Opinion
Case No. 01-CV-72200-DT
July 17, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL
I. Introduction
The Court has before it Plaintiff Oliver McClure's pro se civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court has granted Plaintiff's application to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a). Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee currently confined at the Wayne County Jail in Detroit, Michigan. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he is being unconstitutionally imprisoned on a felonious assault charge and that he is being denied a trial on the charge. Defendants are attorney Capers Harper, Jr. and Wayne County Circuit Judge Maggie Drake. Plaintiff seeks impeachment of Judge Drake, as well as a trial before another judge. Having reviewed Plaintiff's complaint, the Court now dismisses it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) and 1915A (b)(1) for failure to state claims upon which relief may be granted.
II. Discussion
Plaintiff has been granted in forma pauperis status. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) ("PLRA"), the Court is required to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service on a defendant if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (e)(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). The Court is similarly required to dismiss a complaint seeking redress against government entities, officers, and employees which it finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978); Brock v. McWherter, 94 F.3d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1996). A pro se civil rights complaint is to be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jones v. Duncan, 840 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 1988). Despite the liberal pleading standard accorded pro se plaintiffs, the Court finds that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims are subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(b) and 1915A (b) for failure to state claims upon which relief may be granted.
A claim under § 1983 is an appropriate remedy for a state prisoner challenging a condition of his imprisonment. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973). In this case, however, it is clear that Plaintiff is actually seeking habeas corpus relief, inasmuch as his claims address the validity of his imprisonment on the felonious assault charge and his assertion of his right to a speedy trial. Ruling on the claims raised would necessarily imply the invalidity of his continued confinement. Such claims are not properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (holding that a state prisoner does not state a cognizable civil rights claim challenging his conviction or imprisonment if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his continuing confinement invalid, until and unless the reason for his continued confinement has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by a federal court's issuance or a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254); Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1995). This holds true regardless of the relief sought by the plaintiff. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487-89. Given that Petitioner challenges his felonious assault charge and is awaiting trial, his § 1983 claims must be dismissed.
Additionally, attorney Capers Harper is not subject to suit under § 1983 since he is not a state actor. See Polk Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) ("[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding."). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim against Mr. Harper must be dismissed.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state claims upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b).
Additionally, the Court concludes that an appeal from this order would be frivolous and therefore cannot be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997).
IT IS SO ORDERED.