Opinion
No. 2-488 / 01-1327
Filed October 16, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Davis County, Daniel Morrison, Judge.
Defendant's appeal from an order quieting title in plaintiffs to certain abandoned railroad right-of-way. AFFIRMED.
Thomas Walter of Johnson, Hester, Walter, Breckenridge Duker, L.L.P., Ottumwa, for appellant.
Steven Gardner of Kiple, Denefe, Beaver, Gardner Zingg, L.L.P., Ottumwa, for appellees.
Considered by Hayden, and Habhab and Snell, S.J.
Senior judges assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2001).
On May 31, 2001 the district court quieted the following described real estate in Philip G. McClure and Sheila McClure, husband and wife:
A strip of land approximately 100 feet in width, being the former main track right-of-way of the Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad Company, going through the South West 1/4, North West 1/4, and North East 1/2 of section 12, township 70 North, range 13 West, and the South East 1/4 of section 1 township 70 North range 13 West in Davis County, Iowa.
The railroad obtained the right-of-way on February 2, 1871, by deeds from Jacob Minick. These deeds to the railroad provided in the event the railroad company abandoned the route, the land shall revert to and become the property of the grantor, his heirs or assigns. McClures became owners of the land on both sides of the right-of-way from the successors in interest of the original grantors to the railroad.
In the mid 1980s, the railroad abandoned the right-of-way and, by a quit claim deed, attempted to transfer its interest in the property to Hawkeye Land Company. In January, 1987, Hawkeye Land Company issued a quit claim deed of the property to Jeff England. England now claims he is the owner in fee simple of the land in question.
The trial court determined the deed from Chicago Pacific Corporation to Hawkeye Land Company was totally ineffective, since Chicago Pacific Corporation had nothing to convey as a result of the habendum clause in the deed from its grantors. When the railroad abandoned the right-of-way, the property reverted to the original owners, heirs, or assigns, in this case the plaintiffs, and quieted the right-of-way land in the McClures. England appeals. We affirm.
Our standard of review in this equity case is de novo. Iowa R.App.P.6.4.
We agree with the trial court the reversionary language in the 1871 deeds to the railroad clearly establishes a fee simple determinable interest in the right-of-way was conveyed to the railroad. In contrast to an easement, a determinable fee is an estate in fee simple that will expire and revert to the grantor upon the happening of a specified possible future event or contingency. Hawk v. Rice, 325 N.W.2d 97, 98 (Iowa 1982). A similar reversion clause was held to be fee simple determinable in Chicago N.W. Real Estate Co. v. City of Osage, 176 N.W.2d 788, 789 (Iowa 1970). The railroad abandoned the right-of-way, and, on June 1, 1984, filed a trustee's deed assigning its rights to the Chicago Pacific Corporation. On July 1, 1985, the Chicago Pacific Corporation deeded the property by quit claim deed to the Hawkeye Land Company (Hawkeye). On January 12, 1987, Hawkeye deeded the property by quit claim deed to Jeff England.
The reversionary clause in the 1871 deeds to the railroad effectively terminated the railroad's interest in the right-of-way. The railroad had nothing to assign in its trustee's deed to the Chicago Pacific Corporation. The Chicago Pacific Corporation had nothing to convey in its quit claim deed to Hawkeye. Therefore Hawkeye had nothing to convey when it issued a quit claim deed to England. England received nothing by way of the quit claim deed from Hawkeye.
Iowa Code section 327G.77 (2001), entitled Reversion of Railroad right-of way, is as follows:
(I) If a railroad easement is extinguished . . . the property shall pass to the owners of the adjacent property at the time of abandonment. . . .
McClures are successors in interest from the original grantors. The 1871 deeds to the railroad provided that, whenever the railroad abandoned the right-of-way, it reverted to the original grantors, heirs, or assigns. The McClures own the land on both sides of the abandoned right-of-way. Title to the abandoned right-of-way is vested in plaintiffs. See Hawk v. Rice, 325 N.W.2d at 99; Iowa Code § 327G.77.
England also suggests his quit claim deed from Hawkeye was ambiguous and the court should reform the deed. We find the deed was not ambiguous and refuse to attempt to reform it.
Next England claims to hold the land by way of adverse possession. He did not raise or plead this issue in the district court. A claim of adverse possession is a statute of limitations defense. A defendant waives a statute of limitations defense when not raised in the pleadings. See Porter v. Good Eave Spouting, 505 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Iowa 1993). The claim of adverse possession is waived and we do not consider it on appeal.
Title to the land in question and the subject of this appeal is quieted in Phillip McClure and Sheila McClure, husband and wife. We affirm the district court.
Costs of appeal are assessed to Jeff England.