"It is a well known rule of testamentary interpretation that where the intention of the testator is expressed in an ambiguous or obscure manner, such a construction should be adopted, if consistent with other testamentary rules, as will dispose of the property in a just, natural and reasonable manner." McCarthy v. Tierney, 113 Conn. 316, 322 155 A. 226. It would be just, natural and reasonable for the testator to provide for the children of the nearest relative he had in America. The Hershatter family had been close to him for many years and Louis was one of the few confidants he had. As his three blood relatives in Russia were munificently provided for in the residuary clause, it seems unreasonable to ascribe to him an intention to cut off the four children of his aunt and thereby increase the residue by the relatively insignificant amount of $15,000.

Without laboring the point further, the instrument was clearly intended as a complete disposition of all interests in the principal and income of the trust, and the death of Margaret before becoming twenty-five was not intended to put an end to the trust for her. Had the word "and" been omitted and a new sentence been begun with the words "upon the death of Margaret" as they appear in the quotation we have made above from the beginning of the third paragraph, all question would have been obviated; and the manner of the statement affords too weak a basis upon which to defeat the clear intent of the instrument as a whole. McCarthy v. Tierney. 113 Conn. 316, 321, 155 A. 226. The death of Margaret before reaching the age of twenty-five did not cause a failure of the trust. The defendant also claims that certain provisions concerning the disposition of the principal are void under the rule against perpetuities.

" Where there are two possible constructions of a will, that should be adopted which will dispose of the property in a just, natural and reasonable manner. McCarthy v. Tierney, 113 Conn. 316, 322; Tingier v. Woodruff, 84 Conn. 684, 690. A more difficult question arises when one attempts to reconcile that portion of the gift which would seem to give the trustee uncontrolled discretion as to the amount necessary for "maintenance and comfort" and that portion which seems to limit the gift to "approximately one hundred dollars monthly."

That her paragraphing is not controlling is held in Bruce v. Bruce, supra: "Punctuation, the enumeration of paragraphs, or a mistaken use of either in a last will and testament, will not be regarded in its construction if to do so avoids the testamentary intention manifested by the language of the will, and they will be disregarded where necessary to a proper ascertainment of the testator's intention." See also McCarthy v. Tierney, 113 Conn. 316, 155 A. 226, 228, where the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut said: "Paragraphs and punctuation in a will are largely matters under the control of the scrivener, and, while they are not to be disregarded, they are not to be allowed to obscure the real intent of a testator sufficiently otherwise indicated." It seems to me evident that testatrix did not intend to die intestate as to any of her property, but that if her husband survived her he was to have a limited life estate and that after his death the trustees were to pay $1,000 each to the nieces and nephew by marriage named in 9(a), and that she considered 9(b) to be a complete disposition of the rest and residue of her estate, to be divided between her brother, nieces and a nephew of her own blood.