00 (on suggestion of error, 209 Miss. 268, 47 So.2d 150); Tallahatchie Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Yokena-Tallahatchie Dist. No. 1, 148 Miss. 182, 114 So. 264; Universal Motor Co. v. Newton County, 158 Miss. 873, 130 So. 791, 131 So. 827; Weiler v. Monroe County, 76 Miss. 492, 25 So. 352; Secs. 95, 211, Constitution 1890; 20 C.J.S., Sec. 82 p. 849. II. The agreements between the Board of Supervisors and the Giles family were not placed on the minutes of the Board of Supervisors and therefore were null and void. Bridges v. Bd. of Supervisors of Clay County, 58 Miss. 817; Bd. of Supervisors of Lafayette County v. Parks, 132 Miss. 752, 96 So. 466; Campbell v. Hackensack, 115 N.J.L. 209, 178 A. 794; Hawkins v. City of West Point, 200 Miss. 412, 27 So.2d 541; Jackson Equip. Co. v. Dunlap, 172 Miss. 752, 160 So. 734; Martin v. Newell, 198 Miss. 809, 23 So.2d 796; Smith v. Bd. of Supervisors of Tallahatchie County, 124 Miss. 36, 86 So. 707; Sec. 2892, Code 1942; 37 Am. Jur. 677; 20 C.J.S., Sec. 91 p. 863; 32 C.J.S., Sec. 807 p. 734; 62 C.J.S., Sec. 409 pp. 777-783. III. The apportionment of accretions to Sections 4, 5 and 21 by the agreements of 1910 and 1951 was so unjust, inequitable and unfair to the State of Mississippi that said agreements virtually and actually amounted to a donation to the Giles family of school lands, thus said agreements were null and void on their face as being in violation of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi, Section 95. Archer v. Southern Ry. Co., 114 Miss. 414, 75 So. 252; Smith v. Leavenworth, 101 Miss. 238, 57 So. 803; State ex rel. Kyle, Atty. Gen. v. Dear, supra; Sec. 95, Constitution 1890; 32 A.L.R. 453; 41 A.L.R. 383; 52 A.L.R. 1177; 56 Am. Jur., Secs. 463, 494, pp. 876, 904; 65 C.J.S., Sec. 84 p. 181; 1 R.C.L., Secs. 20, 21; 4 R.C.L., Sec. 23; Clark on Surveying Boundaries (2d ed.), Sec. 275 p. 316 Fig. 66, Sec. 321 p. 392 Fig. 86; Vol. 5, Thompson on Real Property, Sec. 2546 p. 294.

Notwithstanding the existence of this legislation, the previously adopted rule, as well as the application thereof, survived the legislative act. See Wagoner v. Sattley Mfg. Co., 23 Okla. 52, 99 P. 643; Hanover State Bank v. Henke, 15 Okla. 631, 83 P. 926; McClelland v. Minor, 19 Okla. 104, 91 P. 863; Sawyer Austin Lbr. Co. v. Champlain Lbr. Co., 16 Okla. 90, 84 P. 1093; Alexander v. First National Bank, 136 Okla. 251, 277 P. 667. Alluding to the foregoing statute, it is to be noted that the statute, specifically authorizes an amendment in case of omission of any "statement or certificate or motion."

A case-made filed in an appellate court imports absolute verity as to what occurred in the trial below. Richardson v. Penny, 6 Okla. 328, 50 P. 231; McClellan v. Minor, 19 Okla. 104, 91 P. 863; St. Louis S. F. Ry. Co. v. Loughmiller (D.C.) 193 Fed. 689. It is the sole, conclusive, and unimpeachable evidence of the proceedings in the lower court. If incomplete or incorrect, amendment or correction must be sought by the proper proceedings. In the case of an omission or error in the record, the power exists in the court below to amend such record, so that it may conform to the actual facts and truth of the case.

It has also been repeatedly held that the certificate of counsel that the case-made contained all the evidence did not dispense with the necessity of a recital in the case-made to that effect. McClellan v. Minor, 19 Okla. 104, 91 P. 863; Exendine v. Goldstine, 14 Okla. 100, 77 P. 45; Co. Commissioners v. Wright, 8 Okla. 190, 57 P. 203; Gaffney v. Stanard et al., 31 Okla. 541, 122 P. 510, and authorities therein cited. In the last case the certificate, however, was made only by the attorney for the plaintiff in error.