Standard, 278 S.C. at 338-39, 295 S.E.2d at 787. In McCormick v. Campbell, 285 S.C. 272, 329 S.E.2d 752 (1985), the court again addressed the issue: In Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982), we abrogated the arbitrary age presumptions in determining a minor's negligence or contributory negligence holding the behavior of minors under the age of fourteen should be judged by the conduct expected of a minor of like age under like circumstances.
Standard, 278 S.C. at 338-39, 295 S.E.2d at 787. In McCormick v. Campbell, 285 S.C. 272, 329 S.E.2d 752 (1985), the Court again addressed the issue: In Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982), we abrogated the arbitrary age presumptions in determining a minor's negligence or contributory negligence holding the behavior of minors under the age of fourteen should be judged by the conduct expected of a minor of like age under like circumstances.
Per Curiam: Remanded for proceedings in accordance with the majority opinion in Jamie McCall, by his Guardian ad Litem, JoanAndrews, v. Frankie Batson and the School District ofGreenville County, 329 S.E.2d 752 (S.C. 1985).
Since Dalon was over fourteen years of age, his conduct was to be judged by an adult standard of care as opposed to that of a minor. McCormick v. Campbell, 285 S.C. 272, 329 S.E.2d 752 (1985). Additionally, application of the sudden peril doctrine is ordinarily an issue for the jury to decide under the particular facts of each case.