in dismissing indictments for lack of prosecution: 21 Am. Jur.2d Criminal Law, § 517; 69 A.L.R. 240; 263 S.C. 363, 210 S.E.2d 600; 11 Ill. App.3d 1067, 297 N.E.2d 18; 149 Ky. 37, 147 S.W. 767; 119 Tex. 110, 26 S.W.2d 174; 289 A.2d 635; 10 Md. App. 300, 270 A.2d 343; 183 S.C. 188, 190 S.E. 466; 257 S.C. 315, 185 S.E.2d 814; 27 C.J.S., Dismissal and Nonsuit, Section 65 (1)-65 (4); 407 U.S. 514, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Terrell L. Glenn and Thomas H. Pope, III, of Columbia, for Respondent, cite: As to the trial Court's properly havingdismissed the indictments: 301 U.S. 389, 57 S.Ct. 809; 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101; 184 Kan. 297, 335 P.2d 1117; 210 S.C. 324, 42 S.E.2d 531; 304 U.S. 458; 58 S.Ct. 1019; 148 S.C. 419, 146 S.E. 237; 249 S.C. 14, 152 S.E.2d 235; 183 S.C. 188, 190 S.E. 466; 107 S.C. 411, 93 S.E. 124; 230 S.C. 405, 95 S.E.2d 857; 260 S.C. 323, 195 S.E.2d 709; 260 S.C. 1, 193 S.E.2d 802; 262 S.C. 346, 204 S.E.2d 433; 263 S.C. 290, 210 S.E.2d 298; 243 S.C. 187, 133 S.E.2d 210; 247 S.C. 393, 147 S.E.2d 627; United States Constitution, Amendment VI; South Carolina Constitution, Article I, Section 14; Rules; Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 48; Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Rule 4, Section 8; Circuit Court Rules, Rule 27; New Jersey Revised Rules, 3:11-3(a); Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 316; South Carolina Circuit Court Rules, Rule 27; Washington Criminal Rule 8.3(b); California Penal Code, Section 1385; Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 8; Michigan Code of Laws Annotated, Section 767.29; Minnesota Statutes Annotated, Section 631.21; New York Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 671; Ohio Revised Code, Section 2941.
Messrs. David Lyle, Cleve A. Lytle, William C. Spencer, and S. Michael Camp, all of Rock Hill, for Appellant, cite: As to error on part of trial Judge in refusing to try the murdercharge first; and not trying the two cases together: 91 S.C. 29, 74 S.E. 43; 21 Am. Jur.2d 222, 223; 132 S.C. 410, 129 S.E. 629; 249 S.C. 14, 152 S.E.2d 235. As to on motion for directed verdict, the trial Judgeis concerned with existence or non-existence of evidence, notwith its weight: 228 S.C. 324, 89 S.E.2d 924. As toin murder prosecution, wherein defendant alleged insanityat time of slaying then testimony concerning defendant's insanitywas for jury. 231 S.C. 391, 98 S.E.2d 826. Asto error on part of trial Judge in overruling defendantsmotion for continuance on ground that prejudice hadbeen created by an article in the local newspaper quoting inaccurateand inflammatory factual information attributed tothe Sheriff of York County: 240 S.C. 472; 199 F.2d 107, 39 A.L.R.2d 1300; 336 U.S. 440, 453, 69 S.Ct. 716, 723, 93 L.Ed. 790; Note, Controlling Press and Radio Influence on Trials, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 840; Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 885; 338 U.S. 912, 70 S.Ct. 252, 94 L.Ed. 562; 313 U.S. 33, 61 S.Ct. 810, 85 L.Ed. 1172; 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192; 328 U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029, 90
Both versions of the test have a common origin in Chapman. Compare Cutro, 365 S.C. at 374, 618 S.E.2d at 894 (citing McCrary v. State, 249 S.C. 14, 152 S.E.2d 235 (1967), for the test); Smith, 322 S.C. at 109, 470 S.E.2d at 365 (same); and McCrary, 249 S.C. at 36, 152 S.E.2d at 246 (citing Chapman), with Harris, 351 S.C. at 652, 572 S.E.2d at 272 (citing Tucker ); Tucker, 324 S.C. at 164, 478 S.E.2d at 265 (citing Tate ); and Tate, 286 S.C. at 464, 334 S.E.2d at 290 (citing Chapman ). In this case, the trial court applied the test from Harris and made individual findings as to each element. Where appropriate, the trial court explained the factual basis for the finding.
A motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 478 S.E.2d 260 (1996); McCrary v. State, 249 S.C. 14, 152 S.E.2d 235 (1967); State v. Carter, 324 S.C. 383, 478 S.E.2d 86 (Ct.App. 1996); State v. Anderson, 318 S.C. 395, 458 S.E.2d 56 (Ct.App. 1995). The court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Tucker, 324 S.C. at 164, 478 S.E.2d at 265; State v. Prince, 316 S.C. 57, 447 S.E.2d 177 (1993); State v. Deal, 319 S.C. 49, 459 S.E.2d 93 (Ct.App. 1995); see also State v. Harris, Op. No. 25535 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Oct. 14, 2002) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 34 at 32) (stating a motion for severance is addressed to trial court and should not be disturbed unless abuse of discretion is shown).
Where the offenses charged in separate indictments are of the same general nature involving connected transactions closely related in kind, place and character, the trial judge has the power, in his discretion, to order the indictments tried together if the defendant's substantive rights would not be prejudiced. State v. Sullivan, 277 S.C. 35, 282 S.E.2d 838 (1981); State v.Williams, 263 S.C. 290, 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974); McCrary v.State, 249 S.C. 14, 152 S.E.2d 235 (1969). The issue then is whether the denial of appellant's severance motion prejudiced him.
.Ct. 2726; 402 U.S. 183, 91 S. Ct. 1454; 215 S.E.2d 883. Messrs. Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., and Joseph R.Barker, Asst. Atty. Gen., of Columbia, and William W. Wilkins,Jr., Sol., of Greenville, for Respondent, cite: As to theAppellant's sentence of life imprisonment pursuant to Section16-331, Code of Laws of South Carolina of 1962, asamended, not violating the Eighth Amendment's ban oncruel and unusual punishment: 64 S.C. 344, 42 S.E. 173; 12 S.C. 567 32 Am. R. 513; 45 S.C. 483, 23 S.E. 619; 185 S.C. 111, 193 S.E. 924; 218 S.C. 106, 62 S.E.2d 100; 32 S.C. 17, 10 S.E. 772; 217 S.C. 496, 61 S.E.2d 56; 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d 273; 82 S.C. 163, 63 S.E. 688; 131 S.C. 169, 127 S.E. 368; 225 S.C. 89, 80 S.E.2d 918; 257 S.C. 528, 186 S.E.2d 712; 245 S.C. 59, 138 S.E.2d 705; 181 S.C. 482, 188 S.E. 133; 55 S.C. 322, 33 S.E. 370; 142 S.C. 43, 140 S.E. 261; 131 S.C. 357, 127 S.E. 439; 138 S.C. 164, 136 S.E. 391; 35 S.C. 340, 14 S.E. 766; 221 S.C. 399, 70 S.E.2d 632; 257 S.C. 89, 184 S.E.2d 344; 152 S.E.2d 235; 216 S.C. 552, 59 S.E.2d 155; 95 S.C. 114, 78 S.E. 737; 17 S.C. 467, 43 Am. R. 614; 85 S.C. 327, 67 S.E. 306; 29 S.C. 81, 6 S.E. 911; 225 S.C. 418, 82 S.E.2d 804; 42 L.Ed.2d 430; 402 U.S. 183, 203, 28 L.Ed.2d 711, 724, 91 S.Ct. 1454; 397 U.S. 664, 678, 25 L.Ed.2d 697, 706, 90 S.Ct. 1409; 206 U.S. 22, 31, 67 L.Ed.2d 107, 112, 43 S.Ct. 9; 302 U.S. 319, 82 L.Ed. 288, 292, 58 S.Ct. 149; 172 U.S. 303, 43 L.Ed. 456, 19 S.Ct. 212; 333 U.S. 740, 92 L.Ed. 1055, 68 S.Ct. 880; 408 U.S. 400, 33 L.Ed.2d 442; 215 S.E.2d 883; 251 S.C. 379, 162 S.E.2d 712. November 11, 1976.
9; 31A C.J.S., Evidence, § 159; 187 F. (1d) 967; McCormick on Evidence, § 185 at 439 (2d ed., 1972); 263 S.C. 310, 210 S.E.2d 305; 253 S.C. 168, 169 S.E.2d 706; 315 F.2d 467; ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function, §§ 1.1, 5.6(b) and (d); ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge, §§ 1 and 1.1, (Approved Draft, 1972); 207 S.C. 126, 35 S.E.2d 38; 230 S.C. 195, 95 S.E.2d 160; 257 S.C. 225, 185 S.E.2d 360. As to a new trial being required because somejurors had served on the jury at a previous trial of AppellantJames Kennedy: 74 S.C. 460, 55 S.E. 120; 248 S.C. 153, 149 S.E.2d 348; 123 S.C. 50, 115 S.E. 748; 169 S.C. 208, 168 S.E. 546. As to the absence of atranscript of the closing arguments of trial counsel denyingAppellants effective assistance of counsel on appeal: 184 S.C. 90, 192 S.E. 365; 222 S.C. 108, 71 S.E.2d 793; 55 S.Ct. 629, 295 U.S. 78; 160 S.C. 111, 158 S.E. 151; 229 S.C. 614, 93 S.E.2d 889; 63 S.Ct. 561, 318 U.S. 236; 463 F.2d 934; 504 F.2d 185; 249 S.C. 14, 152 S.E.2d 235; 285 S.C. 11, 109 S.E.2d 716; S.C. Code § 15-201; S.C. Code § 15-1901; 92 S.Ct. 410, 404 U.S. 189; 356 U.S. 674, 78 S.Ct. 974; 375 U.S. 277, 84 S.Ct. 424; 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396; 415 F.2d 1154. As to the Appellants' not having received effectiveassistance of counsel at trial: 263 S.C. 50, 208 S.E.2d 256; 407 U.S. 25; 397 U.S. 759; 241 S.C. 40, 126 S.E.2d 843; 203 S.E.2d 445; 491 F.2d 687; 479 F.2d 1124; 57 Wis.2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1; 514 F.2d 69; 397 U.S. 759; 303 F. Supp. 821; 241 S.C. 40, 126 S.E.2d 843; 253 S.C. 23, 168 S.E.2d 779; 262 S.C. 493, 206 S.E.2d 264; 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396. Messrs. Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., and Joseph R.Barker, Asst. Atty. Gen., of Columbia, and Mike S. Jolly,Sol., of Union, for Respondent, cite: As to the Trial Court'scorrectly having denied Appellants' motion for a directedverdict: 255 S.C. 86, 177 S.E.2d 464; South Carolina Digest, Criminal Law, Section 753 (1); 262 S.C. 526, 205 S.E.2d 827. As to a lack of error in the introduction oftes
The two indictments were consolidated for trial over the objections of appellant. It is contended that this constituted prejudicial error. The controlling legal principles are thus stated in the syllabus to McCrary v. State of South Carolina, 249 S.C. 14, 152 S.E.2d 235: "Where the offenses charged in separate indictments are of the same general nature involving connected transactions closely related in kind, place and character, the trial judge has power, in his discretion, to order the indictments tried together over objection by the defendant in the absence of a showing that [defendant's] substantive rights would be prejudiced."