The testator's two children predeceased their mother, and she attempted to devise her husband's property to a grandchild. This Court held that the primary purpose of the husband was to provide for the wife's comfort; that the power to sell, dispose of, or convert the property as she should think proper had exclusive reference to the comfort of the wife and meant only such disposition as should be effective in her lifetime and as should be designed primarily for her benefit and advantage. Cf. McClernan v. McClernan, 73 Md. 283, 20 A. 908; Mills v. Bailey, 88 Md. 320, 41 A. 780; Roberts v. Roberts, 102 Md. 131, 147, 62 A. 161; In re Davison Trust Estate, 103 Md. 479, 63 A. 1044; 33 Am. Jur., Life Estates, Remainders, etc., sec. 243; Annotations, 2 A.L.R. 1316, and 69 A.L.R. 830. We hold that Mrs. King had no authority to accumulate the income from the life estate, support herself on the corpus of Mr. King's estate, and bequeath the accumulated income to persons of her own selection.
She held the property therefore as a trustee for the remaindermen. McClernan v. McClernan, 73 Md. 283, 288, 20 A. 908; Miller on Construction of Wills, sec. 253, nn. 7, 8; Meister v. Meister, 121 Md. 440, 88 A. 235; Russell v. Werntz, 88 Md. 210, 44 A. 219; In re Bauernschmidt's Estate, 97 Md. 35, 54 A. 637. Tyson v. Tyson, 31 Md. 134, where it was held that a provision for re-investment annexed to a power to convert was suggestive rather than peremptory, is not inconsistent with that conclusion, for there the court was influenced by the fact that the limitation over applied only "in case no sale or other disposition should be made * * * under the aforesaid powers * * *," a circumstance which distinguishes it from such cases as this as well as from those cited above. As a trustee Mrs. Gaver was under a duty to exercise her power to sell fairly and impartially for the equal benefit of all the remaindermen, and any grant of a gift, benefit, or advantage to one remainderman at the expense of the others would constitute a breach of that duty. 65 C.J., 648; 26 R.C.L. 1280, 1281; Calvert v. Carter, 18 Md.
But if such right ever existed, it has long since been barred by laches if not by limitations. We have carefully examined the cases cited in the appellant's brief and relied upon to sustain his contention that the trust embraced the whole estate in remainder, viz. Chase Postell v. Stockett and Ridout, Exts., 72 Md. 244; McClernan v. McClernan, 73 Md. 283, and Roberts v. Edie, 102 Md. 131, but without going into any discussion of these cases we cannot find in them any warrant for extending this trust beyond what we have indicated. In the view that we have taken of this case, the question of multifariousness, and the omission to file exhibits named in the bill before issuing process, become unimportant, and this opinion will not be extended by any consideration of those questions.