Opinion
1:15-cv-00768-DAD-HBK (PC)
06-30-2022
LAKEITH L. MCCOY, Plaintiff, v. A. HOLGUIN, C. CASILLAS, D. KING, V. MOORE, J. GONZALES, A. MARTINEZ, S. LOMAS, O. DELGADO, E. BARRON, FNU MONTANEZ; FNY MAYFIELD, FNU MORENO, C. MARTINEZ, G. ARELLANO, HOLLIS BENNET,, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO FILE LATE ANSWER ORDER MOOTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT AND COURT-ORDERED JUDGMENT ANSWER DUE WITHIN TWENTY-ONE DAYS (DOC. NOS. 177, 180)
HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for entry of a default and request for judgment, filed on February 4, 2022. (Doc. No. 177). Defendants oppose the motion. (Doc. No. 181). Relatedly, Defendants filed a motion to file a late answer on February 18, 2022. (Doc. No. 180). Plaintiff opposes. (Doc. No. 181). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants' motion to file belated answers and moots Plaintiff's motion for default and incorporated motion for court-ordered judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In 2015, Plaintiff initiated this case as a prisoner proceeding pro se by filing a prisoner civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff proceeds on his second amended complaint. (Doc. No. 15). Recent docket activity reflects a status conference with the parties on June 28, 2021 and an order directing the parties attend a settlement conference on December 15, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 165). The settlement conference was vacated due to Plaintiff's notice of nonparticipation in settlement conference. (Doc. Nos. 168, 174).
In the motion for entry of a Clerk's default, Plaintiff notes that service of process of his second amended complaint was completed via email on Defendants Martinez and Montanez on October 4, 2016. (Doc No. 177 at 1). Because neither Martinez nor Montanez have answered the second amended complaint, Plaintiff requests that the Court direct the Clerk to enter default against Defendants. (Id. at 1-2). Plaintiff further requests the Court to enter default and enter a damages award of approximately 4.5 million dollars. (Id. at 2).
Defendants Martinez and Montanez oppose Plaintiff's motion. (See generally Doc. No. 181). Defendants request the Court deny both Plaintiff's request for Clerk's default and default judgment and submit that they both have been actively participating in litigating this action, but mistakenly did not file an answer. (Id. at 1-2). Defendants argue that cases should be decided on the merits. (Id.).
Also pending is Defendants' motion for leave to file a late answer raising excusable neglect. (Doc. Nos. 180 at 1-2, 181-1 at 2). Seventeen Defendants answered on April 13, 2016, but Montanez and Martinez did not receive service for another six months, or until October 2016. (Doc. No. 181 at 1, 4). Montanez and Martinez then moved to dismiss and revoke Plaintiff's in forma pauperis status. (Id. at 1). After the Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss, Defendants acknowledge they should have answered around May 2017, but inadvertently failed to do so and instead proceeded with the litigation as if they had answered. (Id. at 2). Defendants note no prejudice to Plaintiff, or delay in the proceedings, because they have proceeded to date as if they did answer. (Id.).
In opposition, Plaintiff notes Defendants filed a motion to dismiss in attempt to “obviate the need to file an answer.” (Doc. No. 182 at 2). Plaintiff contends Defendants' failure to file an answer was done for “tactical reasons.” (Id.). Plaintiff further argues that while Defendants address the requisite elements under Pioneer, they do not address element 3, the reason for the delay. (Id. at 3)(citing Pioneer v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 859-860 (9th Cir. 2004)).
II. Applicable Law and Analysis
The Ninth Circuit has ruled that the standard for excusable neglect is the same when considering the concept under either Rule 6, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), Rule 60(b), and Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b). Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1997). To determine whether a party's neglect of a deadline is “excusable,” the Court should consider all relevant circumstances concerning the party's omission. Pioneer Inv. Serv. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 396 (1993). Courts must consider the following factors: (1) danger of prejudice to the non-moving party; (2) length of delay and potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant; (4) whether the moving party's conduct was in good faith. Id. at 395. The weighing of the Pioneer factors is equitable and left to the discretion of the district court in every case. Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2004)(en banc).
Here, considering the totality of the circumstances, it is equitable to permit Defendants Montanez and Martinez to file their answers and affirmative defenses. Plaintiff will not suffer prejudice by Defendants Montanez and Martinez's belated answer because seventeen other Defendants have already answered in this action. Montanez and Martinez have proceeded to date in this litigation as if they had filed an answer in May 2017, actively participating in all aspects of the litigation. Permitting them to answer now will have little to no impact on the proceedings.
Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion that Defendants do not address the reason for the delay in answering-Defendants explain it was an oversight and the deadline was not calendared following the denial of their motion to dismiss. Notably, Plaintiff delayed moving for default for more than two years when a request for entry of default must be made promptly. See Harvey v. United States, 685 F.3d 939, 946 (10th Cir. 2012)(finding plaintiff waived entry of default judgment by waiting more than two years during activate litigation to move, a day after defendants filed a late answer)(citing Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 458 (2004)(“[F]orfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right.”)(quotations omitted)).
Because the Court grants Defendants' motion to file a belated answer, it follows that Plaintiff's motion for default and incorporated motion for court-ordered judgment against these Defendants is moot. A court ordered judgment cannot be entered anyway until a clerk's default has been entered and served upon the defaulted party, which has not happened in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); see also J&J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Martinez, No. 1:14-cv-01578-KJM-BAM, 2015 WL 4643144, * 4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2015)(findings and recommendations to grant defendant's motion to set aside Clerk's entry of default and order denying plaintiff's motion for default judgment as moot). Moreover, cases should be decided on their merits whenever reasonably possible. See Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985)(noting preference for ruling on the merits and setting aside the entry of default judgments when defendants have a meritorious defense and timely sought relief from default judgment). Considering default judgments are ordinarily disfavored and courts' preferences for ruling on the merits, this case does not warrant a departure from these presumptions.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1. Defendants' motion to file a belated answer (Doc. No. 180) is GRANTED. Defendants Montanez and Martinez shall file their Answers and Affirmative Defenses within twenty-one (21) days from the date on this order.
2. Plaintiff's motion for default and court-ordered default judgment (Doc. No. 177) are MOOT.