Opinion
Case No. 2:18-cv-2397-RBH-MGB
09-26-2018
John McCombs, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina, State of, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a civilly committed person, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the case initially and to submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. After careful review, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Complaint (DE# 1) be summarily dismissed , without prejudice, and without issuance and service of process, for the following reasons:
I. The Present Lawsuit
Plaintiff has filed a civil complaint against the State of South Carolina, attempting to challenge his civil commitment and the validity of his underlying criminal conviction. (DE# 1). In the present case, the Plaintiff's "Statement of the Claim" consists of the following:
This Court's docket reflects that the Plaintiff has previously filed a § 1983 action challenging his civil commitment. See McCombs v. McGill, Case No. 8:09-cv-159-RBH-BHH. That case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute.
I am being illegally held, off of an illegal conviction that was used for an illegal civil commitment, which was bolstered by perjured testimony, and a violation of Art. I, sec. 22, of the S.C. Constitution. Habeas in state court is nowhere (§ 2254(f)) (Richland County Courthouse C.A. No. 2015-CP-40-02906).(Id. at 3, ¶ IV). Plaintiff provides no explanation or facts to support his conclusory allegation that his state conviction and subsequent civil commitment are "illegal." For relief, Plaintiff seeks release from detention and monetary damages for the allegedly "illegal conviction" and "illegal detention." (DE# 1 at 5, ¶ IV "Relief").
III. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, the Magistrate Judge has carefully reviewed this pro se prisoner complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and in light of the following cases: Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, and therefore, this case is subject to screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Such statute permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the action. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows the court to dismiss the case upon finding that the case is "frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii).
A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). "A suit is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte "at any time" under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). Id. The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute "is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits." Id. at 326.
As for failure to state a claim, "Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326. The "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' "Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although pro se complaints are liberally construed, a plaintiff must do more than make vague and conclusory statements to state a claim for relief. A plaintiff must allege facts that actually state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
This Court is required to liberally construe pro se documents, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980) (per curiam). The liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a complaint to "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986). The requirement of liberal construction for pro se pleadings does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dept. of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Inherent Authority
In addition to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the present Complaint is also subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, "constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute." In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). A federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, "and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears." Id. at 352; see also Carter v. Ervin, Case No. 0:14-cv-865-TLW-PJG, 2014 WL 2468351, *3 (D.S.C. June 2, 2014) ("the court possesses the inherent authority to ensure that ... federal jurisdiction exists"), appeal dism'd, 585 F.App'x 98 (4th Cir. 2014); Davis v. Wilson, Case No. 9:13-cv-382-GRA-BHH, 2013 WL 1282024, *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 8, 2013)(same), adopted, 2013 WL 1282024 (D.S.C. March 27, 2013), affirmed, 539 F.App'x 145 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 940 (2014), reh'g denied, 134 S. Ct. 1371 (2014); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action."). Although the absence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the case, a determination of jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is the most efficient procedure. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999).
The United States Supreme Court has observed that federal district courts possess inherent authority to dismiss a frivolous case. See Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) ("Section 1915(d) ... authorizes courts to dismiss a 'frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision."); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-537 (1974) (holding that federal district courts may dismiss claims that are "so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit"). Consistent with such authority, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that complaints may be "subject to summary dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court." Ross v. Baron, 493 F.App'x 405, 406 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2012); and see, e.g., Cabbill v. United States, Case No. 1:14-cv-4122-JMC-PJG, 2015 WL 6905072, *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 9, 2015) (same), appeal dismissed, 2016 WL 1085106 (4th Cir. March 21, 2016).
IV. Discussion
Even with liberal construction, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
A. Heck v . Humphrey Bars the Requested Relief of Release From Prison
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that "habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (affirming the district court's dismissal of prisoners' § 1983 claim, explaining that when "the relief [a prisoner] seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from [custody], his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus"); Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750-51 (2004) ("where success in a prisoner's § 1983 damages action would implicitly question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the litigant must first achieve favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence.").
In Heck, the United States Supreme Court explained that:
In order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Id. at 486-87.
Consistent with such authority, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "habeas corpus, and not § 1983, is the exclusive federal remedy for state prisoners seeking actual release from confinement." Griffin v. Baltimore Police Dept., 804 F.3d 692, 694-95 (4th Cir. 2015); see also, e.g., Johnson v. Ozmint, Case No. 0:07-cv-3027-PMD-BM, 567 F. Supp. 2d 806, 812 (D.S.C. 2008) ("To the extent that Plaintiff is challenging the validity of his confinement or seeking release from incarceration, that claim is cognizable only in a petition for writ of habeas corpus."); Deleston v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Case No. 6:10-cv-444-DCN-WMC, 2010 WL 6872294, *3 (D.S.C. March 15, 2010), adopted, 2011 WL 269317 (D.S.C. July 11, 2011) (summarily dismissing civil case that attempted to challenge conviction and citing Heck), aff'd by, 451 F.App'x 285 (4th Cir. Oct. 21, 2011). Release from prison is not an available remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Singleton v. 10 Unidentified U.S. Marshals, No. 2:11-1811-TLW-JDA, 2011 WL 4970779, n.16 (Sept. 1, 2011) ("Plaintiff cannot obtain the requested relief of release from prison in this action because such relief is only available in a habeas corpus proceeding."), adopted, 2011 WL 5005271 (D.S.C. Oct.19, 2011).
Plaintiff's conviction may not be collaterally attacked in this § 1983 action. Heck v. Humphrey precludes such relief. Nothing in the record suggests that the Plaintiff's state conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Under Heck v. Humphrey and its progeny, Plaintiff may not obtain release from confinement by attempting to challenge his state conviction in this § 1983 action. As his state conviction has not been invalidated, he may not seek damages here. See Griffin, 804 F.3d at 695-96 (relying on Heck and affirming dismissal of Plaintiff's suit for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Hence, the present case is subject to summary dismissal. As a matter of law, the deficiencies of this Complaint cannot be remedied through more specific factual pleading, and therefore, amendment would be futile. Any challenge to Plaintiff's state conviction would have to be timely raised in a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after exhaustion of state remedies.
Although the Heck bar is not jurisdictional, see Okoro v. Bohman, 164 F.3d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006), a district court may sua sponte dismiss a case that is barred by Heck. See Knowlin v. Thompson, 207 F.3d 907, 908-09 (7th Cir. 2000); Higgins v. City of Tulsa, Okla., 103 F.App'x 648, 650-51 (10th Cir. 2004); Hicks v. Canterbury, 2015 WL 6509133 (S.D.W.Va. Oct. 28, 2015) ("When a § 1983 action is barred by Heck, the legal effect is that the action is not cognizable, and thus fails to state a claim.").
Although Plaintiff complains that his "habeas in state court is nowhere" (DE#1 at 3, ¶ IV), such vague allegation would not be sufficient to demonstrate exhaustion of remedies.
B. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Eleventh Amendment precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); and see Lee-Thomas v. Prince George's Cty. Pub. Sch., 666 F.3d 244, 248 (4th Cir. 2012) ("an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal court by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state") (quoting Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990)). In other words, a State cannot, without its consent, be sued in a District Court of the United States by one of its own citizens for alleged violation of the Constitution and/or laws of the United States. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663. The State of South Carolina has not consented to be sued for such claims. See S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e) ("Nothing in this chapter is construed as a waiver of the state's or political subdivision's immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States nor as consent to be sued in any state court beyond the boundaries of the State of South Carolina.").
No exceptions to sovereign immunity are applicable in the present case.
Plaintiff seeks release from confinement and sues the State of South Carolina for monetary damages. (DE#1 at 5, ¶ V "Relief," indicating that he wants the State of South Carolina "to free me and pay me enough to cover the last 40 years of my life..."). "Sovereign immunity does not merely constitute a defense to monetary liability...[r]ather, it provides an immunity from suit." Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 766 (2002); see also Ransom v. Lawrence, Case No. 6:12-3141-JFA-KFM, 2013 WL 4523588, *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2013) ("The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining an action against a state."); Singleton, 2011 WL 4970779 at *6 (holding that plaintiff was barred from suing the State based on Eleventh Amendment immunity). Sovereign immunity protects the State, as well as its agencies, divisions, officials, and other "arms of the State" from suits for monetary damages. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989); see also Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (dismissing based on Eleventh Amendment immunity); Jones v. SCDC, Case No. 5:12-cv-3554-RBH-KDW, 2013 WL 3880175, *4 (D.S.C. July 26, 2013) (same).
The State of South Carolina is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity as a matter of law. Such immunity does not depend on any disputed jurisdictional facts in the present case. This case does not involve a situation where the plaintiff "could save his action by merely amending his complaint." Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 of United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993)). The legal deficiencies of Plaintiff's Complaint cannot be remedied by more specific pleading of facts, and therefore, amendment would be futile.
C. Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(b)(1) , Dismissal With or Without Prejudice
The only remaining questions are whether the dismissal should be pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(b)(1), and whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that it is not entirely settled within this judicial circuit "whether a dismissal on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds is a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)." Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524 n.2 (4th Cir. 2000) ("Our cases have been unclear on whether a dismissal on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds is a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)."); Tall v. Md. Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene, 2016 WL 7491621, *4 (D.Md Dec. 29, 2016) (observing that "[i]t is not clear whether a motion to dismiss based on the Eleventh Amendment is properly considered pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6)," but deciding to proceed under Rule 12(b)(1)), aff'd, 690 F.App'x 841 (4th Cir. May 30, 2017); cf. Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 58-59 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing dismissal on Eleventh Amendment grounds as a dismissal for failure to state claim).
Research reflects numerous cases within this judicial circuit that have treated dismissals based on Eleventh Amendment immunity as dismissals pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Abril v. Virginia, 145 F.3d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal on Eleventh Amendment grounds as dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Haley v. Va. Dept. of Health, 2012 WL 5494306, *2 n.2 (W.D.Va. Nov. 13, 2012) (dismissing based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Tall, 2016 WL 7491621, *4 (same, finding "that it is more appropriate to consider this argument under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) because it ultimately challenges this Court's ability to exercise its Article III power") (quoting Beckham v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 569 F. Supp. 2d 542 (D. Md. 2008)). The United States Supreme Court has observed that "sovereign immunity applies regardless of whether a private plaintiff's suit is for monetary damages or some other type of relief." (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) ("we have often made it clear that the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment").
Therefore, based on the State of South Carolina's entitlement to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, and given that this is a ruling "not on the merits," dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) would be appropriate here. See Abdul-Mumit, et al. v. Alexandria Hyundai, LLC, et al, 896 F.3d 278, 2018 WL 3405474, *5 (4th Cir. July 13, 2018) (indicating that a court should explain its rationale when dismissing a case without prejudice); and see, e.g., Garner v. U.S. Dist. Court of S.C., No. 3:08-3913-TLW-JRM, 2009 WL 8762538 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2009) (dismissing without prejudice on the basis of sovereign immunity), adopted, 2009 WL 2192664 (D.S.C. July 21, 2009).
D. No Factual Amendment Could Cure the Legal Deficiencies of the Complaint
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss should be granted "only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Balfour Beatty Infrastructure, Inc., v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 855 F.3d 247, 251 (4th Cir. April 25, 2017) (quoting Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., a Div. of Standex Int'l Corp., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999)). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently observed that dismissals are generally final and appealable in cases where the district court has dismissed the case based "on procedural grounds that no amendment to the pleadings could cure." Stinnie v. Holcomb,734 F.App'x 858, 2018 WL 2337750, *2 (4th Cir. May 23, 2018) (discussing the rationale of Goode and Domino Sugar, and remanding because the grounds for the dismissal without prejudice did not make clear that "no amendment could cure the defects in the plaintiff's case"). In some cases, additional pleaded facts could possibly show a basis for jurisdiction. See, e.g. United States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 875 (2009); Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). The present case does not involve such situation. Here, there are no facts that would affect the State of South Carolina's entitlement to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
No factual amendment would cure the legal defects in Plaintiff's case. The dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) does not rest on the sufficiency of Plaintiffs' factual allegations, and more specific pleading of additional facts would be futile. As a matter of law, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff's suit against the State of South Carolina. See, e.g., Rutland v. Dugas, 2016 WL 3436422, *3 (W.D.N.C. June 17, 2016) (holding that because the claims "are subject to dismissal on the ground of sovereign immunity the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over this case").
IV. Recommendation
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Complaint (DE# 1) should be summarily dismissed , without prejudice, and without issuance and service of process.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE September 26, 2018
Charleston, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the Important Warning on the following page:
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).