Opinion
2015 CA 0520
07-12-2016
FRANCES MCCASTLE, DANNIELLE WATSON INDIVIDUALLY & ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD, DA'RIEL ALEXANDER v. GOAUTO INSURANCE COMPANY
Benjamin T. Lowe David M. Lefeve Spencer H. Calahan Baton Rouge, LA Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants Frances McCastle, Dannielle Watson Individually & On Behalf of Her Minor Child, Da'riel Alexander Chase Tettleton Stephen Babcock Baton Rouge, LA Attorney for Defendant/Appellee GoAuto Insurance Company
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION On Appeal from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana
No. C631270 The Honorable Robert D. Downing, Judge Pro Tempore Benjamin T. Lowe
David M. Lefeve
Spencer H. Calahan
Baton Rouge, LA Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
Frances McCastle, Dannielle
Watson Individually & On Behalf of
Her Minor Child, Da'riel Alexander Chase Tettleton
Stephen Babcock
Baton Rouge, LA Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
GoAuto Insurance Company BEFORE: GUIDRY, HOLDRIDGE, AND CHUTZ, JJ. HOLDRIDGE, J.
This is an appeal of a trial court judgment sustaining a peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata urged by defendant-appellee, GoAuto Insurance Company (GoAuto), in response to a petition for damages brought by plaintiffs-appellants, Frances McCastle and Dannielle Watson, individually and on behalf of her minor child, Da'riel Alexander. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Alexander is an unemancipated minor who was born outside of marriage to Watson, and who has never been formally or informally acknowledged by his respective father, thereby making Watson his natural tutrix of right pursuant to La. C.C. art. 256(A) and making her procedurally qualified to bring this action on his behalf pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 4061.1(A)(3).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 10, 2014, plaintiffs were injured in an automobile accident in East Baton Rouge Parish. McCastle was operating a motor vehicle owned by Michael K. Jackson, in which Watson and her minor son, Alexander, were riding as passengers. Ivoryon Roman was operating a motor vehicle, owned by Rocky M. Smith, when she was struck by another motorist and was subsequently pushed into plaintiffs' vehicle. The accident was caused by the fault and negligence of Roman. On the date of the subject accident, the vehicle operated by Roman was uninsured and Roman did not own a vehicle, thereby resulting in no automobile liability policy from which plaintiffs could recover for their injuries. However, on the date of the accident, GoAuto provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage to the vehicle operated by McCastle in which Watson and Alexander were riding as passengers, with policy limits of $15,000.00/$30,000.00 and medical payment coverage in the amount of $1,000.00. This policy insured plaintiffs for the injuries they sustained.
The GoAuto claims adjuster assigned to plaintiffs' claim was Michele Nalty. On January 15, 2014, plaintiffs verbally agreed to settle their bodily injury claims against GoAuto with Nalty. Specifically, McCastle agreed to settle her claim for $1,000.00, and Watson agreed to settle her claim and Alexander's claim for $750.00 each. The following day, GoAuto mailed the settlement checks to plaintiffs in accordance with their agreement. Upon receipt, plaintiffs endorsed and presented for payment the three settlement checks at their respective banks.
All three of the aforementioned checks included a stub, which contained additional information about the settlement claim. The front of each check carried a notation that the payment was made "[f]or full&final settlement of any&all bodily injury" [sic] claims. The back of each check stated, "I hereby release Go Auto Insurance Company & Go Auto LLC and its insured(s) from any further liability for this accident and agree that this amount is a full and complete settlement of any and all claims I have against them." Each of the three checks carried three signatures, two on the front by authorized representatives of GoAuto and plaintiffs' endorsement on the back of the checks.
Plaintiffs filed a petition for damages on June 12, 2014, seeking to recover for injuries allegedly sustained in the automobile accident that occurred on January 10, 2014. Thereafter, GoAuto filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata on July 25, 2014. After a hearing on December 8, 2014, the trial court subsequently entered judgment in favor of GoAuto on January 15, 2015, sustaining the peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata and dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs now appeal.
GoAuto's peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata was heard before the Honorable Robert D. Downing, Judge, Pro Tempore.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Res judicata bars re-litigation of a subject matter arising from the same transaction or occurrence of a previous suit. Pierrotti v. Johnson, 2011-1317 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/19/12), 91 So.3d 1056, 1063. Although the exception of res judicata typically contemplates the existence of a final judgment on the merits, it also applies if there is a transaction or settlement of a dispute that has been entered into by the parties. Davis v. J.R. Logging, Inc., 2013-0568 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/8/13), 136 So.3d 828, 830, writ denied, 2014-0860 (La. 6/20/14), 141 So.3d 812. On the trial of the peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata, the burden of proving facts essential to sustaining the objection is on the party pleading the objection. Union Planters Bank v. Commercial Capital Holding Corp., 2004-0871 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 907 So.2d 129, 130. The doctrine of res judicata is stricti juris and should be rejected when doubt exists as to whether a party's substantive rights have actually been previously addressed and finally resolved. Dominique ex rel. Dominique v. Allied Discount Tire and Brake, Inc., 2002-1338 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/9/03), 849 So.2d 690, 695, writ denied, 2003-1605 (La. 10/3/03), 855 So.2d 320. When a party raises the objection of res judicata, the court must examine not only the pleadings, but also the entire record in the first suit to determine whether the second suit is barred by res judicata. Union Planters, 907 So.2d at 130. When an objection of res judicata is raised before the case is submitted and evidence is received on the objection, the standard of review on appeal is traditionally manifest error with regard to factual findings of the trial court. However, the res judicata effect of a prior judgment is a question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal. Pierrotti, 91 So.3d at 1063.
DISCUSSION
We must now consider the primary issue in this appeal—whether the trial court erred in finding that there was a valid compromise between the parties pursuant to La. C.C. art. 3071. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship. La. C.C. art. 3071. A peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata is the proper procedural vehicle when a suit is barred by a valid written compromise or transaction. La. Workers' Comp. Corp. v. Betz, 2000-0603 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/18/01), 792 So.2d 763, 766.
At the hearing on the peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata, GoAuto evidenced the compromise between the parties by submitting a copy of the three signed checks issued by GoAuto to plaintiffs and the affidavits of GoAuto employees who supervised the processing of plaintiffs' claims. No objection was made by plaintiffs to the introduction of the evidence submitted by GoAuto at the hearing. The copies of the GoAuto checks show both the front and the back of the instruments, which display the restrictive endorsement language "[f]or full&final settlement of any&all bodily injury" [sic] claims. The back of each check bears the notation, "I hereby release Go Auto Insurance Company & Go Auto LLC and its insured(s) from any further liability for this accident and agree that this amount is a full and complete settlement of any and all claims I have against them." The settlement terms are clear and unequivocal. See McClelland v. Sec. Indus. Ins. Co., 426 So.2d 665, 671 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1982) (finding that a restrictive endorsement providing that payment "is in full and final settlement of all claims" was "clear and explicit"); F & S Enters., Inc. v. Cure, 1996-0729 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/12/97) 690 So.2d 263, 265; Didriksen v. Sewerage & Water Bd. Of New Orleans, 527 So.2d 319, 321 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1988); Creative Mktg. Sales, Inc. v. Rayborn, 615 So.2d 1107, 1109 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1993) (finding that a notation of "Final Payment" was sufficient). Each check was signed by two agents of GoAuto and endorsed by plaintiffs. See also Felder v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 405 So.2d 521, 524 (La. 1981) (wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court found that a written and signed draft containing a notation of full release of all claims constituted a written acceptance of a settlement offer). Thus, we find that the restrictive endorsement language placed on each side of the checks is so explicit that it cannot be reasonably argued that plaintiffs were not informed of the nature and conditions of the compromise offer.
The hearing transcript reveals that plaintiffs submitted no evidence in support of their claim. While plaintiffs dispute that there was ever a meeting of the minds between the parties to establish the requirements of a valid compromise, the aforementioned checks are sufficient to establish the requirements of a valid compromise. See La. C.C. art. 3071; see also Audubon Ins. Co. v. Farr, 453 So.2d 232, 234 (La. 1984); American Century Casualty Company v. Sale, 45,560 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/10), 47 So.3d 1143, 1146, writ denied, 2010-2410 (La. 12/17/10), 51 So.3d 12 (recognizing that a check can serve as a compromise if it recites that it is in full payment for all claims and the draft is endorsed and negotiated). In the absence of evidence to rebut this implication, we conclude that there was a meeting of the minds between the parties regarding the settlement terms and a valid compromise pursuant to La. C.C. art. 3071. Therefore, we find no merit in plaintiffs' claim.
We find no merit in plaintiffs' argument made in brief that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties because additional payments were tendered to plaintiffs after the settlement checks were issued. The plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence on this claim at the hearing on the peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata, and the record is devoid of any evidence rebutting the existence of a valid and enforceable compromise between the parties. --------
Moreover, plaintiffs assert several arguments finding error in the trial court's findings. Specifically plaintiffs allege that even if there was a valid compromise, it was unenforceable because the plaintiffs' consent was obtained by error and/or fraud or because it violated public policy. However, the record reflects that plaintiffs submitted no evidence or testimony at the hearing on the peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata regarding these claims, relying instead on argument alone. Because the record is devoid of evidence to support plaintiffs' contentions, we find no merit in plaintiffs' claims.
MOTIONS TO STRIKE
GoAuto filed two separate motions to strike the brief of plaintiffs claiming that their brief allegedly failed to reference specific page numbers of the record and included discourteous language. Considering the disposition of this matter on procedural grounds, we conclude that the motions are moot. See In re Westlake Petrochemicals Corp. Ethylene Plant Part 70, 1999-1726 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/00), 769 So.2d 1278, 1280.
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment sustaining GoAuto's peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata and dismissing plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. Appeal costs are assessed against plaintiffs-appellants, Frances McCastle and Dannielle Watson, individually and on behalf of her child, Da'riel Alexander.
MOTIONS DENIED; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.