That is, the permissible measure of force is "that which an ordinary, prudent, and intelligent person with the same knowledge, and in the same situation as, the arresting officer would have deemed necessary." Id. (quoting McCrary v. City of Memphis, No. W2004-01840, 2005 WL 452788, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2005)). The standard is substantially similar to, if not identical, to the standard for use of force under the Fourth Amendment. Butler, 2008 WL 4006786 at *13.
Plaintiff argues that, for the same reasons Trooper Davis's actions were objectively unreasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, his actions were objectively unreasonable for purposes of his state-law assault claim. See McCrary v. City of Memphis, No. W2004-01840-COA-R3CV, 2005 WL 452788, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2005) (considering a plaintiff's state-law assault claim and affirming the trial court's application of the Graham court's "reasonably necessary" and "objectively reasonable" standards); see also Anderson v. Antal, 191 F.3d 451 (Table), 1999 WL 717993, at *6 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirming the judgment of the district court dismissing the plaintiff's assault and battery claim under Michigan law because the officer's actions were objectively reasonable for purposes of a § 1983 claim). Here, for the same reasons the Court has concluded that there are no genuine issues of fact in regard to plaintiff's excessive force claim or that Trooper Davis lacked probable cause, the Court finds that Trooper Davis's actions were objectively reasonable for purposes of plaintiff's state-law assault claim and Trooper Davis is entitled to summary judgment in regard to this claim.
The officer is not required to determine at his or her peril the precise amount of force necessary in each instance and to use that much and no more; rather, the officer may be guided by the reasonable appearances and the nature of the case in determining the amount of force to be used.McCrary v. City of Memphis, No. W2004-01840-COA-R3CV, 2005 WL 452788, at *7 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2005) (quoting 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 53 (2004)). This standard is substantially similar, if not identical, to the standard for use of force under the Fourth Amendment.
Lewis v. Metro. Gen. Sessions Court for Nashville Davidson County, 949 S.W.2d 696, 703 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1997); Dowlen v. Matthews, No. M2001-03160-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 1129588, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2003). Tennessee courts have applied federal case law on claims for assault and battery in similar contexts, see McCrary v. City of Memphis, No. W2004-01840-COA-R3CV, 2005 WL 452788, at *6 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2005), and have held that, under Tennessee common law, "an officer may only use the force reasonably necessary to accomplish [an] arrest, with due regard to the other attendant circumstances, such as his own safety or that of others present." City of Mason, 581 S.W.2d at 626.
Further, Tennessee courts apply federal case law on excessive force in similar contexts. See McCrary v. City of Memphis, No. W2004-01840-COA-R3CV, 2005 WL 452788, *6 (Tenn.Ct.App. Feb. 25, 2005) (applying an objectively reasonable standard to excessive force claims brought under state law and citing several United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit cases).
Id. Further, Tennessee courts apply federal case law on excessive force in similar contexts. McCrary v. City of Memphis, 2005 WL 452788, *6 (Tenn.Ct.App. Feb. 25, 2005) (applying an objectively reasonable standard to excessive force claims brought under state law and citing several United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ("Sixth Circuit") cases). Therefore, since Defendants were executing valid felony arrest warrants, and there exists no dispute of material fact that would render Defendants' use of Ringo objectively unreasonable, Defendants's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's state law assault and battery claims will be GRANTED.
3) the statement must "be made under circumstances qualifying the statement as one against declarant's interest."McCrary v. City of Memphis, No. W2004-01840-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 452788, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2005) (emphasis added). Each of these three prongs must be established for the hearsay to be admissible.