Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 03-2195-GTV
January 28, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This civil rights action is before the court on Defendants' motion to review the magistrate judge's order granting pro se Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint (Doc. 90). Defendants object to the order for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiffs' motion was procedurally defective; (2) the additional claims do not meet the requirements of Rule 20; (3) Defendants will be unfairly prejudiced; (4) the amendments are futile; (5) the amendments are untimely; and (6) Plaintiffs presented the proposed amendments in bad faith. For the reasons set forth below, the court overrules Defendants' objections.
When a magistrate judge rules on nondispositive matters and a party files objections to the rulings, the district court reviews the magistrate judge's order under the "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" standard. First Union Mortgage Corp. v. Smith, 229 F.3d 992, 995 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1461-62 (10th Cir. 1988); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a)). This standard "requires that the reviewing court affirm unless it . . . is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Ocelot Oil Corp., 847 F.2d at 1464 (quotation omitted). Generally, and in the instant case, the court reviews denial of a motion to amend under the clearly erroneous standard of review. Pedro v. Armour Swift-Eckrich, 118 F. Supp.2d 1155, 1157 (D. Kan. 2000) (citations omitted).
The magistrate judge, Judge O'Hara, granted Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint. Leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). This is a "mandate . . . to be heeded." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Leave to amend is a matter committed to the court's sound discretion and is not to be denied without the court giving some reason or cause on the record.Fed. Ins. Co. v. Gates Learjet Corp., 823 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1987). Leave may be denied when the amendment would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party, when the movant has "unduly and inexplicably delayed" in requesting leave, when the movant acts on a "bad faith or dilatory motive," or when the amendment would be futile.Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; State Distribs., Inc. v. Glenmore Distilleries, 738 F.2d 405, 416 (10th Cir. 1984). In exercising its discretion, the court must be mindful that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to facilitate decisions on the merits rather than on pleading technicalities. Koch v. Koch Indus., 127 F.R.D. 206, 209 (D. Kan. 1989).
I. Procedural Defects
Defendants first object to Judge O'Hara's order because Plaintiffs' motion was procedurally defective, and Judge O'Hara had previously warned Plaintiffs that he might deny future motions solely on procedural grounds. Plaintiffs failed to set forth a concise statement of their proposed amendments, neglected to attach an original and a copy of the proposed amended pleading, and inaccurately certified the date of delivery to Defendants.
The court overrules this objection. Failing to deny the motion to amend because of procedural defects was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
II. Rule 20
Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs' additional claims do not meet the standards imposed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a). Rule 20(a), governing permissive joinder, provides:
All persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
The magistrate held that amendment was not improper because all of the claims arose out of a series of confrontations between Plaintiffs and various City of Lawrence police officers. The court determines that Judge O'Hara did not commit clear error when he ruled that Plaintiffs' claims were a series of occurrences, properly joined under Rule 20.
III. Prejudice
In evaluating the merits of a motion to amend, the overarching consideration is prejudice to the opposing party. Zhu v. Countyside Realty Co., 160 F. Supp.2d 1210, 1226 (D. Kan. 2001) (citation omitted). Defendants claim that they will be prejudiced by Plaintiffs' amendments because the case will be too large to defend. The magistrate held that "[a]though the addition of claims and defendants may have an impact on the defense of this case, the court is unpersuaded that . . . arguable prejudice warrants denying the motion to amend."
Again, keeping in mind the liberal standards of amendment and review of the magistrate's ruling, the court cannot conclude that Judge O'Hara's ruling was clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
IV. Futility
Defendants made extensive and persuasive arguments why the magistrate should have denied Plaintiffs' motion to amend as futile. Judge O'Hara dismissed Defendants' arguments, stating:
Plaintiffs' proposed amendments are not clearly futile. The issues raised by defendants would be more appropriately resolved by way of a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. The better course of action is to consider defendants' arguments at these other procedural junctures rather than to deny plaintiffs the opportunity to assert these claims.
Defendants object to Judge O'Hara's ruling on several grounds. They contend that the appropriate standard is not "clearly futile," but whether the claims are futile. They also argue that deferring ruling on the claims until a later time only serves to escalate Defendants' costs of litigation. Finally, Defendants contend that even if the "clearly futile" standard applies, Plaintiffs' amended claims are indeed "clearly futile."
The court concludes that Judge O'Hara applied the appropriate standard of review without clear error. He explained that the standards for a motion to dismiss apply, and essentially ruled that he did not have enough information to find Plaintiffs' claims futile. While this court may have reviewed Plaintiffs' claims more closely, it was not clear error or contrary to law for Judge O'Hara to defer ruling on the validity of Plaintiffs' claims until a later date. Defendants may reassert their arguments in a motion to dismiss. At such time, the court's rulings will not be confined by the "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" standard of review.
V. Untimeliness
Defendants next contend that Plaintiffs' motion to amend should have been denied because Plaintiffs knew of the facts supporting the additional claims at the time they filed their original complaint. The magistrate did not address this argument.
While it is true that the court may deny leave to amend when a plaintiff could have added claims earlier, a denial is not mandated.See Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, N.A., 60 F.3d 1486, 1495 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) ("Untimeliness in itself can be a sufficient reason to deny leave to amend, particularly when the movant provides no adequate explanation for the delay.") (emphasis added). The decision whether to grant leave to amend is discretionary. Here, while it appears that Plaintiffs knew of the facts giving rise to most of their amendments before they filed their initial complaint, the court determines that Judge O'Hara did not commit clear error when he failed to deny Plaintiffs' motion based solely on untimeliness.
VI. Bad Faith
Finally, Defendants argue that the record supports a finding that Plaintiffs offered the amendments in bad faith. The magistrate held that the limited record before the court did not support such a finding, and this court agrees.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that Defendants' motion for review (Doc. 90) is denied.
Copies or notice of this order shall be transmitted to counsel of record and pro se Plaintiffs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.