Opinion
C/A No. 8:17-cv-3323-JFA-JDA
07-16-2018
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Fredrick Maurice McCoy ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Berkeley County Detention Center and is suing the Berkeley County Clerk of Court with regard to a prior conviction and sentence that appears unrelated to his current detention. He files this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A.
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint [Docs. 1 and 1-2] against the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC"), alleging that SCDC violated his constitutional rights by wrongfully imprisoning him for ten months. [Doc. 1-2 at 3 ¶ B.] On March 28, 2018, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation, finding that Plaintiff had failed to name a proper defendant and recommending that Plaintiff be given an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in his Complaint. [Doc. 21.] By Order dated May 22, 2018, the Honorable Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., accepted the Report and Recommendation, dismissed the case without prejudice, and gave Plaintiff twenty-one days to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies noted in the Report and Recommendation. [Doc. 26.] On June 4, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. [Doc. 29.]
In his original Complaint, Plaintiff named only SCDC, which is a department of the State of South Carolina that has Eleventh Amendment immunity from a suit for damages brought in this Court. See Belcher v. South Carolina Bd. of Corr., 460 F.Supp. 805, 808-09 (D.S.C. 1978); Alkebulanyahh v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 6:10-cv-2976-MBS-KFM, 2010 WL 5625463, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2010), adopted by, 2011 WL 202987 (D.S.C. Jan. 21, 2011); Felton v. S.C. Dep't of Corr. Div. of Classification, No. 8:12-cv-1290-SB-JDA, 2012 WL 2149788, at *3 (D.S.C. May 31, 2012), adopted sub nom., 2012 WL 2154235 (D.S.C. June 13, 2012). Accordingly, SCDC was dismissed from this action and Plaintiff was directed to file an Amended Complaint, naming a proper defendant. [Doc. 26.]
On June 13, 2018, upon a review of the Amended Complaint [Doc. 29], the undersigned issued an Order, finding that Plaintiff had again failed to name a proper defendant and directing Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint to cure the deficiencies noted in the Court's Order. [Doc. 32.] However, Plaintiff has not filed a second amended complaint and did not otherwise respond to the Court's Order. The Order was returned to the court as undeliverable. [See Doc. 35 ("RETURN TO SENDER, NO MAIL RECEPTACLE, UNABLE TO FORWARD, RETURN TO SENDER").]
In light of the foregoing and having reviewed the Amended Complaint [Doc. 29] in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues a single Defendant—the Berkeley County Clerk of Court—again asserting a claim for wrongful imprisonment. [Doc. 29 at 2-3.] Plaintiff alleges the following facts to support his claim. Upon conviction in Berkeley County for a probation violation, Plaintiff was sent to prison. [Id. at 4.] In January 2016, Plaintiff wrote to the Solicitor and to the Clerk of Court while incarcerated at Manning Correctional Institution, inquiring as to why he was serving more time than that to which he was sentenced. [Id. at 5.] Instead of a response, Plaintiff was immediately released in the middle of January at 11:30 p.m. and was given a bus ticket to Charleston without any explanation. [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks $40,000 in damages for wrongful imprisonment. [Id.]
Based on Plaintiff's original Complaint filed in this matter, it appears that Plaintiff was sentenced in 2008 to seven years imprisonment. [Doc. 1 at 3.] After completing eighty-five percent of his term, he was granted two years of supervised release. [Id.] However, after ten months, Plaintiff violated the terms of his supervised release. [Id.] At the sentencing hearing on his supervised release violation, the judge sentenced Plaintiff to five years and eleven months time served, with ten months credit for his completed supervision time, and forty-five days in jail. [Id.] Nevertheless, upon arriving in SCDC custody, he was told he had to complete a mandatory full year of imprisonment. [Id.] Because he had only forty-five days left on his sentence, he began to appeal. [Id.] Finally, after ten months, while he was sleeping at 11:30 at night, he was "awoken an[d] given a bus ticket and let out." [Id.] He contends that SCDC knew it had made an error and that is why they released him. [Id.]
The crux of this action appears to be a challenge to Plaintiff's allegedly unlawful incarceration in SCDC for approximately ten months. Plaintiff does not appear to be seeking release from SCDC; but to the extent that he does, release from prison is not an available remedy in this civil rights action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that "habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983"); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (attacking the length of duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) DSC, the undersigned is authorized to review the Amended Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Amended Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Amended Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Amended Complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). "A claim has 'facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
Assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim in this case, he has nevertheless failed to name a defendant amendable to suit under § 1983. Specifically, the Berkeley County Clerk of Court has absolute immunity from suit. Plaintiff essentially alleges the Berkeley County Clerk of Court either acted improperly or failed to act, resulting in Plaintiff's alleged unlawful imprisonment. Thus, Plaintiff implicitly alleges that the Berkeley County Clerk of Court did not properly conduct its duties in the role as the Clerk of Court. It is well settled that judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions. See Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985). Notably, clerks of court and other court support personnel are entitled to immunity similar to judges when performing their quasi-judicial duties. See Jarvis v. Chasanow, 448 F. App'x 406 (4th Cir. 2011); Stevens v. Spartanburg Cnty. Probation, Parole, and Pardon Serv., C/A No. 6:09-795-HMH-WMC, 2010 WL 678953, at *7 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2010). "Absolute immunity 'applies to all acts of auxiliary court personnel that are basic and integral part[s] of the judicial function.'" Jackson v. Houck, 181 F. App'x 372, 373 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). Here, the alleged wrongful acts, or failures to act, were part of the Clerk of Court's alleged quasi-judicial functions. See Baccus v. Wickensimer, C/A No. 9:13-1977-DCN-BM, 2013 WL 6019469, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Nov. 13, 2013) (explaining that judicial immunity is from claims for damages and injunctive relief). Thus, Defendant has absolute quasi-judicial immunity from this lawsuit.
Plaintiff also fails to allege any specific facts against the Berkeley County Clerk of Court that would subject this Defendant to liability under § 1983. A plaintiff must allege specific facts as to each defendant in a § 1983 action. Plaintiff's failure to allege specific facts as to Defendant would subject this case to summary dismissal, even if Defendant was not otherwise entitled to immunity from suit.
Plaintiff has had two opportunities to amend his Complaint to cure the deficiencies contained therein by naming a proper Defendant. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2015). Consequently, for the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Plaintiff was warned that failure to file a second amended complaint that corrects the deficiencies may result in this action being recommended for summary dismissal, with prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action with prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); see also Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, No. 17-7621, 2018 WL 2472069, at *1 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (explaining where the district court has already afforded a plaintiff with the opportunity to amend, the district court, in its discretion, can either afford plaintiff an additional opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice); Mitchell v. Unknown, No. 17-7638, 2018 WL 3387457, at *1 (4th Cir. July 11, 2018) (same). Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge July 16, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).