By contrast, it is well established that a suit to foreclose a mortgage is quasi in rem. McCorkle v. Hamilton, 150 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1941, writ ref'd); Edinburg Irr. Co. v. Paschen, 235 S.W. 1088, 1090 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922). A quasi in rem proceeding has been described as an action "between parties, where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest therein."
If, however, a demand is an integral part of a cause of action, or a condition precedent to the right to sue, limitations does not begin to run until a demand is made, unless demand is waived or is unreasonably delayed. Cummins and Walker Oil Co. v. Smith, 814 S.W.2d 884 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1991, no writ); Young v. J J Bail Bonds Co., 792 S.W.2d 484 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1990, no writ); Gabriel v. Alhabbal, 618 S.W.2d 894 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Foreman v. Graham, 363 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1962, no writ); McCorkle v. Hamilton, 150 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1941, writ ref'd). Ford contends that demand was a requirement before this note became due, and therefore limitations did not begin to run until her demand letter was sent in May 1990.
A suit to foreclose a mortgage is considered an action quasi in rem. See McCorkle v. Hamilton, 150 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1941, writ ref'd). In Roberts v. Carlisle, 4 S.W.2d 144, 151 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1928, writ dism'd), the court determined that a suit to foreclose a lien on property was an action quasi in rem, saying:
Foreman v. Graham, 363 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1962, no writ); Dunn v. Reliance Life and Accident Insurance Company of America, 405 S.W.2d 389 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1966, writ ref'd n. r. e.). In McCorkle v. Hamilton, 150 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1941, writ ref'd) the plaintiff entered into a contract with Lloyds America whereby she agreed to become one of the insurance underwriters of the company. In connection with this contract she executed a promissory note in the sum of $3,500 payable on demand to the attorneys in fact for the insurance company.
The judgment is binding only upon the parties and their privies. McCorkle v. Hamilton, 150 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1941, writ ref'd). In our case, plaintiff is proceeding directly and only against the property for satisfaction of its mortgage lien. Plaintiff does not seek personal judgment against either defendant.
Local actions are in the nature of suits in rem, a term defined as designating proceedings or actions instituted against the thing, that is, an action taken directly against property or one which is brought to enforce a right in the thing itself. Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed.). See, Knox v. Quinn, 164 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.Civ.App. Austin 1942, no writ); McCorkle v. Hamilton, 150 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1941, writ ref'd); Perdue v. Perdue, 208 S.W. 353 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1918), aff'd. 217 S.W. 694 (Tex. 1920).