Opinion
November 18, 1925.
November 18, 1925.
Present: RUGG, C.J., BRALEY, PIERCE, WAIT, SANDERSON, JJ.
Workmen's Compensation Act, Finality of decision by Industrial Accident Board as to incapacity, Law of the case.
After a decree by the Industrial Accident Board which neither party certified to the Superior Court under G.L.c. 152, § 11, and which affirmed and adopted findings by a single member of the board that the "employee can work if he cares to apply himself. The insurer therefore is authorized to discontinue compensation at this time," there is no jurisdiction either in the Industrial Accident Board or in the Superior Court to order payment of further compensation. Following Brode's Case, 251 Mass. 414. After the Industrial Accident Board on April 16, 1924, rendered the decision above described, a single member of the board at the request of the employee gave a further hearing on the question, whether there was disability after February 20, 1924, and the single member made detailed findings of fact and concluded that disability ceased on that date. On review by the Industrial Accident Board, an order was made that compensation for total disability between February 20 and June 2 be paid, and the insurer appealed. Held, following Brode's Case, 251 Mass. 414, that the decree must be reversed.
CERTIFICATION to the Superior Court under the provisions of the workmen's compensation act of a decision by the Industrial Accident Board on July 30, 1924, finding "upon all the evidence that this employee [by reason of an injury received while employed by Grossman-Black Potato Company] was totally incapacitated for work from February 20, 1924, to June 2, 1924, on which latter date total incapacity for work terminated and that the employee is entitled to compensation in the sum of $237.71, to June 2, 1924. The Board reserves the employee's right to partial incapacity compensation after June 2, 1924."
The record disclosed that on May 10, 1922, the employee received an injury to his left knee. In accordance with an agreement approved by the Industrial Accident Board on June 15, 1922, he was paid a weekly compensation of $16. On February 8, 1924, a hearing was had before a single members of the board, who found on February 20 "that this employee can work if he cares to apply himself. The insurer therefore is authorized to discontinue compensation at this time." The employee claimed a review by the board who, on April 16, 1924, affirmed and adopted the findings and decision of the single member and authorized the insurer to discontinue compensation as of February 20, 1924. Neither party certified this decision to the Superior Court.
At the request of the employee, who alleged that he still suffered disability as a result of his injury, and that he was entitled to further compensation at that time, another hearing was had before a single member of the board who, from facts reported by him in detail, concluded "that this employee is no longer incapacitated from earning his former wage as a result of his injury. While it is not impossible that he may have some pain, I find that it is not of such a character as to disable him. I further find that so far as affecting his ability to earn wages is concerned, his disability is at an end and has been since February 20, 1924." From this decision by the single member, the employee claimed a review to the full board, who made the decision set out above, which was certified to the Superior Court, where the case was heard by McLaughlin, J., and a decree was ordered awarding compensation in accordance with the decision of the board. The insurer appealed.
W.I. Badger, Jr., for the insurer.
No argument nor brief for the claimant.
The principles stated and amplified in Brode's Case, 251 Mass. 414, decided since the hearings before the Industrial Accident Board, indubitably and imperatively require the conclusion that the employee is not entitled to compensation on the facts here disclosed. The case at bar is distinguishable from Hunnewell's Case, 220 Mass. 351, and Weir's Case, 252 Mass. 236.
Decree reversed. Decree to be entered in favor of insurer.