Opinion
Case No. 2:19-cv-48-BHH-MGB
02-01-2019
Jeffrey Glenn McCoy, # 355188, Petitioner, v. Warden Willie Davis, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Jeffrey Glenn McCoy, a pro se South Carolina state prisoner, seeks habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. No. 1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the petition and submit a recommendation to the United States District Judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that the petition be summarily dismissed, without prejudice and without requiring the Warden to respond.
BACKGROUND
McCoy is serving sentences for South Carolina convictions at Kirkland Correctional Institution in Columbia, South Carolina. Respondent Willie Davis is the warden.
McCoy's § 2241 petition involves a detainer from Mississippi filed against him. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) According to McCoy, the detainer is invalid because it "is not supported by an affidavit with judicial determination as to probable cause." (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Nor could it be, McCoy alleges, as there is no evidence he was even in Mississippi when the crimes were committed, let alone that he committed them. (Id. at 2-3.) McCoy contends the detainer violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and he wants this Court to order the detainer dismissed. (Id. at 3.)
The petition does not identify the crimes and does not make clear whether McCoy has been convicted of the crimes or has only been charged.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This is a preliminary review of McCoy's § 2241 petition. See Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see also Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (allowing district courts to apply the rules to other § 2241 petitions). The narrow question before the Court is whether it "plainly appears" that McCoy is not entitled to any relief in this Court. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. If so, the petition must be dismissed; if not, the warden must respond. Id. Because McCoy is representing himself, the undersigned has reviewed the petition liberally. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
DISCUSSION
McCoy's § 2241 petition is subject to summary dismissal because it does not name the proper respondent, and this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the proper respondent, and because this district is not the proper forum for the dispute.
A prisoner in custody in one state may use § 2241 to attack a detainer lodged by another state. Braden v. 30th Jud.Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1973). A prisoner can challenge the validity of the detainer itself, the effect it has on his current custody, or both. See Norris v. Georgia, 522 F.2d 1006, 1011 (4th Cir. 1975). There is a "fundamental distinction" between those two types of challenges: "[t]he former is an assault on the detainer's underlying criminal charges or conviction," while the latter challenges the adverse impacts on the prisoner's current confinement that have resulted from the detainer being filed. Id.
The type of challenge a prisoner brings against another state's detainer dictates who and where he must sue. A prisoner challenging a detainer's effect on his current confinement may sue his warden in the district where he is confined. See Norris, 522 F.2d at 1010, 1012. However, a prisoner attacking the detainer's validity "must file in the district where the detainer originates, as that district court alone has jurisdiction over the [out-of-]state defendants." Skinner v. United States, 857 F.2d 1469, 1988 WL 92926 at *1 (4th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (table); accord Emanuel v. Witkowski, 915 F.2d 1564, 1990 WL 148486, at *1 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (table); Wallace v. Crawley, 817 F.2d 103, 1987 WL 35965, at *1 (4th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (table). As the Fourth Circuit explained in Norris, this is so because
[i]n order to possess jurisdiction in a case involving a challenge to an untried criminal charge on which a detainer is based, a federal district court must possess the power to grant relief, which would entail possessing the power to direct [i]n personam, that the pending charge be dismissed. However, a federal district court in the state and district of confinement simply has no state officer within its jurisdiction whom it can direct to dismiss the pending charges, and there is no way of enforcing any writ to that effect which might be issued.522 F.2d at 1013 (citation omitted); see also Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.3d 352, 357 (4th Cir. 1969) (stating a habeas petition attacking an out-of-state detainer's validity filed in the prisoner's district of confinement "would be met with jurisdictional problems as well as . . . practical difficulties").
At first glance, this requirement might seem in tension with the "default' habeas rule that "the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held." Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435. But that rule "does not apply" where, as here, "a habeas petitioner challenges something other than his present physical confinement." Id. at 438. In addition, this requirement aligns with the more basic habeas rule, also discussed in Rumsfeld, that petitions must be filed in the judicial district that has jurisdiction over the person who can provide the prisoner relief on the claim at issue. See 542 U.S. at 442.
In addition to that jurisdictional requirement, practical considerations make the federal district where the detainer issued the most appropriate forum for a challenge to the detainer's validity. E.g., Foley v. O'Brien, No. 7:09-cv-212, 2009 WL 5178374, at *1 (W.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2009), aff'd, 376 F. App'x 311 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). After all, that is where all of the material events took place, and where the records and witnesses are likely to be found; it is simpler and less expensive to litigate the question there than in the district where the inmate is housed; and the custodial district is presumably indifferent to the resolution of the prisoner's attack on the detainer because the dispute is not with the custodian, but with the state issuing the detainer. Braden, 410 U.S. at 483-86.
McCoy's petition is plainly one attacking only his detainer's validity. McCoy alleges that the detainer was improperly issued and that the charges underlying the detainer are baseless, and he asks this Court to dismiss the detainer. Meanwhile, nothing in the petition could be liberally construed as a challenge to an effect the detainer has had on his current confinement. He does not allege the detainer has adversely affected his confinement at Kirkland, and he does not ask the Court to make Warden Davis change anything about his confinement there.
Consequently, McCoy has not named the proper respondent. Allowing McCoy to substitute the proper respondent would be futile, as this Court would lack personal jurisdiction over a respondent in Mississippi.
Likewise, McCoy has filed in the wrong forum. In some instances, this Court has remedied the misfiling of a detainer challenge by transferring the case to the appropriate federal district. See, e.g., Flores v. McCabe, No. 6:11-cv-2773-JFA, 2011 WL 6059797, at *1 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2011); Drew v. Owens, No. 9:09-cv-853-TLW, 2009 WL 3617572, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 29, 2009). But in those instances, either the proper respondent was already named in the petition. Here, in contrast, the one respondent McCoy has named is not the right target for his petition. Instead of burdening McCoy and another court with the transfer of a case where no proper respondent has been named, the undersigned finds it more appropriate to dismiss without prejudice so that McCoy may craft a new petition and file it in a federal court in Mississippi. See, e.g., Foley, 2009 WL 5178374, at *1 (dismissing, rather than transferring, habeas challenge to detainer that did not name any proper respondents); Grace v. Hagan, No. 9:09-cv-1815-MBS, 2009 WL 2601521, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 21, 2009) (same).
The undersigned expresses no opinion on whether McCoy has exhausted any remedies Mississippi law provides for challenging detainers. See Braden, 410 U.S. at 490-92.
CONCLUSION
The undersigned recommends the Court summarily dismiss the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction, without prejudice and without requiring the Warden to file a return.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. February 1, 2019
Charleston, South Carolina
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE The parties' attention is directed to the Important Notice on the next page:
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).