Opinion
Nos. WD 61048 Consolidated with WD 61049
June 24, 2003
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County, Honorable Thomas J. Brown, III, Judge.
Sean P. McCauley, Overland Park, KS, for Appellants.
D. Keith Henson, St. Louis, MO, for Respondents.
Before Smith, P.J., Lowenstein and Hardwick, JJ.
Michael McCoy and John Oaks appeal the circuit court's dismissal of their Petitions for Judicial Review under the contested case provisions of the Missouri Administrative Procedures Act (MAPA), § 536.100, RSMo 2000. We reverse and remand.
All statutory citations are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2000, unless otherwise indicated.
Factual and Procedural History
Effective December 31, 2000, the Sheriff of Caldwell County terminated the employment of Michael McCoy and John Oaks as Deputy Sheriffs. In August 2001, the Sheriff provided McCoy and Oaks with written notice of the grounds for termination, as required by Section 57.275.1. This statute provides in relevant part:
Any full-time deputy sheriff upon dismissal shall be furnished with a written notice of the grounds for the dismissal. Upon receipt of the written grounds for the dismissal, the deputy sheriff may request a hearing. The request must be made to the sheriff, in writing, within three working days of receipt of the grounds for dismissal. Such hearing shall take place before the hearing board to be appointed by the sheriff. The sheriff shall schedule a closed hearing within a reasonable time but within thirty days after the written request was received by the sheriff. A written report of the facts determined during the hearing shall be forwarded to the sheriff. The sheriff will review the findings, and has the final decision-making authority.
§ 57.275.1.
Pursuant to this statute, McCoy and Oaks timely requested a hearing and the Sheriff appointed a three-person board to review the grounds for the employment terminations. The board conducted a hearing on August 23, 2001, during which witnesses provided information about events, which led to the terminations. Despite requests from McCoy and Oaks, the hearing board did not allow cross-examination of the witnesses nor a recording of the proceeding for transcription purposes.
Following the hearing, the board issued written findings that the Sheriff "acted within his authority" in terminating the employment of the Deputy Sheriffs. The Sheriff affirmed his termination decision upon receipt of the written finding. McCoy and Oaks thereafter filed separate petitions in the Circuit Court of Cole County, requesting judicial review of the hearing board's decision as a "contested case" under MAPA, § 536.100. Upon motions to dismiss filed by Caldwell County and the Sheriff, the circuit court determined it did not have jurisdiction and dismissed the petitions because the hearing board proceeding was not a contested case subject to judicial review under MAPA.
Issue on Appeal
As their sole point in this consolidated appeal, McCoy and Oaks contend the circuit court erroneously applied the law in dismissing their Petitions for Judicial Review. They argue the hearing board procedure set forth in Section 57.275 satisfies the definition of a contested case for purposes of judicial review under MAPA, § 536.100. Because this appeal raises a jurisdictional issue of law, we exercise our independent judgment without deference to the circuit court's ruling. Phillips v. Fallen , 6 S.W.3d 862, 864 (Mo.banc 1999).
Pursuant to MAPA, §§ 536.100 and 536.110, any person who has exhausted all administrative remedies and is aggrieved by a final decision in a "contested case" is entitled to judicial review by a circuit court of proper venue. MAPA defines a contested case as "a proceeding before an agency in which legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law to be determined after hearing." § 536.010(2). The "law" referred to in this definition includes any ordinance, statute, or constitutional provision that mandates a hearing. State ex rel. Yarber v. McHenry , 915 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Mo.banc 1995). Thus, the right to a hearing is determined by substantive law outside MAPA. Id.
McCoy and Oaks contend the hearing procedure in Section 57.275 is required by law and therefore satisfies the definition of a contested case. This statutory procedure requires a county sheriff to provide written notice of grounds for the termination of a deputy sheriff. § 57.275.1. Within three days of receiving such notice, a terminated deputy sheriff can request a hearing on the reasons for the termination. Id. The sheriff must then appoint a board to conduct a hearing within thirty days of the request. The statute defines the scope of the hearing as:
a closed meeting conducted by a hearing board appointed by the sheriff for the purpose of receiving evidence in order to determine the facts regarding the dismissal of the deputy sheriff. Witnesses to the event that triggered the dismissal may attend the hearing for the limited purpose of providing testimony; the attorney for the deputy dismissed may attend the hearing, but only to serve as an observer; the sheriff and his or her attorney may attend the hearing, but only to serve as an observer.
§ 57.015(2). Following the hearing, the board must provide the sheriff with a written report of the facts determined. § 57.275.1. The sheriff retains final decision-making authority after reviewing the facts determined by the hearing board. Id.
In response to this point, Caldwell County and the Sheriff argue that the hearing required by Section 57.275.1 is not a sufficiently formalized procedure to qualify as a contested case. They contend the procedural formalities in contested cases generally include notice of issues to be determined at the hearing, sworn testimony subject to cross-examination, the making of a record, and written decisions with findings of fact and conclusions of law. See §§ 536.067, 536.070, 536.090. Because these procedures were not required by Sections 57.275 or 57.015, Respondents argue the hearing was not adversarial and did not satisfy MAPA's requirements for judicial review of a contested case.
Respondents' argument concerning the procedural aspects of the hearing is irrelevant in determining whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to review this matter as a contested case. We must focus on MAPA's definition of a contested case as a "proceeding before an agency in which legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law to be determined after a hearing. § 536.010(2). For purposes of determining whether judicial review is appropriate, we need only consider whether the procedure for terminating a deputy sheriff, as outlined in Sections 57.275 and 57.015, met this threshold requirement. The issue is not whether the contested case procedures were followed in conducting the hearing, rather we must determine whether a hearing was required by law. See Yarber , 915 S.W.2d at 328.
There can be no dispute that section 57.275 requires a hearing to be conducted upon the timely request of any terminated deputy sheriff. Based upon written findings from the hearing, the sheriff must determine whether the termination was proper. § 57.275.1. The hearing procedure is required by law and determines whether the deputy sheriff is entitled to retain his or her job. Section 57.275 does not provide for judicial review of the sheriff's decision, but the hearing procedure satisfies the definition of a contested case subject to judicial review under MAPA, §§ 536.100 and 536.010(2).
Although contested cases must generally follow the contested case procedures set forth in MAPA, the jurisdictional determination of whether a contested case exists is not dependent upon these procedural formalities. See Cade v. State , 990 S.W.2d 32, 37 n. 4 (Mo.App.W.D. 1999). Once jurisdiction for judicial review of a contested case is established under Sections 536.100 and 536.010(2), then the circuit court can consider whether the hearing was properly conducted according to the contested case procedures set forth in MAPA. See §§ 536.067, 536.070, 536.090.
In Rugg v. City of Carrollton , 990 S.W.2d 89 (Mo.App.W.D. 1999), two police officers were disciplined by the City of Carrollton and sought a review hearing, pursuant to procedures in the City's personnel manual. During the hearing before the City Council, the officers were not allowed to present evidence and no record of the proceeding was made. Id. at 90. The City Council upheld the disciplinary action, and the officers sought judicial review in circuit court. Id.
The circuit court exercised jurisdiction over the matter as a contested case, pursuant to MAPA Section 536.100, without regard for whether MAPA's contested case procedures had been followed in conducting the City Council hearing. The court considered the procedural deficiencies only in ruling on the merits of the case. Id. The circuit court reversed the City Council's determination and remanded the case for a new hearing to be conducted based on MAPA's contested case procedures. Id.
On appeal, the City argued that the circuit erred in giving contested case status to the hearing procedure required by the personnel manual. Id. at 91. We affirmed, holding that the only relevant issue in determining contested case status is whether the police officers were legally entitled to a hearing. Id. We held that the classification of a contested case is not determined by the manner in which the agency conducts a hearing. Id. Because the City promised and declared the availability of a disciplinary review hearing in the personnel manual, the hearing was required by law and, therefore, met the definition of a contested case. Id.
In deciding that the hearing procedure was required by law, the court noted that the personnel manual was a part of the City Charter and had been formally adopted by the City Council in 1996. Rugg , 990 S.W.2d at 91.
Similarly, the only relevant issue here is whether Section 57.275 required that a hearing be granted to McCoy and Oaks. The circuit court held that the hearing board procedure was not subject to judicial review as a contested case because it "was not an adversarial hearing where a measure of procedural formality was required." The court erred in considering the procedural aspects of the hearing to determine its jurisdiction. The fact that McCoy and Oaks were entitled to a hearing by law under Section 57.275 was sufficient to invoke MAPA's provision of judicial review for contested cases.
Alternatively, Respondents argue that the circuit court properly declined jurisdiction because McCoy and Oaks were at-will employees whose terminations were not subject to judicial review under MAPA. They correctly point out that Section 57.275.2 declares deputy sheriffs to be at-will employees whose status is unaffected by the procedural requirements of Section 57.275.1. They cite Mosley v. Members of the Civil Service Board for the City of Berkeley , 23 S.W.3d 855 (Mo.App.E.D. 2000), for the proposition that terminated at-will employees are not entitled to judicial review of the termination decision as a non-contested case under MAPA. Respondents argue this holding should be equally applicable to contested cases and, therefore, bars judicial review of the decision to terminate McCoy and Oaks as at-will employees.
We agree that Mosley is applicable, but Respondents have ignored a key distinction the court made in that case. The court held in Mosley that terminated at-will employees can not seek judicial review of the "adequacy of the grounds" for the termination decision. Id. at 859-60. The court expressly ruled, however, that terminated at-will employees can seek judicial review of any procedural improprieties related to the termination. Id. at 860. Thus, the availability of judicial review for an at-will employee is determined by the nature of the error alleged by the terminated employee.
In their Petitions for Judicial Review, McCoy and Oaks made the following allegations:
15. During the hearing, [McCoy and Oaks were] denied the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and [were] prohibited from making an official record of the proceedings, thus denying [their] due process rights pursuant to Section 536.070(2)(4).
16. Moreover, the respondent agency's reasons for termination are unsupported by competent and substantial evidence, and are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
Paragraph 15 of the Petition alleges procedural errors during the hearing, which are subject to judicial review despite the at-will status of McCoy and Oaks. Id . However, the allegations in Paragraph 16 challenge the grounds for the termination, which are not subject to review because McCoy and Oaks were at-will employees subject to termination with or without cause. Id. at 859-60.
Conclusion
McCoy and Oaks are entitled to judicial review of the hearing board procedure as a contested case under MAPA, § 536.100. We reverse the circuit court's dismissal of the Petitions for Judicial Review and remand for consideration of the Petitions' allegation that the hearing board failed to follow contested case procedures in conducting the termination review hearing.
All concur.