Sweeting v. State.McCoon v. State, 294 Ga. App. 490, 491 ( 669 SE2d 466) (2008).Colbert v. State, 284 Ga. 81, 81-82 ( 663 SE2d 158) (2008).
Miller's struggle to keep his money and his resulting injuries were contemporaneous with the taking, occurring as Abdul–Hakeem and Bellamy attempted to leave the scene with the money, and thereby established the necessary "force." See Henderson, 209 Ga. at 72(1), 70 S.E.2d 713; McCoon v. State, 294 Ga.App. 490, 492(1)(a), 669 S.E.2d 466 (2008) (where homeowner "stumbled upon" appellant and his co-defendants while they were in the process of stealing items from house, and appellant and co-defendants shot at homeowner and then fled, force required for armed robbery was contemporaneous with taking).Bellamy did not dispute any of Abdul–Hakeem's admissions.
Thus, the concept of “immediate presence” is broadly construed if the object taken was under the victim's control or responsibility and the victim is not too distant. McCoon v. State, 294 Ga.App. 490, 492(1)(b), 669 S.E.2d 466 (2008) (immediate presence shown when the victim was present in his residence at the time his shotgun was being stolen in a nearby room). Here, evidence that the victim was being held at gunpoint in the kitchen while Patterson stole items from various rooms in the house was sufficient to constitute a theft from his immediate presence.
Thus, the concept of "immediate presence" is broadly construed if the object taken was under the victim's control or responsibility and the victim is not too distant. McCoon v. State, 294 Ga. App. 490, 492 (1) (b) ( 669 SE2d 466) (2008) (immediate presence shown when the victim was present in his residence at the time his shotgun was being stolen in a nearby room) . Here, evidence that the victim was being held at gunpoint in the kitchen while Patterson stole items from various rooms in the house was sufficient to constitute a theft from his immediate presence.
(Citations, punctuation and footnotes omitted.) McCoon v. State, 294 Ga. App. 490, 491 ( 669 SE2d 466) (2008). Since the record here refutes Belcher's attacks on his guilty plea, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for an out-of-time appeal.
This record affirmatively establishes that Underwood was informed of and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights against compulsory self-incrimination, to trial by jury, and to confront his accusers. See McCoon v. State, 294 Ga. App. 490, 492-493 (2) ( 669 SE2d 466) (2008); Sweeting, 291 Ga. App. at 694; Johnson v. State, 287 Ga. App. 759, 762 (3) ( 652 SE2d 836) (2007). Underwood's claim to the contrary lacks merit.