Opinion
NO. 2012-CA-000932-MR
04-19-2013
JOHN MCCAULEY APPELLANT v. JOHN L. LEWIS, III AND BONNIE LEWIS APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Jonathan G. Hieneman Campbellsville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Samuel Todd Spalding Lebanon, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM TAYLOR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ALLAN RAY BERTRAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00321
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: MAZE, STUMBO AND VANMETER, JUDGES. STUMBO, JUDGE: John McCauley appeals from an Order of the Taylor Circuit Court fixing a boundary line between the parties' parcels consistent with the plat of record. The Order was rendered on remand from a prior Opinion of this Court. The McCauleys argue that the trial court's original findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, that the court erred in failing to consider the legal effect of those findings, and that the court erred by relying on dicta from the appellate Opinion. We find no error, and affirm the Order on appeal.
This action to quiet title underwent a bench trial on March 13, 2006, which resulted in a Judgment and Order rendered on May 25, 2010. That Judgment established a boundary line between the parties' respective parcels, the effect of which was to award a disputed tract of land to John and Patsy McCauley. That award was based in large part on a written legal description contained in a 1988 deed called the "Sebastian deed". That deed memorialized a conveyance to Yvonne Sebastian, who was the predecessor in interest of John and Bonnie Lewis. The award was appealed by the Lewises to a panel of this Court, which reversed and remanded upon determining that the trial court improperly failed to consider a "Montgomery plat". The panel of this Court found error because the Montgomery plat was attached to the Sebastian deed and was thus part of the document, and because reliance on the Montgomery plat was necessary to explain an ambiguity within the deed itself.
Patsy McCauley is not a party to the instant appeal. In order to conform this Opinion to the record, which refers to "the McCauleys", we will use "McCauley" and "the McCauleys" interchangeably.
In the interest of judicial economy, and because no good purpose is served by reconstructing the factual and procedural history already contained in the record, we adopt this Court's previous recitation of the facts. The panel of this Court stated in its July 1, 2011 Opinion as follows:
In September 1998, the McCauleys purchased from Edward Sebastian property located on Dutton Creek
Road in Campbellsville, Kentucky. The deed granted to the McCauleys all of Sebastian's property except a 10.34-acre tract that had previously been conveyed to Sebastian's daughter, Yvonne. Yvonne Sebastian subsequently conveyed her tract to Valco Industries, Inc., who later conveyed the same property to the Lewises in December 1999.
At some point during the first few months after the Lewises purchased Yvonne Sebastian's property, the McCauleys became concerned about the actual location of the boundary line between the properties and retained Donald Dabney to survey their own property. Ultimately, the Lewises disagreed with Dabney's survey and filed the instant quiet title action in the Taylor Circuit Court.
A bench trial was conducted on March 13, 2006, wherein the central issue concerned the interpretation of the 1988 deed conveying the property from Edward to Yvonne Sebastian (hereinafter referred to as the "Sebastian deed"). The legal description of the property was set forth in the deed as follows:
Beginning at a point in the center of the Dutton's Branch Road (chapel to Wooleyville) in Whitney's line thence along the center of the road; N 57 [degrees] 15' W 251.5 feet; N 60 [degrees] 24' W 111.8 feet; N 65 [degrees] 22' W 167.1 feet; N 74 [degrees] 00' W 146.0 feet; N 84 [degrees] 16' W 139.0 feet; S 88 [degrees] 48' W 183.8 feet; S 87 [degrees] 40' W 526.3 feet; thence leaving the road with division lines S 1 [degree] 17' W (passing an iron pin at 21.2 feet) 188.1 feet to an iron pin; S 74 [degrees] 54' E 44.5 feet to an iron pin; S 63 [degrees] 38' E 257.8 feet to an iron pin; S 41 [degrees] 42' E 190.4 feet to an iron pin; thence with the outside line N 81 [degrees] 04' E 1054.4 feet (passing an iron pin at 1018.2 feet) to the point of beginning containing 10.34 acres subject to road right of way.
Attached to the deed was a plat prepared by surveyor Richard Montgomery, which showed a boundary line
different from the legal description found in the Sebastian deed.
The McCauley's expert, Donald Dabney, testified that his survey accurately represented the boundary line as it was described in the Sebastian deed and, subsequently, the McCauley deed. On cross-examination, however, Dabney conceded that the survey, based strictly upon the calls contained in the deed's legal description, resulted in 10.2206 acres rather than the stated 10.34 acres.
The Lewises' expert, surveyor Dan Anzelmo, testified that his survey of the property was consistent with the Montgomery plat and was exactly 10.34 acres. Anzelmo opined that part of the discrepancy between the deed and the plat was the result of a missing call in the legal description. All parties agreed that if the language of the Sebastian deed was controlling, the McCauleys prevailed; if the Montgomery plat controlled, the Lewises prevailed.
On May 25, 2010, the trial court entered a judgment and order ruling that the boundary line was established by the written legal description contained in the Sebastian deed. The court concluded that because the deed did not specifically incorporate or refer to the Montgomery plat, such was not part of the deed and had no legal effect. Thus, the court found that the plat did not create an ambiguity since the calls set forth in the deed clearly established the boundary. The Lewises thereafter appealed to this Court as a matter of right.
Thereafter, the first panel of this Court considered the effect, if any, of the Montgomery plat. It found in relevant part that the Montgomery plat was appended to the Sebastian deed and was thus part of the document, and that the plat "showed a boundary line different from the legal description found in the Sebastian deed." In its view, this discrepancy between the deed and the plat created an ambiguity which required reconsideration by the trial court. Said the panel, "Clearly then, a latent ambiguity existed with the legal description itself. Therefore, even if the trial court did not believe that the Montgomery plat was part of the Sebastian deed, it should have nonetheless considered it to resolve the ambiguity."
On remand, the Taylor Circuit Court reconsidered the boundary issue in light of the ruling that it should consider the Montgomery plat. The court then rendered Orders on September 13, 2011, and April 23, 2012, determining "that the Plat of record by Richard Montgomery shall constitute the boundary line between the parties . . . consistent with the Kentucky Court of Appeals decision[.]" The effect of the Taylor Circuit Court's ruling was to quiet title by removing the disputed boundary line in favor of the Lewises. This appeal followed.
The latter corrected and modified the former.
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The McCauleys now argue that the Taylor Circuit Court committed reversible error in resolving the boundary dispute in favor of the Lewises. Specifically, the McCauleys first contend that the Taylor Circuit Court's original findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. They note that Taylor Circuit Court Judge Allen R. Bertram heard several hours of testimony from multiple witnesses on March 13, 2006, and that no party has taken issue with those findings. In the McCauleys' view, because no party has challenged those findings, there was no basis from which the first panel of this Court could have properly determined those findings to be void of substantial evidence found in the record. They argue that pursuant to CR 52.01, the trial court's original findings must stand.
Though they do not characterize it in this manner, the McCauleys are appealing the ruling of the first panel of the Court of Appeals to the instant and second panel of this Court. In reversing and remanding the matter, the first panel resolved questions of law, to wit, whether the Montgomery plat was part of the Sebastian deed, whether it created an ambiguity, and whether a remand was required to resolve the ambiguity. It answered each of these question of law in the affirmative. In so doing, the resolution of these issues became the law of the case. "The law of the case doctrine is 'an iron rule, universally recognized, that an opinion or decision of an appellate court in the same cause is the law of the case for a subsequent trial or appeal however erroneous the opinion or decision may have been.' " Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing Authority, 244 S.W.3d 747 (Ky. App. 2007), quoting Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Blackwell's Adm'r, 291 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Ky. 1956). Limited exceptions exist to this doctrine, Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982), which are not present herein. Additionally, an aggrieved party may prosecute an appeal only to a higher court. "All appeals shall be taken to the next higher court[.]" CR 73.01(2). Since the issue at bar was previously addressed and resolved on appeal, and as we are without the authority or inclination to review the actions of prior panels of this Court, we have no basis for addressing the McCauleys' assertion that the trial court's original findings were not clearly erroneous.
The McCauleys also contend that the Taylor Circuit Court erred by failing to consider the legal effect of its factual findings. That is to say, they maintain that subsequent to the remand from the first appeal, and based on that panel's Opinion, the trial court improperly gave too much legal effect to the Montgomery plat and too little to the other findings. Rather, the McCauleys argue that the trial court erred in failing to consider "the legal effect of the totality of factual circumstances at issue in this case." In essence, the McCauleys are maintaining that the trial court reached the wrong result based on the evidence of record. Additionally, the McCauleys contend that the trial court erred in relying on dicta from this Court's first Opinion. In their view, that dicta was the first panel's statement that "we believe the expressed intent of Edward Sebastian was to convey 10.34 acres to Yvonne Sebastian." The McCauleys argue that the trial court improperly viewed this statement as binding on remand.
On appeal of a decision from a bench trial, we review the lower court's findings of fact for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. Arnold v. Patterson, 229 S.W.3d 923 (Ky. App. 2007). In the matter at bar, the trial court duly considered the entirety of the record, including the Montgomery plat. In so doing, it affixed the boundary based on its consideration of both the Sebastian deed and the Montgomery plat, and in a manner favorable to the Lewises. The trial court's determination in this regard is supported by the record and the law. The first panel of this Court determined that an ambiguity existed between the Sebastian deed and Montgomery plat, and the Taylor Circuit Court resolved that ambiguity as so directed by this Court's first opinion. We find no basis for concluding that the trial court relied on dicta, nor that there is anything to suggest that the trial court viewed the above-noted statement as "binding on remand". In sum, the Taylor Circuit Court's resolution of the ambiguity is supported by the record and the law, and we find no error.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the April 23, 2012 Order of the Taylor Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Jonathan G. Hieneman
Campbellsville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Samuel Todd Spalding
Lebanon, Kentucky