Opinion
CLAIM NO. E416630
OPINION FILED SEPTEMBER 9, 1996
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by the HONORABLE TIM PARKER, Attorney at Law, Eureka Springs, Arkansas.
Respondents represented by the HONORABLE RANDOLPH C. JACKSON, Attorney at Law, Fort Smith, Arkansas.
Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Affirmed.
OPINION AND ORDER
The claimant appeals the decision of an administrative law judge filed August 8, 1995, finding that his claim for benefits is barred by the Statute of Limitations. After carefully conducting a de novo review of the entire record, we find that the administrative law judge's decision must be affirmed.
The claimant was employed as a cook by the respondent employer during the summer of 1992. On July 13, 1992, the claimant was in the kitchen preparing breakfast. He alleges it was extremely hot as he stood over the stove and that he blacked out, causing him to fall and strike his face on the edge of the stove. The fall resulted in the need for immediate emergency care and the claimant was transported to the local hospital via ambulance where he remained for about 5 days. He later received treatment from a dentist for the damage to his teeth that supposedly occurred in the fall. The claimant, though working in Eureka Springs, was an Oklahoma resident and the contract of employment was apparently entered into in Oklahoma. The claimant, therefore, initially filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits in Oklahoma. That claim was dismissed in September of 1994. According to the claimant, it was dismissed because "the Workman's Compensation Court in Oklahoma City ruled that it should have been filed here in Arkansas." Next, in December of 1994, more than two years since the date of injury, the claimant filed the claim for benefits that is currently before this Commission.
This claim, having resulted from an injury which occurred prior to the enactment of Act 796 of 1993, is not subject to that Act's provisions on the Statute of Limitations. Rather, the law as it existed on July 13, 1992, governs resolution of the issues presented. The Statute of Limitations applicable in this matter is found in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702 (Repl. 1996). The statute requires that a claim for compensation be filed within two years of the date of injury, if no benefits for the claim are received by the claimant, or within one year from the date of the last receipt of benefits by the claimant. The respondents, having controverted the claim in its entirety, have not paid any benefits in this matter. Therefore, the claimant was statutorily required to file his claim within two years from the date of injury, or by July 13, 1994. As noted, this claim was not filed until December of 1994. Consequently, the claim is barred unless the claimant has tolled the Statute of Limitations in some manner. The claimant alleges he did so by filing his claim in Oklahoma.
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702 (e) (Repl. 1996) states that:
Whenever recovery in an action at law to recover damages for injury to or death of an employee is denied to any person on the ground that the employee and his employer were subject to the provisions of the Act, the limitations prescribed in subsections (a) and (b) shall begin to run from the termination of such action.
In construing this statute, our courts have stated that a claimant must establish three things in order to toll the statute of limitations. 1) An action at law for damages, 2) denial of recovery, and 3) that the recovery was denied on the grounds that the parties were subject to the Workers' Compensation Act. See, Plunkett v. St. Francis Valley Lumber Company, 25 Ark. App. 195, 755 S.W.2d 240 (1988). If all three requirements are not met, the claim is barred by the Statute of Limitations. We find that the claimant's filing in Oklahoma was not an "action at law to recover damages" as that phrase is used in the statute. Additionally, we find that recovery in Oklahoma was not denied on the grounds that the claimant was subject to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act.
The claimant, in asserting his claim filed in Oklahoma was "an action at law for damages," relies primarily on the case ofArkansas Casualty Surety Co. v. Jordan, 234 Ark. 339, 352 S.W.2d 75 (1961). In Jordan, the claimant, a resident of Louisiana, was injured while working in Arkansas. After the payment of some benefits, a dispute arose and he filed a claim for additional benefits in his home state of Louisiana. However, the Louisiana courts dismissed the claim. The claimant then filed his claim in Arkansas where the Statute of Limitations was raised as a bar to additional compensation. In discussing the requirement of "an action at law for damages" the Arkansas Supreme Court stated:
At all times herein involved the claimant lived in the State of Louisiana. After the insurance carrier ceased making compensation payments . . . the claimant filed suit in Louisiana against the [insurance company]. . . This was the correct procedure in Louisiana for the adjudication of compensation claims, i.e., rather than seeking an award from a commission, the claim is filed in the proper district court (23:1311 Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950). . . The insurance carrier excepted to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana Court and claimed that the . . . Arkansas Workmen's compensation commission had exclusive jurisdiction. . . .
In view of the Arkansas Statutes and the facts as recited, we hold that [Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702 (e)] is applicable, and that the claim is not barred by limitation. Learned counsel from the insurance carrier says that the action in the Louisiana District Court was not "an action for damages" and is therefore not within the purview of the said paragraph (e), but this argument is not impressive. The purpose of filing a claim is to set in motion the approved machinery for adjudication. The action in the Louisiana District Court certainly put the insurance carrier of the employer on notice. The purpose of subsection (e) is to toll the statute of limitation while an action is pending. The action in the Louisiana Court was to recover money for injuries sustained by the claimant. It was in a court of law. What more is a damage suit than an action in a law court to recover money for injuries sustained.
It would be putting form above substance to hold that subsection (e) . . . was not applicable in this case . . . . we are committed to the rule that if a substantial doubt exists as to which is the applicable statute of limitations, the longer rather than the shorter period is to be preferred and adopted. This rule is in harmony with our settled policy of giving a broad and liberal interpretation to the construction of the provisions of the Compensation Act to effectuate its purposes, and the further policy of resolving doubtful cases in favor of the claimant.
Id. at 341-43 [citations omitted].
The respondents resist an interpretation of the above that would find the claimant in the instant case did bring an "action at law for damages" in Oklahoma by pointing to the more recent decision of Haney v. Young Sales Company, 22 Ark. App. 212, 737 S.W.2d 669 (1987). In Haney, a similar fact pattern existed, except that the claim was originally filed in Missouri. In discussing the "action at law for damages" requirement andJordan, the Arkansas Court of Appeals stated:
We cannot agree that the filing of the claim before the Missouri Division of Workmen's Compensation would make [Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702 (e)] applicable. Actions at law to recover damages for injury are entirely different from claims for compensation on account of disability. Actions at law for damages are brought in constitutional courts having jurisdiction over torts. Claims for compensation for disability are determined by administrative agencies created for that purpose. The distinction between the two and the difference between our Workers' Compensation Commission and our courts of law have been recognized on many occasions. . .
[Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702 (e)] was not intended to apply to claims for statutory benefits for industrial injuries filed before the workers' compensation agencies of sister states but was designed to allow an extension of the period of limitations for the filing of claims by those who mistakenly pursued tort claims against their employers, when in fact the exclusive remedies afforded for their injuries were under the Workers' Compensation Act. . . . The appellant argues that this case is controlled by the decision in [Jordan, Id.]. We do not agree. We can only conclude that Jordan is, and certainly ought to be, limited to its peculiar facts. The court in Jordan placed great emphasis on the fact that, under Louisiana law, compensation cases are initiated in its courts of law and that such an action is one to recover money for injuries sustained by a claimant. In Missouri, claims for industrial injuries are processed through the Division of Worker's Compensation, which is not a court but a mere administrative agency. The courts of Missouri have so declared.
Haney at 214-15 [citations omitted].
Rather than establish an administrative agency or quasi-judicial body as Arkansas has done, Oklahoma has set up a system of Workers' Compensation Courts to hear claims. Oklahoma law and the appellate courts of Oklahoma expressly declare the Workers' Compensation Courts of Oklahoma to be "courts of record." The Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Courts have the authority to punish for "direct contempt" and are vested with exclusive jurisdiction over workers' compensation claims. See, 85 Okl.St.Ann. 1.2 (A), (F), (I) and (J). See Also, Texas Oklahoma Express v. Sorenson, 652 P.2d 285, 287 (Okl. 1982) andJohnston Food Co. v. Monday, 702 P.2d 62 (Okl. 1985). See Generally, 85 Okl.St.Ann. § 1.1[ 85-1.1] et seq.
However, contrary to the claimant's position, the mere fact that he initially brought his claim in a court of record does not end the inquiry. As noted, the requirement is that he bring "an action at law for damages." We find that the claim filed in Oklahoma, even though before a declared court of record, was not "an action at law for damages." Rather, it was a claim for workers' compensation benefits before the body established by Oklahoma to hear compensation claims. This case is unlikeJordan, Supra, where the claimant instituted an action in a court of record empowered to hear tort and other civil claims. Here, the claimant asserted an entitlement to compensation before a court which was created for the sole and express purpose of determining claims for disability based on work-related injuries. Moreover, the Oklahoma court's jurisdiction is explicitly limited to the determination of workers' compensation claims. It has no power beyond the determination of such claims. Consequently, We find the language in Haney, supra, regarding the differences in actions for damages before courts of law and claims for compensation before administrative agencies, to be applicable to the situation presented in this case.
In filing his claim in the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Courts, the claimant did not file an action seeking damages to redress his alleged injuries and make him "whole" again. Instead, he sought compensation pursuant to a statutory scheme which dictates the value of injuries and lost time from work resulting from an on-the-job injury. The statutory scheme does not, through the benefits it provides, make any pretense at making the claimant "whole" for his injuries. Rather, it is an expression of a public policy to assist injured workers until such time as they can return to productivity without regard for what their damages in an action at law would be worth. Finally, as noted above, the claim was brought before a body whose sole purpose and reason for existence is the determination of compensation claims and not an adjudication of damages. Pursuant to the above, we find that while the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Courts may be courts of record under Oklahoma law, the bringing of a claim in them is not equivalent to the bringing of "an action at law for damages" as that phrase is used in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702 (e) (Repl. 1996).
In addition to the foregoing, the claimant has also failed to establish that his claim in Oklahoma was dismissed because he and the respondents were subject to the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act. The only evidence in the record concerning Oklahoma's dismissal of the case is the above quoted portion of the claimant's testimony. That testimony shows, at most, that the case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. As the Court of Appeals stated in the quoted portion of Haney, supra, the legislature's intent with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702 (e) (Repl. 1996) was to extend the limitations period for those who filed a tort action without realizing their claim was subject to the exclusive remedies afforded under the Workers' Compensation Act. There is no evidence that the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court dismissed the claimant's action with a finding he was subject to the exclusive remedies afforded under the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act. The statute is clear in its requirement that the claim be dismissed in the other forum because the parties are subject to the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act. In Jordan, supra, the claim was dismissed in Louisiana upon the respondent's motion which asserted "that the Arkansas Workmen's Compensation Commission had exclusive jurisdiction" over the claim. There is no evidence in the record before us to indicate any such assertion or finding was made in Oklahoma. Consequently, we find that a dismissal for want of jurisdiction without a finding the claimant is subject to the Arkansas Act, as occurred in the present case, is insufficient to fulfill the statutory requirement and toll the limitations period.
Statutes of limitations are legislative enactments of public policy which will eventually operate to bar a remedy. The fact that a claim may have merit will not excuse it from the operation of the applicable Statute of Limitations. The decisions of the legislature in placing a limitation on the time in which a claim must be asserted or be forever barred will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of palpable error in the exercise of the legislative judgement. See, Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 25 Ark. App. 66, 752 S.W.2d 288 (1988).
Accordingly, based on our de novo review of the record in this matter and for the reasons discussed herein, we find the claimant has failed to establish requirements for tolling the Statute of Limitations expressed in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702 (e) (Repl. 1996). Consequently, his claim is barred from further consideration and is dismissed. The decision of the Administrative Law Judge must be, and hereby is, affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Commissioner Humphrey dissents.