Opinion
CV166063796S
08-29-2017
Theresa McCarty v. Yale University
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#111)
Robin L. Wilson, J.
FACTS
The plaintiff, Theresa McCarty (McCarty), filed the operative revised complaint; (Docket Entry no. 102); on October 17, 2016, in which she alleges the following against the defendant, Yale University (Yale). McCarty, as a graduate student at Yale, entered into a contract with the university whereby McCarty agreed to pay for and Yale agreed to provide a graduate degree education. Additionally, both parties agreed to comply with specific procedures in terms of ethical behavior and the imposition of discipline for a breach thereof. Yale breached such contract by failing to follow such procedures when expelling McCarty for an alleged act of plagiarism and attempt to cover up such plagiarism.
Yale filed its motion for summary judgment; (Docket Entry no. 111); accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law; (Docket Entry no. 112); on April 4, 2017. McCarty's brief in opposition; (Docket Entry no 114); was filed on May 15, 2017, to which Yale replied; (Docket Entry no. 116); on May 31, 2017. Oral argument on the motion was heard on June 5, 2017.
Yale's exhibits include: (A) excerpts of a deposition transcript of McCarty; (B) excerpts of a deposition transcript of Angel Hsu; (C) McCarty's final paper; (D) an email exchange between McCarty and Yale representatives; (E) an affidavit of James Saiers and accompanying exhibits; (F) an email to Peter Crane regarding the imposition of McCarty's expulsion; (G) the letter to McCarty communicating her expulsion; (H) an email exchange between McCarty and Yale representatives; (I) an email exchange between McCarty and Yale representatives; (J) an email exchange between McCarty and Yale representatives; (K) McCarty's letter of appeal; (L) an email exchange between McCarty and Yale representatives; (M) McCarty's responses to interrogatories; and (N) Yale's Professional and Academic Ethics Code.
McCarty's exhibits include: (1) excerpts of a deposition transcript of McCarty; and (2) Yale's responses to interrogatories.
DISCUSSION
" [S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cefaratti v. Aranow, 321 Conn. 637, 645, 138 A.3d 837 (2016). " A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case . . . The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Recall Total Information Management, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 147 Conn.App. 450, 456, 83 A.3d 664 (2014), aff'd, 317 Conn. 46, 115 A.3d 458 (2015).
" In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 319-20, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). " [I]t is only [o]nce [the] defendant's burden in establishing his entitlement to summary judgment is met [that] the burden shifts to [the] plaintiff to show that a genuine issue of fact exists justifying a trial . . . Summary judgment should be denied where the affidavits of the moving party do not affirmatively show that there is no genuine issue of fact as to all of the relevant issues of the case . . . Accordingly, the rule that the party opposing summary judgment must provide evidentiary support for its opposition applies only when the moving party has first made out a prima facie case for summary judgment . . . [I]f the party moving for summary judgment fails to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the nonmoving party may rest on mere allegations or denials contained in his pleadings . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 320-21.
" To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 317 Conn. 223, 228, 116 A.3d 297 (2015).
" [T]he party moving for summary judgment . . . is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, supra, 310 Conn. 324 n.12. " [O]nly evidence that would be admissible at trial may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nash v. Stevens, 144 Conn.App. 1, 15, 71 A.3d 635, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 915, 76 A.3d 628 (2013). The trial court has discretion in determining whether to consider documentary evidence submitted by a party in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. See Bruno v. Whipple, 138 Conn.App. 496, 506, 54 A.3d 184 (2012) (" [w]hether a trial court should consider documentary evidence submitted by a party in relation to a motion for summary judgment presents an evidentiary issue to which we apply an abuse of discretion standard").
I
BREACH (AND CAUSATION)
Yale does not challenge the existence of an implied contract that includes the terms contained within Yale's Professional and Academic Ethics Code (ethics code), but argues that it did not breach the terms contained therein, and even if it did, such breach did not cause McCarty's expulsion. " It is well established that [t]he elements of a breach of contract action are the formation of an agreement, performance by one party, breach of the agreement by the other party and damages . . . Although this court has intimated that causation is an additional element thereof . . . proof of causation more properly is classified as part and parcel of a party's claim for breach of contract damages . . . [D]amages for breach of contract are recoverable where: (1) the damages were reasonably foreseeable by the breaching party at the time of contracting; (2) the breach is a substantial causal factor in the damages; and (3) the damages are shown with reasonable certainty . . . The causation requirement focuses on whether a loss may fairly and reasonably be considered [as] arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Meadowbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman, 149 Conn.App. 177, 185-87, 90 A.3d 219 (2014). " Causation [is] a question of fact for the [fact finder] to determine . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 193. See also West Haven Sound Development Corp. v. West Haven, 201 Conn. 305, 316, 514 A.2d 734 (1986) (" [c]ausation [is] a question of fact for the jury to determine"). " Although the issue of causation generally is a question reserved for the trier of fact . . . the issue becomes one of law when the mind of a fair and reasonable person could reach only one conclusion, and summary judgment may be granted based on a failure to establish causation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 240 Conn. 300, 307, 692 A.2d 709 (1997).
The ethics code provides the following regarding procedure with respect to disciplinary action. " At the beginning of the investigation, the Chair [of the disciplinary committee] will inform the student whose conduct is in question of the procedures that will be followed and will notify the student of the membership of the committee. Within one day after receiving that notification, the student may object to member(s) as prejudiced by stating in writing the basis for this objection. On receipt of this objection, the Chair will rule on whether the member should be recused from taking part in the proceedings and, if this is done will recommend to the Dean a successor for temporary appointment to the committee for participation in the matter. A decision of the Chair not to recuse the challenged member will be communicated to the student, who may within one day after receiving the notice appeal the decision to the Dean. The Dean's decision to deny or grant the appeal will be final." (Def.'s Ex. N, p. 2, Docket Entry no. 112.)
Yale does not offer any evidence that it informed McCarty before the disciplinary hearing of the membership of the disciplinary committee, and therefore, Yale has also failed to offer evidence that it provided McCarty a day to object to such membership, as provided for in the ethics code. Yale contends, nonetheless, that even had McCarty been afforded the opportunity to object to two members of the committee, as McCarty argues she would have, the basis for her objection would not have been sufficient to demonstrate prejudice necessary for recusal. As evidence of McCarty's basis, Yale puts forth her responses to interrogatories wherein McCarty stated that she would have objected to two members because they had advised her with respect to the disciplinary proceedings; (Def.'s Ex. M, p. 4, Docket Entry no. 112); i.e., they acted as both counselor and judge. Yale concludes that this would have been insufficient to demonstrate prejudice, and therefore, McCarty would have faced the same committee membership regardless. (See Def.'s Mem. Supp., pp. 13-15, Docket Entry no. 112.) Aside from the fact that a court of law can easily understand the prejudice to a defendant who is advised by the same person who determines his or her fate, such a matter of causation is a question of fact for the jury, and inappropriate for resolution at this stage. For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that Yale has failed to meet its burden of establishing that there does not exist any genuine issues of material fact as to whether Yale breached the contract, or that such breach was not the cause of McCarty's damages.
Because the court has concluded that Yale has failed to meet its burden with respect to one of the alleged breaches, it need not examine the other allegations of breach of contract. That said, the court would be remiss not to point out that Yale relies on inadmissible hearsay and speculation as evidence of the " fact" that, as required by the Code; (see Def.'s Ex. N, p. 3, Docket Entry no. 112); the Dean reviewed and approved the committee's decision to expel McCarty prior to its effectiveness. (See Def.'s Mem. Supp., pp. 10-11, Docket Entry no. 112, citing Def.'s Exhibits E and I, Docket Entry no. 112.)
II
EDUCATIONAL DEFERENCE
Yale argues that even if Yale breached the contract, educational deference prohibits the court from reaching such claim unless McCarty has shown that the decision to expel her was made arbitrarily or in bad faith. McCarty counters that educational deference is not applicable to the alleged breaches at issue because they relate to specific contractual promises separate from Yale's general obligation to offer a reasonable education.
Both parties rely on Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 687 A.2d 111 (1996). " We recently joined those courts that have rejected the cognizability of educational malpractice claims. In Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, supra, 239 Conn. 580, the plaintiff resident physician brought a breach of contract claim against the defendant hospital alleging that he was improperly dismissed from the residency training program, and that such dismissal was a breach of the residency agreement between the plaintiff and the hospital. The hospital based its decision to dismiss the plaintiff on his inability to make decisions in the operating room, his unwillingness to accept responsibility for errors, and gaps in the plaintiff's knowledge base. Id., 579. In granting the hospital's motion for summary judgment, the trial court characterized the decision to dismiss the plaintiff as an academic decision that lay solely within the province of the medical community. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 581. We affirmed the judgment of the trial court, stating that [a] residency committee's decision to dismiss a resident physician for poor performance in the clinic mirrors a professor's decision to fail a medical school student for poor performance in the classroom. Id., 587. We rejected the propriety of permitting courts to evaluate such an academic decision as the dismissal of a student based on poor performance. Id., 590-92, 594-95. In short, we concluded that the plaintiff had not stated a cognizable claim. Id., 598." Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 657-58, 748 A.2d 834, 846 (2000).
In acknowledging judicial deference with respect to the plaintiff's claim that the defendant had failed to provide an adequate residency program, the court in Gupta distinguished " a contract claim based on inadequate educational services" from a " fail[ure] to fulfil a specific contractual promise distinct from any overall obligation to offer a reasonable program." See Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, supra, 239 Conn. 591-93. " Judicial noninterference is especially appropriate in cases like the present one, in which the focus of a breach of contract claim is an allegedly inadequate residency program . . . There are, however, at least two situations wherein courts will entertain a cause of action for institutional breach of a contract for educational services. The first would be exemplified by a showing that the educational program failed in some fundamental respect, as by not offering any of the courses necessary to obtain certification in a particular field . . . The second would arise if the educational institution failed to fulfil a specific contractual promise distinct from any overall obligation to offer a reasonable program." Id., 592-93. " Like the decision of an individual professor as to the proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking . . . [F]or dismissal grounded in disciplinary, rather than academic, reasons, courts appropriately may engage in more thorough due process analysis[.]" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 594.
Yale would have the court ignore the fact that McCarty's claims fall squarely within the second exception to the judicial deference rule, i.e., failure to fulfil a specific contractual term that is distinct from the university's general obligation to provide an education that is not fundamentally flawed. McCarty's expulsion was not grounded in academic, but disciplinary reasons, and therefore, the court need not confer upon Yale the type of deference that is appropriate within the context of an academic, rather than a contractual dispute, which falls squarely within the court's competency. Yale's reliance on Okafor v. Yale University, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-98-0410320-S, (June 25, 2004, Corradino, J.), is inapposite because the court in Okafor determined that Yale had " substantially complied with the rules and regulations it set up for disciplinary procedures against students, " whereas in the case of McCarty, Yale has failed to meet its burden as to this point.
III
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Yale contends that summary judgment should be granted with respect to McCarty's prayer for relief for specific performance, i.e., reinstatement of McCarty as a student, because public policy prohibits specific performance of contracts for personal services. McCarty's response is that summary judgment is not to be granted as to a prayer for relief.
" Contracts of personal service are not specifically enforceable." Burns v. Gould, 172 Conn. 210, 214-15, 374 A.2d 193 (1977). " A court will refuse to grant specific performance of a contract for service or supervision that is personal in nature. The refusal is based in part upon the undesirability of compelling the continuance of personal association after disputes have arisen and confidence and loyalty are gone and, in some instances, of imposing what might seem like involuntary servitude. To this extent the rule . . . is an application of the more general rule under which specific performance will not be granted if the use of compulsion is contrary to public policy . . . The refusal is also based upon the difficulty of enforcement inherent in passing judgment on the quality of performance. To this extent the rule . . . is an application of the more general rule on the effect of difficulty of enforcement . . ." (Citations omitted.) 3 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 367, comment (a), p. 192 (1981).
" A performance is not a personal service under the rule . . . unless it is personal in the sense of being non-delegable . . . However, not every non-delegable performance is properly described as a service. An act such as the writing of an autograph or the signing of a diploma may be personal in the sense of being non-delegable even though it is not a personal service, and if that is so specific performance is not precluded. In determining what is a personal service, the policies reflected in the more general rules on the effect of public policy . . . and of the difficulty of enforcement . . . are relevant. The importance of trust and confidence in the relation between the parties, the difficulty of judging the quality of the performance rendered and the length of time required for performance are significant factors. Among the parties that have been held to render what are personal services within the rule . . . are actors, singers and athletes, and the rule applies generally to contracts of employment that create the intimate relation traditionally known as master and servant . . . The rule that bars specific enforcement of the employee's promise to render personal service has sometimes been extended to bar specific enforcement of the employer's promise where personal supervision is considered to be involved. The policies against compelling an employer to retain an employee have not, however, prevented courts from ordering reinstatement of employees discharged in contravention of statutes prohibiting discrimination or in violation of collective bargaining agreements." (Citations omitted.) 3 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 367, comment (b), pp. 192-93 (1981).
" [T]here may be a cause of action for specific performance of a contract between a college and its students in proper circumstances." Williams v. Howard University, 528 F.2d 658, 660, 174 U.S. App.D.C. 85 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850, 97 S.Ct. 138, 50 L.Ed.2d 123 (1976). In Illinois, where monetary damages are available for " a private school's wrongful expulsion of a student, " specific performance is not available in the case of a Ph.D. student and a private university. See Bilut v. Northwestern University, 269 Ill.App.3d 125, 133-34, 645 N.E.2d 536, 206 Ill.Dec. 531 (1994) (" defendant's faculty must work closely with its Ph.D. candidates"), cert. denied 161 Ill.2d 523, 649 N.E.2d 413, 208 Ill.Dec. 357 (1995). This court is unable to find, and the defendant has failed to point to, a single Connecticut case wherein the court ruled that a contract between a college and its student is not subject to specific performance. All of the cases cited by the defendant are from outside Connecticut, and all but one of these relate to Ph.D. programs. In the one case cited to by the defendant that does not relate to a Ph.D. student, the court there determined that specific performance would be contrary to public policy because " the relationship between a grade school and a student is one highly personal in nature." Bloch v. Hillel Torah North Suburban Day School, 100 Ill.App.3d 204, 206-07, 426 N.E.2d 976, 55 Ill.Dec. 651 (1981).
The court, however, at this stage, need not resolve the question of whether a contract between a college and a master's program student is subject to specific performance. There is a split among the trial courts as to whether partial summary judgment can be granted as to a prayer for relief. Compare Secured Systems Technology, Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-09-5021153-S (January 16, 2013, Sommer, J.) (granting summary judgment as to plaintiff's claim for attorneys fees) with Frederick v. Gladeview Health Care Center, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-11-6011350-S (April 10, 2014, Devine, J.) (58 Conn.L.Rptr. 47, 51-52, ) (denying summary judgment as to plaintiff's claims for punitive damages).
" In Larobina [v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 876 A.2d 522 (2005)], the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's granting summary judgment to the defendants after determining that the plaintiff's factual allegations as to certain counts were legally insufficient." Frederick v. Gladeview Health Care Center, Inc., supra, 58 Conn.L.Rptr. 47, 51. " The analysis in Larobina began by recognizing that generally the motion to strike is the proper procedural vehicle to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint but that the court's jurisprudence regarding whether summary judgment could also be used for that purpose had become unclear . . . The court then emphasized that, ultimately, the desire for judicial efficiency inherent in the summary judgment procedure would be frustrated if parties were forced to try a case where there was no real issue to be tried . . . With these considerations in mind, the court concluded that the use of a motion for summary judgment to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is appropriate when the complaint fails to set forth a cause of action and the defendant can establish that the defect could not be cured by repleading." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
" While Larobina undoubtedly broadened our summary judgment procedure, the case does not stand for the proposition that partial summary judgment can be granted on a prayer for relief." Frederick v. Gladeview Health Care Center, Inc., supra, 58 Conn.L.Rptr. 47, 51. " Larobina was predicated on judicial efficiency (as is the entire summary judgment procedure); however judicial efficiency would not be advanced and may in fact be actively hindered by granting the defendant's motion in this case. First, in light of the above ruling, this suit is moving forward to trial and, therefore, little to no resources would be spared in granting judgment on one of multiple prayers for relief. Second, the underlying legal question here--whether the [relief requested is recoverable]--is one for which our superior courts cannot agree on an answer . . . If this court were to agree with the defendant on this issue and grant summary judgment on the [claim for relief], the trial would proceed on the remaining prayers for relief. However, if the plaintiff appealed and the Appellate Court decided that the [relief was recoverable], the court would be forced to have a second trial. Two trials for one case is the antithesis of judicial efficiency. The far more prudent approach is to permit the trial to move forward with [the relief requested] and, if such [relief is] later deemed improper . .., any [such relief] that result from the trial can simply be remitted." (Citation omitted.) Id., 51-52.
One case that extended Larobina to allow partial summary judgment as to a prayer for relief did so without analysis, but by simply adding the language " or a prayer for relief" to the language of the Larobina opinion. See Secured Systems Technology, Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-09-5021153-S . Because the reasoning in Frederick v. Gladeview Health Care Center, Inc., supra, 58 Conn.L.Rptr. 51-52 is not only more persuasive, but is also on point, in that the present case is proceeding to trial and presents a question of law with respect to the challenged prayer for relief that has yet to be resolved by Connecticut authority, the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's prayer for relief of specific performance is denied. See also Gonska v. Highland View Manor, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-12-6030032-S, (June 26, 2014, Peck, J.) (" There is no appellate authority on the propriety of [granting summary judgment as to a prayer for relief], but [n]umerous [trial] courts have held that a motion for summary judgment is an improper method by which to challenge a prayer for relief . . . This court agrees with the numerous courts that have held that a party may not move for summary judgment on a prayer for relief" [citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.