Opinion
Hearing Granted March 23, 1944.
Original proceeding by McClatchy Newspapers against Honorable Malcolm C. Glenn, as Judge of the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County of Sacramento, for a writ of mandate or other appropriate writ to compel the respondent to set aside and annul certain orders made by him in a certain action pending before the superior court, entitled Babcock v. McClatchy Newspapers and others.
Peremptory writ issued. COUNSEL
Alex J. Ashen and Downey, Brand & Seymour, all of Sacramento, and Sullivan, Roche, Johnson & Farraher and Theo. J. Roche, all of San Francisco, for petitioner.
Malcolm C. Glenn, of Sacramento, in pro. per.
Otis D. Babcock and John L. Brannely, both of Sacramento, amici curiae.
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner has applied to this court to issue a writ of mandate or other appropriate writ to compel respondent Superior Court to set aside and annul certain orders made by respondent in that certain action pending before said Superior Court, entitled Babcock v. McClatchy Newspapers, a corporation, et al. The allegations of the petition not controverted here show the following facts:
Otis D. Babcock, who will be referred to hereinafter as plaintiff, on January 27, 1943, filed in the Superior Court of the County of Sacramento an amended complaint in an action against McClatchy Newspapers, a corporation, and one A. J. Harder, for damages for alleged libel. In said complaint plaintiff alleged that he was the District Attorney of Sacramento County, and a candidate for reelection to said office, and that defendant McClatchy Newspapers was publisher of "The Sacramento Bee"; (par. III) that on August 8, 1942, defendants falsely and maliciously and with the intent and design to injure, disgrace and defame plaintiff, published in said Sacramento Bee an article containing false, libelous and malicious matter as follows: "How was it possible for you, Mr. Babcock, going into office dead broke, on a salary of $4,500, to buy an office building at a purported price of $80,000? * * * In contrast to the record of the incumbent Babcock, John Quincy Brown, deputy state attorney general, has an exemplary record, both as a member of the bar and in his private life. Sacramento County needs this man." (par. IV); that "defendants meant thereby to be understood as meaning and asserting, and the readers of said publication, in fact, understood as meaning and asserting, that plaintiff was a dishonest public official and that he was guilty of corruption in his official duties while occupying the office of District Attorney of Sacramento County"; (par. V) that by reason of such publication plaintiff was injured in his reputation, etc., to his damage in the sum of $50,000. The plaintiff further alleged (par. VI) that in publishing and circulating said libel defendants acted maliciously and with intent to injure, disgrace and defame plaintiff, and that by reason thereof plaintiff was entitled to recover exemplary damages in the sum of $20,000.
To said complaint defendant McClatchy Newspapers filed its answer, denying the allegations of paragraphs III, IV, V and VI, but admitting that it published in its paper an article a portion of which consisted of the language stated in plaintiff’s complaint.
The entire article was as follows:
In a second separate defense defendants pleaded that the matter published was privileged, in that the nature and source of the assets of a public officer and consideration of his record are proper matters of newspaper comment upon the issue of his reelection, and that said matter was published without malice and for an honest purpose.
In a third separate defense it was alleged that the published matter was a mere reiteration of a news item theretofore published in a morning newspaper, and that it was published for the public benefit and without malice.
In a fourth separate defense it was alleged on information and belief that the supposed defamatory words were true in that during his term of office plaintiff had increased his net worth to an extent and degree not reasonably to be accounted for by his salary of $375 per month, and that the source of said assets was proper matter of public comment and inquiry upon the issue of plaintiff’s reelection.
As a fifth separate defense defendants alleged that at the time of the publication of the alleged defamatory matter defendants believed, with good reason, that plaintiff had during his term of office accumulated property not to be accounted for out of his salary, and that plaintiff had, to defendants’ knowledge, bought an office building at a purported price of over $80,000.
For a sixth separate defense it was alleged that by becoming a candidate for reelection plaintiff tendered as issues to be tried out publicly before the people, his honesty, etc., that the voters were interested in such issues, that defendant Harder had proposed the question and made the statement for the consideration of the voters and for plaintiff to answer; that the same were relevant to the issue of plaintiff’s honesty, etc., and that defendant published same without malice and in the public interest, and that the same was privileged under subdivisions 3 and 5 of section 47 of the Civil Code.
In a seventh separate defense it was alleged on information and belief that when plaintiff became District Attorney he owned certain described real and personal property having a net worth of approximately $20,000; that after he became District Attorney he began to accumulate property rapidly and at the time of the alleged libel had a net worth in excess of $100,000, and an annual income from certain of his properties of approximately $28,000; and that the increase in plaintiff’s net worth was not reasonably to be accounted for out of his salary as District Attorney.
As an eighth separate defense section 78 of the Charter of Sacramento County was set forth, and it was alleged, also on information and belief, that while acting as District Attorney, plaintiff engaged in private business and activities in violation of said section, including the buying and selling of real estate on a large scale, and the running and operating of properties and business.
Section 78 of the Charter of Sacramento County provides: "Except as otherwise herein provided elective and appointive officers, their deputies and employees, serving full time with compensation, shall not engage in any private practice or business. The provision of this section shall not, however, apply to members of the Board of Supervisors nor to the Justices of the Peace or Constables outside of Sacramento township."
The day after the filing of the foregoing answer, defendant McClatchy Newspapers filed and served notice of the taking of the depositions of certain named officials of banks, title companies and investment brokerage firms, and secured the issuance by the clerk of the Superior Court of subpoenas duces tecum directed to said officials, and had said subpoenas served upon said persons. Said subpoenas requested the production of the records of the respective witnesses pertaining to bank deposits and withdrawals, loans from and financial statements made to said banks by plaintiff during the period of his incumbency as District Attorney; records of securities bought and sold during said period by plaintiff from said brokers; and records of real estate transactions handled for plaintiff by said title companies during said period. On the same day said defendant served on plaintiff and filed a notice of motion for inspection of plaintiff’s state and federal income tax statements during the years of his incumbency as District Attorney, his financial statements and records of loans from named banks and his records of deposits and withdrawals, his brokerage account with Dean Witter & Company, and his records of transactions for the same period with named title companies, in particular those involving some forty-two described pieces of real property in Sacramento, Placer and Alameda Counties.
Shortly after the filing of defendant’s notices of the motions aforesaid, plaintiff filed a demurrer to defendants’ answer, and, at the same time, a notice of motion to quash the subpoenas duces tecum theretofore issued. The latter notice was based upon an affidavit of plaintiff’s attorney alleging that the said subpoenas duces tecum were unreasonable and oppressive in that the issues in the case had not been defined; that defendant’s affidavits failed to disclose the contents of the papers to be produced or to show their materiality or relevancy to the issues of the case, and that they failed to describe the documents so that they could be identified.
Defendant’s motion for inspection and plaintiff’s demurrer and motion to quash were heard by the trial court on February 8, 1943, and submitted; and on February 26th the court made its ruling sustaining a general demurrer to defendants’ fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth separate defenses, the demurrer to said eighth defense being sustained without leave to amend; and quashing and recalling the subpoenas duces tecum, and denying defendant’s motion for inspection, said ruling being based upon the proposition that no issues relating to plaintiff’s financial transactions or the increase in his assets while he was District Attorney were material. Regarding the subpoenas and the requested inspection the court said "there is no plea upon which such an investigation can be buttressed."
The petition herein further alleges that defendants, after the foregoing rulings on demurrer, amended their fourth separate defense to allege that the asserted libel referred to by plaintiff consists of (a) an underlying factual statement substantially to the effect that plaintiff had made approximately $80,000 during his term of office, and (b) a challenge or demand for an answer at a public meeting, how plaintiff had made that much money on his salary of $4,500 per year; also alleging, on information and belief, that during his term of office plaintiff had increased his net worth more than $80,000. To this amended defense a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend.
Thereafter defendants amended their fifth defense to allege that prior to his election as District Attorney in 1935 plaintiff had announced publicly that he was a "poor man" and was running for office as such and that defendants had knowledge of this statement; that prior to the publication of the alleged libel defendants also had knowledge that plaintiff was buying many pieces of real property during his incumbency, among which was the Bryte Building in Sacramento; that defendant acquired immediate knowledge of this purchase and that the purchase price was $80,000, and published the fact in said paper on August 1, 1940; also that revenue stamps on the deed indicated that the price of the property was $80,000, and that when the building burned in November, 1940, the fact that plaintiff owned the building was given newspaper publicity; and that in view of the foregoing, defendant believed, at the time of the alleged libel, that plaintiff had gone into office a poor man and had thereafter purchased the Bryte Building for $80,000, and had purchased many other properties; and believed that the public had a right to know these facts and to have an explanation by plaintiff as to the source of his assets; and that said publication was without malice. Also defendants denied that the alleged defamatory matter charged or was meant to be understood as asserting, that plaintiff was a dishonest public official or that he was guilty of corruption. Demurrer to this defense was overruled.
However, an amendment to the seventh defense was filed in which defendants set forth a list of properties, which they were informed and believed were owned by plaintiff when he went into office, with their alleged values, and a list of properties which he had subsequently acquired; but a general demurrer thereto was sustained without leave to amend.
The petition herein also alleges that plaintiff’s deposition had originally been taken in the action at which time plaintiff had been questioned generally as to his financial status and business transactions while in office, and that plaintiff had then referred defendants to various financial records and had consented to defendants’ examination of the same; that relying on said consent defendants had not completed their examination of plaintiff; but that subsequently plaintiff had withdrawn his consent; that the court had thereafter made an order permitting defendants to take plaintiff’s deposition on matters not previously covered, but that on the taking thereof plaintiff had refused to answer certain questions. Questions 1 to 12, inclusive, inquired as to whether plaintiff had filed income tax returns during his term of office, whether he had copies of them, and whether he would produce them at the trial; who, if anyone, helped prepare such returns, what was his gross income shown thereby for the years 1935-1942, and other matters contained therein. A 13th question was whether plaintiff had purchased certain described properties during said years, and, if so, when, what was paid down on it and where plaintiff got the money for such payment. On application to the court for an order to compel plaintiff to answer said questions, the court denied the request, except that it allowed inquiry as to whether plaintiff purchased the real property described in the 13th question, and when, thus limiting defendants’ inquiry to matters relevant to the fifth defense dealing with mitigation.
In this court it is contended by respondent that mandamus does not lie to control judicial discretion, and that it is not a proper remedy to be pursued by petitioner.
While it may be conceded that mandamus will not issue to compel performance of an act which is merely discretionary (Woolwine v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. 388, 188 P. 569; Bender v. Hutton, 160 Cal. 372, 117 P. 322), it will issue to compel a court to accept jurisdiction conferred by statute (Texas Co. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.App.2d 651, 81 P.2d 575), and it is a proper remedy to enforce a statutory right to take a deposition, or for the purpose of discovery of evidence addressed to a valid issue. San Francisco Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. 30, 99 P. 359, 17 Ann.Cas. 933; Hays v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.2d 260, 105 P.2d 975; Moran v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.App.2d 328, 100 P.2d 1096; Levin v. Superior Court, 139 Cal.App. 693, 34 P.2d 832; 9 Cal.Jur. 407, sec. 10; Crocker v. Conrey, 140 Cal. 213, 218, 73 P. 1006; Austin v. Turrentine, 30 Cal.App.2d 750, 87 P.2d 72, 88 P.2d 178; Zellerbach v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.App.2d 49, 39 P.2d 252; Golden State Co. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.App.2d 176, 76 P.2d 728. And where the exercise of judicial discretion is not involved and the duty of a court to act in a particular way becomes absolute, mandate will issue for relief of an aggrieved party. Bales v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.2d 17, 25, 129 P.2d 685. It will issue to correct an abuse of discretion. Hays v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.2d at page 266, 105 P.2d 975.
In the case before us we believe that an abuse of discretion by the trial court has been shown. Its rulings appear to be based upon the ground that the published article is libelous per se for the reason alleged in the innuendo in the complaint; that it charges plaintiff with corruption in office, and is not susceptible of any other construction. This is the ground upon which defendants’ special defenses were eliminated from their answer; and having in effect stricken them out the trial court appears to hold that defendants may not by depositions develop any testimony not presently material to the pleadings as limited by the rulings on demurrer.
A similar contention was made in San Francisco Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, supra [ 155 Cal. 30, 99 P. 360], and held reviewable on petition for writ of mandate. There it was sought to take the deposition of one Orchard after trial of the case, and while the same was pending on appeal; and plaintiff contended that after verdict and findings there was no issue of fact to be tried, and therefore no occasion for taking of depositions. But the court there said:
"It may be answered to this objection that in case of an action it is not requisite that an issue of fact should have arisen in order to authorize the taking of depositions. As soon as the summons has been served, either party may commence the taking of depositions relevant to any possible issue that may arise upon a denial of the allegations of the complaint or upon the allegation of new matter in the answer, and there is perhaps some significance in the distinction made by the statute in this particular between actions and special proceedings. Clearly, therefore, the existence of an actual, as distinguished from a potential, issue of fact, is not, by the terms of the statute, made a conclusive test of the right to take depositions de bene esse. On the contrary, it is, as we have seen, broad enough in its express terms to include this very case, and, if it is to be construed in a narrower sense, the reasons for that construction must be sought in the policy which prompted its enactment. The Code provisions in respect to this matter, like other Code provisions, were designed to simplify procedure--to promote the ends of justice by enabling litigants to protect their substantial rights by simpler, speedier, and more efficacious means. Among the most important rights of a litigant is that of securing the evidence by which the justice of his claim or defense may be established, and when there is but a single witness upon a material point, or the witnesses are old and infirm, or without the jurisdiction, the necessity of taking their depositions is apparent. It was therefore an important part of what has been called the auxiliary jurisdiction of courts of equity to provide for the perpetuation of testimony in view of anticipated litigation, as well as for the taking of depositions de bene esse in causes actually at issue. * * *
"There was also some reason to expect that the case of Linforth v. Gas Co. might be retried. On principle there does not seem to be any valid distinction between a case on appeal from an order denying a new trial, and a case in which an action may never be commenced. The difference is one of degree, and not of kind. In either case, the issue may or may not come to be tried, and under our statute it is plain that the proceeding to perpetuate testimony would lie in cases involving even a remoter possibility that the testimony would ever be required than there is in the average of appealed cases that there will be a reversal. * * *
"Our conclusion is that the right of the petitioner to take the deposition of Orchard is plain, unless it be a valid objection, as contended by respondent, that the answer of the petitioner in the damage suit raises no issue as to the cause of the explosion by which Linforth’s house was damaged. The answer, it is said, makes no denial that the explosion was caused by the ignition of escaping gas. It is true that the answer fails to make a direct issue upon this point, but it does make a very plain issue upon the alleged negligence of the corporation in allowing gas to escape from its pipes. This question of negligence is certainly material. The mere fact of the explosion, otherwise unexplained, would perhaps justify the inference of escaping gas--an essential step in the proof of negligence, and Orchard’s testimony, if believed, would refute the theory of a gas explosion.
"But, aside from this, the real question is not whether Orchard’s testimony would be material to the issues which were tried, but whether it will be material on a new trial, and under such an amendment to the answer as the circumstances of the case would warrant the court in allowing." (Latter Italics ours.)
In Most v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.App.2d 394, at pages 397, 398, 77 P.2d 532, 533, the court cited Rossbach v. Superior Court, 43 Cal.App. 729, 185 P. 879, saying:
"It was there held that the filing of the complaint constitutes the bringing of the action, and the plaintiff’s right to have the defendant’s deposition taken depends, not alone upon whether it is material to issues tendered thereby, but the right thereto is equally clear if it would be material to any possible issue raised by new allegations contained in an amended complaint which the court might properly permit the plaintiff to file. Indicative of the trend of judicial decisions in this regard, it was held in the case last above mentioned that the ruling of the court in sustaining the general demurrer to the complaint might on appeal by plaintiff be reversed, thus upholding the right to have a deposition taken for use in a possible new trial. [Citing San Francisco Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, supra.] * * *
"In the instant case, it is clear that the question of an accounting is raised as a potential, if not an actual, issue of fact, and, such being the case, it is evident, upon the authority of San Francisco Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, supra, that section 2021 of the Code of Civil Procedure is broad enough in its express terms to include the case now before us, and to confer upon the superior court the right to compel petitioner to answer questions pertinent and material to the possible issue of an accounting, which, under the pleadings, at least may arise. Whether the issue of an accounting may or may not come to be tried is not determinative, but the real question is whether the questions asked would be material to issues raised by an accounting in the event such issues might come before the trial court under the issues as framed by the pleadings."
In Rossbach v. Superior Court, supra, where defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint had been sustained and plaintiff was seeking to take defendant’s deposition, defendant contended that plaintiff had no right to take such deposition because there was no pleading on file. But the court said, page 730 of 43 Cal.App., page 880 of 185 P.:
"We are not in accord with this contention. Section 2021 [of the] Code of Civil Procedure is broad and comprehensive. It provides: ‘The testimony of a witness in this state may be taken by deposition in an action at any time after the service of the summons or the appearance of the defendant, and in a special proceeding after a question of fact has arisen therein, in the following cases’--when he is a party to the action. It conclusively appears that the witness whose deposition was sought to be taken was a party to an action as distinguished from a special proceeding, and that he had appeared therein, and the statute in plain and explicit terms provides that the testimony of such witness may be taken by deposition in an action at any time after his appearance. [Also citing San Francisco Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, supra.] * * *
"The filing of the complaint constituted the bringing of the action (Code Civ.Proc., section 405), and plaintiff’s right to have defendant’s deposition depends not alone upon whether it is material to issues tendered thereby, but the right thereto is equally clear if it would be material to any possible issue raised by new allegations contained in an amended complaint which the court might properly permit plaintiff to file. San Francisco Gas etc. Co. v. Superior Court, supra.
"Moreover, the ruling of the court in sustaining the general demurrer to the complaint might, on an appeal by plaintiff, be reversed, thus bringing the case within the facts considered in the case last cited, upholding the right to have a deposition taken for use in a possible new trial granted on an appeal from an order denying a motion therefor."
Also see Kibele v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.App. 720, 722, 121 P. 412; St. Clair Estate Co. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal.App.2d 389, 107 P.2d 45; California, etc., Co. v. Schiappa-Pietra, 151 Cal. 732, 91 P. 593.
From the foregoing cases the conclusion seems inevitable that defendant is entitled to take depositions and secure inspection of documents in anticipation of issues that may hereafter arise either by reason of amendment of the pleadings or by reason of a new trial that might be the result of an appeal.
In the recent case of Emde v. San Joaquin County, etc., Council, 23 Cal.2d 146, 143 P.2d 20, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court entered after verdict of a jury in favor of plaintiffs, and on the appeal considered the scope and effect of the publication sued upon as libelous and held that plaintiffs’ plea by way of innuendo, that the publication was intended to convey the charge that plaintiffs were dishonest, was broader than the meaning which the words used naturally bear; that an innuendo cannot add to, enlarge or change the sense of published words, and that the words used did not charge dishonesty, and that the charge that plaintiff had openly violated its word was within the permissible limitations of fair comment by the Labor Journal; and that the "gist" or "sting" of the aforesaid statement in the publication had been sufficiently proven. It also held that it was immaterial whether the publisher believed his statements were true at the time they were made so long as they were in fact true.
In view of the foregoing decision rendered since the making of the rulings of the trial court herein complained of, the trial court may well reconsider its rulings on the demurrers to defendant’s special defenses, and allow amendments thereto; but at any event the said ruling of the trial court may be reversed on an appeal, and the evidence sought to be educed by defendant by the depositions denied to it, then become relevant and pertinent.
Furthermore, we do not agree with the trial court’s holding that the language of the publication under consideration is susceptible of but one construction--that it charges corruption in office. That said language is ambiguous was conceded by plaintiff when he found it necessary to plead an innuendo, for an innuendo need be pleaded only when language used is ambiguous. If it is unambiguous, an innuendo has no place in the complaint. 33 Am.Jur. 40. And, as said in the Emde case, supra, and as stated in 33 Am.Jur. 220, an innuendo cannot be used to alter, enlarge, extend, or restrict the language theretofore set out. It is for the jury to determine the true import of language having a covert meaning. Hearne v. De Young, 119 Cal. 670, 680, 52 P. 150, 499.
In this case the answer sets up several special defenses, including that of privilege, under section 47 of the Civil Code, and detailed statements of facts tending to show the truthfulness of the alleged libelous publication for the purpose of showing that that publication was justifiable. The answer also claims the right of privilege of publication, both absolute and qualified. With respect to the defense of privilege it is claimed the defendant Newspapers had a right and duty to inform the public of the character and fitness of a candidate for public office in Sacramento County provided the statement was true. It has been held that either a newspaper or an individual may make statements regarding the character or fitness of public officers or candidates therefor "so long as they are confined to the truth." Christal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal.App.2d 564, 92 P.2d 416; Taylor v. Lewis, 132 Cal.App. 381, 384, 22 P.2d 569; Jones v. Express Pub. Co., 87 Cal.App. 246, 255, 262 P. 78; Snively v. Record Pub. Co., 185 Cal. 565, 576, 198 P. 1; Estelle v. Daily News Pub. Co., 99 Neb. 397, 156 N.W. 645; Bailey v. Kalamazoo Pub. Co., 40 Mich. 251; Scripps v. Foster, 41 Mich. 742, 3 N.W. 216; Palmer v. Concord, 48 N.H. 211, 97 Am. Dec. 605; 36 C.J. 1287, sec. 292.
The authorities are uniform to the effect that the truth of alleged libelous publications is a complete defense to an action for damages therefor. Newell on Slander and Libel, 4th Ed., 764, sec. 696; Odgers on Libel and Slander, 4th Ed., p. 173. In the text found in Newell, supra, page 764, it is said in that regard: "In civil actions, and against a party coming into a court of justice on a claim for damages, it has long been held, as a rule of the common law, that the truth of the facts imputed constituting the slanderous or libelous charge may be pleaded by way of justification, and if proved constitute a good bar to the action. In such case, of course, the motive and purpose are immaterial, and cannot be the subject of inquiry."
Assuming, but not deciding, that the published article which is involved in this proceeding is libelous per se, whether because it charges corruption in office or the engaging in business in violation of Section 78 of the Charter, nevertheless it is clear that petitioner has an absolute right to set up and prove as matters of defense either a privileged communication, or facts which justified the publication, or the truth of the proper inferences to be drawn therefrom. If the inferences from the published article should be deemed to be a charge of dishonesty, evidenced by the acquiring of numerous pieces of real property valued far in excess of his income obtained during his term of office, the defendants would be relieved from liability by proof of the truth of that charge. Even though the defense merely amounts to a qualified privilege, the defendants are entitled to the evidence sought to be elicited for the purpose of reducing the amount of any judgment which might be rendered against them. In any event, to establish the defenses of absolute privilege, qualified privilege or justification by proving the truth of the charge, the evidence is competent, and the defendant Newspapers would therefore be entitled to the statutory privilege of ascertaining the facts by means of depositions taken under the provisions of Section 2021 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court therefore exceeded its jurisdiction and virtually denied the defendant Newspapers the statutory right provided by the last mentioned section. The subpoena duces tecum was wrongfully quashed and the court was not authorized to deny defendants the right to take the testimony of the witnesses named.
Defendants’ right to an inspection of documents for similar purposes under Section 1000 of the Code of Civil Procedure was also unduly restricted. It was said in Austin v. Turrentine, supra, 30 Cal.App.2d at page 762, 87 P.2d at page 78, that the enactment of statutes relative to the remedy of obtaining evidence by inspection was had with a view of providing a more speedy and less expensive remedy than by the proceedings in chancery, and, being remedial in their nature, such rules should be liberally construed. Liberality in the matter of granting inspection cannot be better exemplified than by referring to Chapter V of the new Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. Also see Union Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.2d 449, 462, 81 P.2d 150, 118 A.L.R. 259.
It is therefore ordered that a peremptory writ issue as prayed.
"Harder Issues Challenge, Gets Babcock Reply
"District Attorney Accepts Offer to Debate on Vice, Convictions
"A. J. Harder, Sacramento attorney and supporter of John Quincy Brown for district attorney of Sacramento County, today issued a challenge to District Attorney Otis D. Babcock and Babcock immediately accepted.
" ‘I’ll meet Harder any place he says. Let him arrange the date and the hall and I’ll be there,’ Babcock declared.
"Harder’s challenge was for the district attorney to answer ‘at a public meeting three questions which the people of this county have the right to ask.’
"Asks Three Questions
"The Questions follow:
" ‘How was it possible for you, Mr. Babcock, going into office dead broke, on a salary of $4500 to buy an office building at a purported price of $80,000?
" ‘Why do you, Mr. Babcock, through your special emissary, contend that vice in the delta has been cleaned up, when venereal disease reports from the public clinics show an increase?
" ‘How can you, Mr. Babcock, claim to have efficiently run your office in the face of the many dismissals and failures to convict on your cases in Sacramento courts--the state legislative lobbying case for one; the recent North Sacramento rape case, for another?’
"Harder, asserting that the office of district attorney has needed a cleaning out for at least six years, said he would pay for the hall and arrange all the details of a public meeting if Babcock will appear and explain these things to him.
"Contrasts Brown’s Record
"Harder added:
"In contrast to the record of the incumbent Babcock, John Quincy Brown, deputy state attorney general, has an exemplary record, both as a member of the bar and in his private life. Sacramento County needs this man."