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McCoy v. Holland

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Feb 9, 2017
Case No. 1:16-cv-01333-DAD-JLT (PC) (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2017)

Opinion

Case No. 1:16-cv-01333-DAD-JLT (PC)

02-09-2017

LAKIETH LEROY McCOY, Plaintiff, v. HOLLAND, et al., Defendants.


FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT

(Doc. 7)

14-DAY DEADLINE

I. FINDINGS

Plaintiff initially filed this action in Kern County Superior Court, (Doc. 1, pp. 8-19), and Defendants removed it to this Court (Id., pp. 1-6). Plaintiff filed a motion for remand which should be GRANTED since federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.

A. Legal Standards

Section 1441(a) of Title 28 provides that a defendant may remove from state court any action "of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction." The vast majority of lawsuits "arise under the law that creates the cause of action." Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). Federal courts "shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, "a case may [also] arise under federal law 'where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law,' " Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Const. Laborers Vac. Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983) (emphasis added)), but "only [if] . . . the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on a substantial question of federal law," Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 28 (emphases added).

For removal to be proper, it must be clear from the face of the complaint that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n. v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 840-41 (1989) (per curiam). The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar, Inc., v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Hunter v. Phillip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009); Marin General Hosp. v. Modesto Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 2009); Hall, 476 F.3d at 687.

The removal statute is strictly construed against removal and the defendant bears the burden of establishing grounds for removal. Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002); Nevada v. Bank of America Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 2012); Fossen v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Montana, Inc., 660 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011); Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042 (citations omitted). Courts must consider whether federal jurisdiction exists, Rains v. Criterion Systems, Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1996), and must reject federal jurisdiction if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance, Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042 (citations omitted).

B. Discussion

Plaintiff makes two arguments to support his motion to remand: (1) that Defendants removal violated the "rule of unanimity" (Doc. 7, pp. 4-5); and (2) that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction since his claims do not arise under federal law (id., p. 5). Defendants respond that Plaintiff's Complaint "is primarily a constitutional civil rights claim that must remain in Federal Court." (Doc. 8, p. 1.)

Since federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, it is dispositive and the unanimity of defendants need not be addressed.

The pivotal question is whether the Complaint presents a federal question on its face. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392; Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042 (citations omitted); Marin General Hosp,.581 F.3d at 944 ; Hall, 476 F.3d at 687 (citation omitted). State-law causes of action "invoke[ ] federal-question jurisdiction only if [they] necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial." Nevada, 672 F.3d at 674 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

In the Complaint, Plaintiff contends that the "Guard One" welfare checks were negligently implemented at CCI which amount to a breach of duty, harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. 1, pp. 8-19.) Plaintiff argues that he did not intend his pleading to present any federal questions; that he only pled state law claims and did not plead any claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983; and that he intentionally did not mention the Constitution or any federal constitutional rights in the Complaint. (Doc. 7, p. 5.)

The "Guard One" system utilizes a metal mechanism in the center of the cell door that is touched with a wand by correctional staff, triggering a loud "bang" every 30 minutes. (Doc. 1, pp. 10-12.)

Defendants counter that while Plaintiff's stated causes of action arise under California law, the central focus of the Complaint is "constitutional" and that the Complaint states causes of action for unconstitutional conditions of confinement and retaliation. (Doc. 8, p.2.) However, this contention is not supported by a review of Plaintiff's complaint. Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1979) (existence of federal jurisdiction determined by the complaint at the time of removal).

None of Plaintiff's allegations show that the "Guard One" procedure was implemented in deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff as required for a "conditions of confinement" claim as Defendants assert. See Labatad v. Corrections Corp. of America, 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). In fact, Plaintiff alleges that the "Guard One" procedure was implemented to provide for inmates' safety by ensuring prison staff conducted welfare checks to see if suicidal and otherwise emotionally fragile inmates were not in need of "dire medical attention" or had harmed themselves. (Doc. 1, pp. 10-11.)

Plaintiff's allegations also do not show that the "Guard One" procedure was implemented out of retaliatory animus for Plaintiff's protected conduct to state a retaliation claim as Defendants assert. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff's allegations actually show that the "Guard One" procedure was implemented to advance a legitimate goal of the correctional institution -- ensuring the safety of suicidal and emotionally fragile inmates. Plaintiff states no allegations to show that he had engaged in protected conduct, let alone that either of the Defendants were aware he engaged in any such activities. Further, Plaintiff alleges that correctional staff encouraged Plaintiff and other inmates who complained about the "Guard One" procedure to file inmate grievances as a potential means for effecting change.

The only mention of federal law in the Complaint is on the page before the last, under the "Prayer for Relief where Plaintiff requests an order granting him "a declaration that the acts and omissions described herein violated his rights under both state and federal law." (Doc. 1, p. 18.) However, requests for declaratory relief do not provide subject matter jurisdiction and are regularly dismissed from §1983 actions because they are subsumed by determinations on claims for damages. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 565-66 n.8.

Plaintiff could have filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and attempted to state cognizable claims for violation of his federal constitutional rights, as well as violations of California law, but he chose not to. The Complaint delineates five state law claims for relief: negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of duty, and harassment. (Doc. 1, pp. 15-16.) None of these causes of action are cognizable, or require elements similar to claims which would be cognizable under federal law to "necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial." Nevada, 672 F.3d at 674. Further, Plaintiff exercised his right to rely exclusively on state law by filing suit in state court utilizing the state legal process. Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392. Thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action and it should therefore be remanded to the Kern County Superior Court.

Since subject matter jurisdiction is lacking and so dispositive, unanimity of defendants need not be addressed. --------

II. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's motion to remand the action to state court, filed September 29, 2016 (Doc. 7), be GRANTED.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 9 , 2017

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE


Summaries of

McCoy v. Holland

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Feb 9, 2017
Case No. 1:16-cv-01333-DAD-JLT (PC) (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2017)
Case details for

McCoy v. Holland

Case Details

Full title:LAKIETH LEROY McCOY, Plaintiff, v. HOLLAND, et al., Defendants.

Court:UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Date published: Feb 9, 2017

Citations

Case No. 1:16-cv-01333-DAD-JLT (PC) (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2017)