Opinion
CASE NO. 1:08cv-634-MEF.
May 5, 2009
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 31) filed on October 10, 2008. On August 6, 2008, Plaintiff brought suit against the City of Dothan, Alabama, and several individual defendants in their official and individual capacities. Plaintiff's claims are made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, a former employee of the City of Dothan, alleges violations of his right to procedural due process, equal protection, and retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
Those individual defendants are Billy Mayes ("Mayes"), Mike West ("West"), Kai Davis ("Davis"). Mayes is alleged to have been a Department Heard for the City of Dothan. West is alleged to have been City Manager for the City of Dothan. Davis is alleged to have been Personnel Director for the City of Dothan.
The City of Dothan seeks dismissal of the claim against it because contends that the claim is duplicative of the claims of Mayes, West, and Davis in their individual capacities. Plaintiff cannot and does not seriously dispute that the claim against the city and the claim against Mayes, West, and Davis are duplicative or redundant. Instead he argues that redundancy is not a ground on which a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) can be made.
The Court finds that under the applicable law the claims against Mayes, West, and Davis are indeed duplicative or redundant claims in light of the existence of Count VII of the Amended Complaint against the City of Dothan, the entity for which Mayes, West, and Davis all worked. In Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985), the United States Supreme Court sought to eliminate lingering confusion about the distinction between personal-capacity and official-capacity suits. The Supreme Court emphasized that official-capacity suits "`generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" Id. at 165 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)). Accord, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (explaining that the real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named official). Thus, suits against municipal officials in their official capacity therefore should be treated as suits against the municipality. See, e.g., Brown v. Neumann, 188 F.3d 1289, 1290 (11th Cir. 1999) (a suit against a governmental official in his official capacity is deemed a suit against the entity that he represents); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) ("Such suits against municipal officers are therefore, in actuality, suits directly against the city that the officer represents"); Gray v. City of Eufaula, 31 F. Supp. 2d 957, 965 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (same). Indeed, based on these and similar cases, Courts in this Circuit have rather routinely dismissed claims against municipal employees in their official capacities where the municipality was properly made a defendant. Perhaps such rulings are more properly characterized as made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) which allows a court to strike from a pleading any redundant material. Indeed, such an action can be taken by a court even without a motion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f)(1).
In this case the application of these well-established principles make it plain that the official capacity claims against Mayes, West, and Davis are really claims against the governmental entity by which they were employed, the City of Dothan, Alabama. The City of Dothan, Alabama has already been made a proper party defendant to this action. Any relief required against Mayes, West, and Davis can be achieved by Plaintiff's claims against the City of Dothan. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that the official capacity claims against Mayes, West, and Davis are unnecessarily duplicative and redundant.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. On or before May 22, 2009, Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint which omits either the claim against the City of Dothan, or the claims against Mayes, West, and Davis in their official capacities.
2. The Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 31) filed by the City of Dothan and the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 32) filed by Mayes, West, and Davis are denied as MOOT as they are directed to the Amended Complaint which will be supplanted by the second amended complaint.
A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on April 9, 2006, the new fee to file an appeal will increase from $255.00 to $455.00. CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST1. Appealable Orders : Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: 28 U.S.C. § 158Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre 701 F.2d 1365 1368 28 U.S.C. § 636 In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, 54Williams v. Bishop 732 F.2d 885 885-86 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co. 486 U.S. 196 201 108 S.Ct. 1717 1721-22 100 L.Ed.2d 178LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc. 146 F.3d 832 837 Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: 28 U.S.C. § 1292 Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541 546 93 L.Ed. 1528Atlantic Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc. 890 F.2d 371 376 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp. 379 U.S. 148 157 85 S.Ct. 308 312 13 L.Ed.2d 199 2. Time for Filing Rinaldo v. Corbett 256 F.3d 1276 1278 4 Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): 3 THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): 28 U.S.C. § 1746 3. Format of the notice of appeal : See also 3pro se 4. Effect of a notice of appeal : 4
Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute: (a) Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under , generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." , , (11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. (c). (b) a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. (b). , , (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. , , , , , (1988); , , (11th Cir. 1998). (c) Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. (d) The certification specified in (b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable. (e) Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: , , , 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, (1949); , , (11th Cir. 1989); , , , , , (1964). Rev.: 4/04 : The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. , , (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. (a) and (c) set the following time limits: (a) A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below. (b) "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later." (c) If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion. (d) Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension. (e) If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid. Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. Fed.R.App.P. (c). A notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant. A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. (a)(4).