Opinion
CV166063796S
02-21-2019
Theresa MCCARTY v. YALE UNIVERSITY
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Wilson, J.
The plaintiff, Theresa McCarty commenced this breach of contract action against the defendant, Yale University School of Forestry and Environmental Studies (Yale). The plaintiff was expelled from Yale for allegedly committing plagiarism, lying to Yale’s disciplinary committee, and fabricating evidence to mislead the committee. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that as a graduate student at Yale, she entered into a contract with the university whereby she agreed to pay for and Yale agreed to provide a graduate degree education. Additionally, both parties agreed to comply with specific procedures in terms of ethical behavior and the imposition of discipline for a breach thereof in accordance with Yale’s Professional and Academic Ethics Code. The plaintiff alleged that Yale breached such contract by failing to follow such procedures when expelling McCarty for an alleged act of plagiarism and attempt to cover up such plagiarism. Yale did not challenge the existence of an implied contract that includes the terms contained within Yale’s Professional and Academic Ethics Code (ethics code), nor was there evidence submitted to the jury challenging the existence of a contract that included the terms contained in the ethics code. However, Yale argued that it did not breach the terms contained therein. According to Yale, it complied with the procedures in that the plaintiff received a fair hearing, and the decision to expel her was unanimously rendered by the nine-member disciplinary committee, the four-member committee of review, and the dean of the school in accordance with the provisions of the ethics code.
The case was tried before a jury. Evidence commenced on January 23, 2018 which lasted until January 26, 2018. The parties submitted interrogatories to the jury. Since Yale did not challenge the existence of an implied contract that includes the terms contained within Yale’s Professional and Academic Ethics Code (ethics code), and since there was no evidence submitted to the jury challenging the existence of a contract that included the terms contained in the ethics code, it was not necessary for the jury to determine whether a contract was formed, and thus, the following interrogatories were submitted to the jury:
1) Has the plaintiff proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that she performed her obligations under the parties’ agreement?
YES____ NO____
(If the answer to this interrogatory is "YES" then go on to answer interrogatory # 2. If the answer is "NO" then STOP and enter a verdict for the defendant on the defendant’s verdict form.)
2) Has the plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant breached the contract by not performing its obligation under the contract?
YES____ NO____
(If the answer to this interrogatory is "YES" then go on to answer interrogatory # 3. If the answer is "NO" then STOP and enter a verdict for the defendant on the defendant’s verdict form.)
3) Has the plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she was deprived of a fair hearing as a result of the defendant’s breach?
YES____ NO____
(If the answer is this interrogatory is "YES" then STOP and enter a verdict for the plaintiff on the plaintiff’s verdict form. If the answer is "NO" then STOP and enter a verdict for the defendant on the defendant’s verdict form.)
On January 30, 2018, the jury rendered its verdict in favor of the defendant. In answering the interrogatories, the jury checked "NO" to interrogatory # 1, rendered a verdict for the defendant and completed the verdict form for the defendant. The jury did not answer the remaining questions on the jury interrogatories. Thus, in finding for the defendant, the jury concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she performed her obligations under the parties’ agreement. On January 31, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the verdict and a motion for a new trial. In her motions, the plaintiff argues that because the court ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s obligation under the contract was to enroll as a student and pay her tuition, it should not have submitted to the jury interrogatory # 1 because there was no dispute in the evidence that the plaintiff failed to perform her obligations under the contract.
On February 6, 2018, the defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff’s motions to set aside and for a new trial. In its objection the defendant argues that the plaintiff’s motions should be denied for any or all of the following five reasons. First, the plaintiff failed to make any motion for a directed verdict during the trial, much less one directed at the element of her claim on which the jury found against her. Having failed to make such a motion, the law is clear that the plaintiff may not seek to have the verdict set aside based on lack of evidence. The defendant argues that this rule also applies to new trial motions based on lack of evidence (rather than new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence, for example). The defendant argues that because the granting of a motion for a new trial based on lack of evidence is essentially the same as setting aside the verdict, which requires the plaintiff to have moved for a directed verdict, the motion for new trial like the motion to set aside should be denied. Second, there was a sufficient basis for the jury to find that the plaintiff failed to perform her obligations under the contract, even if her obligations under the contract were just enrolling at Yale and paying her tuition, as the plaintiff claims. Third, since the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the elements of her breach of contract claim, and since the jury was entitled to disbelieve the entirety of the plaintiff’s evidence, the jury could reasonably find that the plaintiff did not meet her burden of proof as to that element of her claim. Fourth, when moving for a new trial, the plaintiff must show that an injustice has been done in that the result of a new trial would probably be different. The plaintiff’s motions make no attempt to show a reasonable probability of a plaintiff’s verdict at a new trial. Fifth, the defendant argues, as an alternative ground of denial, that the plaintiff’s lies, cover-up, and fabrication of evidence at the beginning of and throughout the disciplinary committee’s investigation were material breaches of the alleged contract.
The court heard oral argument on the motions on March 19, 2018.
Due to an unexpected death in the court’s family, the court requested the parties to waive the 120-day time requirement for the filing of the court’s decision. The parties agreed to waive same.
DISCUSSION
I
Motion to Set Aside
As previously noted, one of the grounds which the defendant puts forth for denial of the motions to set aside and for a new trial is plaintiff’s failure to move for a directed verdict during the trial.
"Generally speaking, a motion for directed verdict must be made before a court may properly entertain a motion to set aside a verdict. ‘The rules of practice establish a procedure pursuant to which a motion for a directed verdict, if denied, is considered renewed by the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ... Practice Book § 16-37 provides for a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in accordance with [the party’s] motion for a directed verdict ... The purpose of the motion for a directed verdict with respect to the motions to set aside and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is to give notice to the trial court ...’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bauer v. Pounds, 61 Conn.App. 29, 34-35, 762 A.2d 499 (2000), citing Salaman v. Waterbury, 246 Conn. 298, 309, 717 A.2d 161 (1998). ‘It has long been the rule that [a] motion for a directed verdict is a prerequisite to the filing of a motion to set aside the verdict ...’ Bauer v. Pounds, supra, 35, quoting Salaman v. Waterbury, supra, 311 (Katz, J., concurring).
"The trial court does have the inherent authority to set aside a verdict, but only under certain circumstances. In Hudson United Bank v. Cinnamon Ridge Corp., 81 Conn.App. 557, 564-65 n.9, 845 A.2d 417 (2004), the court noted that ‘[t]he exercise of [the trial court’s inherent authority to set aside a verdict when no motion for a directed verdict has been filed] is appropriate where a party could not raise an issue in a motion for a directed verdict during trial because the issue did not arise until after the jury returned its verdict.’ (Emphasis in original.) The precept of this footnote has more recently been adopted by Judge Lee in Vaid v. Equinox Greenwich Old Track Road, Inc., Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-13-6019426-S (April 15, 2016, Lee, J.) (trial court has authority to set aside verdict in absence of motion for directed verdict only when issue arises after jury returns its verdict)." Ciarlo v. George, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-06-5000951S (October 12, 2017, Roraback, J.) .
In the present case, the grounds raised in the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict all arose prior to the return of the jury’s verdict. The issues relied upon by the plaintiff as a basis for her motion to set aside the verdict could have appropriately been raised in a motion for a directed verdict. Because they were not, this court holds that it need not reach the merits of the claims raised in this motion, and the plaintiff’s motion is therefore denied.
Irrespective of the foregoing, even if the court were to reach the merits of the plaintiff’s motion to set aside, it would still be denied. The plaintiff claims that because the court ruled that the plaintiff’s only obligation under the agreement was to pay her tuition and enroll at Yale, the court should not have submitted interrogatory number 1 to the jury because there was no dispute in the evidence that the plaintiff did in fact pay her tuition and enrolled at Yale. What should be made clear, is that the court did not rule that it was undisputed that the plaintiff did perform her obligation under the contract, but rather, and over strenuous objection by the defendant, that the plaintiff’s only obligation to fulfill under the contract was that she paid her tuition and enrolled at Yale. Thus, although the court ruled as such, the plaintiff was still obligated to submit evidence on each element of her claim for breach of contract. The only element of plaintiff’s claim that was not challenged by Yale, and in which there was no dispute in the evidence, was the existence of an implied contract which included the terms of the Ethics Code, and the court instructed the jury as such.
The court instructed the jury on the elements of a breach of contract as follows: "The plaintiff claims that the defendant breached a contract with her. In order to recover on a breach of contract claim, the plaintiff must prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence:
1. The formation of an agreement with the defendant. There is no dispute in the evidence that the Ethics Code constituted a contract between the parties;
2. That the plaintiff perform her obligations under the agreement;
3. That the defendant failed to perform its obligations under the agreement;
4. That as a result, the plaintiff was deprived of a fair hearing.
" ‘A party challenging the validity of the jury’s verdict on grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support such a result carries a difficult burden. In reviewing the soundness of a jury’s verdict, [the court] construe[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.’" (Citations omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 294 Conn. 280, 299, 984 A.2d 658 (2009).
" ‘[T]he role of the trial court on a motion to set aside the jury’s verdict is not to sit as a seventh juror, but, rather, to decide whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the jury could reasonably have reached the verdict that it did ... A verdict is not defective as a matter of law as long as it contains an intelligible finding so that its meaning is clear ... A verdict will be deemed intelligible if it clearly manifests the intent of the jury ... In reviewing the action of the trial court in denying the motions ... to set aside the verdict, [the Appellate Court’s] primary concern is to determine whether the court abused its discretion and [the court] decide[s] only whether, on the evidence presented, the jury could fairly reach the verdict [it] did." Weihing v. Preto-Rodas, 170 Conn.App. 880, 884-85, 155 A.3d 1278 (2017).
"It is not [the court’s] position to dictate which witnesses the jury should credit; [t]he trier [is] free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 885.
It is well established that" ‘[t]he elements of a breach of contract action are the formation of an agreement, performance by one party, breach of the agreement by the other party and damages.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pelletier v. Galske, 105 Conn.App. 77, 81, 936 A.2d 689 (2007), cert. denied, 186 285 Conn. 921, 943 A.2d 1100 (2008)."
As previously discussed, the plaintiff had the burden of proving each element of her breach of contract claim. The existence of an agreement was not in dispute, therefore the plaintiff was required to prove that she performed her obligation under the contract, the defendant breached, and damages. On issue of whether the plaintiff performed her obligation under the contract, Yale disputed this issue and left the plaintiff to her proof. The plaintiff did not submit any evidence that she paid her tuition. There were no documents admitted into evidence to demonstrate that the plaintiff made tuition payments. The plaintiff submitted no cancelled checks, no account balances and no receipts from Yale of any kind. The plaintiff’s testimony itself on the subject of tuition was what she believed was the approximate tuition at Yale. No evidence was submitted as to what plaintiff in fact paid. The jury is the sole arbiter of the facts. It is for them to decide the credibility or the believability of the witnesses. Since it was the plaintiff’s burden of proving that she performed her obligations under the contract by paying her tuition, and since the jury could have discounted her testimony and evidence, the jury was free to find that she had not met her burden on this element. Accordingly, even if the court were to reach the merits of the plaintiff’s motion to set aside, the motion would be denied.
II
Motion for New Trial
" ‘A motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will never be granted except on substantial grounds.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Gilmore, 289 Conn. 88, 98, 956 A.2d 1145 (2008). ‘The basic question which the trial court has to decide is whether upon all the evidence an injustice has been done.’ Burr v. Lichtenheim, 190 Conn. 351, 355, 460 A.2d 1290 (1983).
"The grounds upon which a trial court may award a new trial is set forth in General Statutes § 52-270 (‘Causes for which new trials may be granted’). In particular, § 52-270(a) allows the trial court to grant a new trial in an action which has been heard before the court for the following reasons: ‘mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or part existed, or the want of actual notice to any plaintiff of the entry of a nonsuit for failure to appear at trial or dismissal for failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence, or for other reasonable cause, according to the usual rules in such cases.’" Bennett v. Chenault, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-0950310853-S (August 7, 2012, Wilson, J.), aff’d, 147 Conn.App. 198, 81 A.3d 1184 (2013).
General Statutes § 52-570 provides in relevant part: "(a) The Superior Court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or part existed, or the want of actual notice to any plaintiff of the entry of a nonsuit for failure to appear at trial or dismissal for failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence, or for other reasonable cause, according to the usual rules in such cases. The judges of the Superior Court may in addition provide by rule for the granting of new trials upon prompt request in cases where the parties or their counsel have not adequately protected their rights during the original trial of an action."
In the present case, the ground of "for other reasonable cause" is ostensibly the only ground set forth by the plaintiff which might apply under the express provisions of § 52-270; there has been no contention by the plaintiff of newly discovered evidence, mispleading, or want of notice in the underlying action. However, our Supreme Court has stated that "[a]lthough ... § 52-270 permits the court to grant a new trial upon proof of reasonable cause, the circumstances in which reasonable cause may be found are limited ... The basic test of reasonable cause is whether a litigant, despite the exercise of due diligence, has been deprived of a fair opportunity to have a case heard on appeal ... A new trial may be granted to prevent injustice in cases where the usual remedy by appeal does not lie or where, if there is an adequate remedy by appeal, the party has been prevented from pursuing it by fraud, mistake or accident." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murphy v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 86 Conn.App. 147, 152-53, 860 A.2d 764 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 910, 870 A.2d 1080 (2005). Thus, "[§ 52-270] does not furnish a substitute for, nor an alternative to, an ordinary appeal, but applies only when no other remedy is adequate and when in equity and good conscience relief against a judgment should be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jacobs v. Fazzano, 59 Conn.App. 716, 724, 757 A.2d 1215 (2000).
The phrase "other reasonable cause" has also been construed to include "any cause, legal or equitable, seeking a new trial for reasons other than those specifically mentioned in the statute." E. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure, (3d Ed.2002) Vol. II, Sec. 202(b)(f), 450-52, citing Perry v. Pucklin, 100 Conn. 104, 110, 123 A. 28 (1923).
In the present case, the plaintiff seeks a new trial not on any of the grounds enumerated in the statute, but rather on the same ground she seeks to set aside the verdict which is evidentiary insufficiency. The facts alleged in this motion are facts ordinarily alleged in a motion to set aside a verdict, or, an appeal. There is no claim of mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action, to the plaintiff, of either the entry of a nonsuit or dismissal for failure to prosecute, as is provided as causes for a new trial under General Statutes § 52-270. As this court previously concluded, the plaintiff did not move for a directed verdict which was required, and therefore the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial is also procedurally barred.
Nonetheless, even if the court were to consider the merits of the plaintiff’s motion it would still be denied. As previously noted, this court ruled, over strenuous objection by the defendant, that the plaintiff’s only obligation under the contract was to enroll as a student and pay her tuition. This ruling did not dispense with the plaintiff’s burden of proving each element of her claim for breach of contract. The only element which was not disputed was the existence of a contract between the parties. The plaintiff was still required to prove, that she fulfilled her obligation under the contract, that Yale breached the contract by not performing its obligations under the contract, and that she was deprived of a fair hearing as a result of the defendant’s breach. In accordance with the jury’s answer to the interrogatories, the plaintiff, plain and simple did not prove the first element. What little evidence the plaintiff submitted on this element, the jury chose not to believe it, which they were entirely free to do. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial is also denied.