On the other hand, a trial court's decision to award spousal support, bar support, or reserve support is discretionary. See MCL 552.23 (if the parties' estate and effects "are insufficient for the suitable support and maintenance of either party . . ., the court may . . . award" spousal support); McCoy v McCoy, 317 Mich. 478, 481; 27 N.W.2d 62 (1947); Torakis v Torakis, 194 Mich.App. 201, 202; 486 N.W.2d 107 (1992). The "parties . . . are entitled to individual consideration based on the law and facts applicable to their case ...."

This construction comports with a trial court's prerogative to reserve the issue of spousal support for future determination. See McCoy v McCoy, 317 Mich. 478, 480-482; 27 N.W.2d 62 (1947). More specifically, this Court has held that, "where the question of alimony is reserved, no change of circumstances is required as a prerequisite to an award of alimony at a later time."

Copeland v Copeland, 109 Mich. App. 683, 686; 311 N.W.2d 452 (1981). See also McCoy v McCoy, 317 Mich. 478, 481; 27 N.W.2d 62 (1947). Because the plaintiff was seeking modification of the original judgment, the enforcement provision of MCL 600.5809(3); MSA 27A.5809(3) was not triggered. Plaintiff's petition for alimony was not barred.

The determination of the issue is not governed by set rules. * * * Citing Mayer v Mayer, 266 Mich. 241 [ 253 NW 282] (1924), it was said in Robinson v Robinson, 275 Mich. 420 [ 266 N.W. 403] (1936), `There is no rigid rule of division of property in divorce proceedings but the division must be equitable.'" McCoy v McCoy, 317 Mich. 478, 482; 27 N.W.2d 62 (1947). Finally, defendant's failure to appear at the default divorce hearing did not waive all objections to the fraud, since the fraud is upon the court itself, affecting its fact-finding process.

This provision has been discussed by the Michigan Supreme Court on only a few occasions. The sole relevance of these decisions to the present case lies in the fact that they have made clear what the language of the statute already states is the effect of a divorce court's failure to make provision in the divorce decree with reference to a policy on a husband's life of which the wife is the beneficiary: her interest is terminated. McCoy v. McCoy, 317 Mich. 478, 27 N.W.2d 62 (1947); Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendrick, 316 Mich. 253, 25 N.W.2d 189 (1946). That court has not decided whether this general principle would in any way be affected by Cisneros' ability to prove either that the policies in question were purchased otherwise than in anticipation of marriage or that they were taken out with Cisneros as primary beneficiary pursuant to a valid contractual agreement between her and Robert Carruthers.

Defendant cites Pierson v. Pierson, 351 Mich. 637, as holding that although provisions of a divorce decree for alimony and support of wife may later be modified, not so provisions as to property settlement or awards in lieu of dower, and that where no allowance of alimony is contained in original decree it may not later be amended to award alimony. Also cited with Pierson are Moross v. Moross, 129 Mich. 27, Harner v. Harner, 255 Mich. 515, and McCoy v. McCoy, 317 Mich. 478, for the proposition that once a decree of divorce without allowance for alimony becomes final it may not thereafter be amended to provide for alimony. The cited cases are inapt. Here the agreement contemplated that the decree should provide for alimony and it did, in so many words. Under the heading "Support and Alimony" it provided that the defendant should pay to the clerk $30 per week "for support of minor children and as alimony". There is no point to defendant's citation of Kutchai v. Kutchai, 233 Mich. 569, to the effect that child support and alimony are one and the same thing.

The disposition of the controversy must necessarily rest, in each instance, on the particular facts involved as established by the proofs. McCoy v. McCoy, 317 Mich. 478. On behalf of the defendant it is argued that the trial court was in error in requiring payment of the indebtedness incurred by plaintiff in the establishment of a home for herself and minor children. Such provision of the decree was obviously intended to insure stability of the home and to prevent interference from any source with its use and enjoyment.

"The decree should not be construed so as to foreclose her from obtaining it. The decree is modified so as to include a provision that the plaintiff is not precluded from applying for and obtaining alimony for her support from defendant should the trial court deem it proper and order it." In McCoy v. McCoy, 317 Mich. 478, we approved a decree of divorce in which the right was reserved by the trial court to pass in the future on the question of alimony for the support of the plaintiff. See, also, Adams v. Seibly, 115 Mich. 402, and other authorities cited in the McCoy Case at page 481.

In the instant case, no award was made, the question of alimony having been expressly reserved. At the same time, the case law of this state authorizes an express reservation of the question of alimony. Seibly v. Person (1895), 105 Mich. 584; McCoy v. McCoy (1947), 317 Mich. 478. The reason given for reservation of the question here was the court's belief that defendant was able to work and that the refusal to grant her alimony at the time of judgment would encourage her to seek employment. Two years later defendant showed by competent testimony that she was indeed unemployable and thus there was no longer any reason to reserve judgment on the question.

"As it was not otherwise ordered in the divorce decree, the policy became and was payable to the estate of the husband, there being no other beneficiary whom he affirmatively designated." Further, in McCoy v. McCoy (1947), 317 Mich. 478, the Supreme Court in considering the provisions of the same statute, modified the judgment to conform with the statute, in view of the absence of any provision in the decree covering the parties' interests in certain policies of insurance. The added defendant, Mary Lou Binben, or Mary Lou Binben as administratrix of the estate of William W. Binben, deceased, is not entitled to the proceeds of the policy, either as a beneficiary, heir, or under the terms of the statute.