Opinion
22-cv-23193-GAYLES
10-18-2022
ORDER DISMISSING CASE
DARRIN P. GAYLES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on a sua sponte review of the record. Plaintiff, John J. McCarthy, appearing pro se, filed this action on October 3, 2022. [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis the same day [ECF No. 4]. Because Plaintiff has moved to proceed in forma pauperis, the screening provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), are applicable. Pursuant to that statute, the court is permitted to dismiss a suit “any time [] the court determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915(e)(2).
The standards governing dismissals for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) are the same as those governing dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). To state a claim for relief, a pleading must contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. To survive a motion to dismiss, a claim “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[T]he pleadings are construed broadly,” Levine v. World Fin. Network Nat'l Bank, 437 F.3d 1118, 1120 (11th Cir. 2006), and the allegations in the complaint are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998). At bottom, the question is not whether the claimant “will ultimately prevail . . . but whether his complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court's threshold.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff attempts to assert a claim against Governor Ron DeSantis and unnamed federal agents for “send[ing] illegal immigrants by two planes to Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts” in violation of the immigrants' constitutional rights [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to properly allege standing. “[S]tanding is a threshold question that must be explored at the outset of any case.” Corbett v. Transp. Sec. Admin, 930 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2019). It is not a “mere pleading requirement[] but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case . . . .” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). To establish Article III standing, “[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). “In plainer language, the plaintiff needs to show that the defendant harmed him, and that a court decision can either eliminate the harm or compensate for it.” Muranksy v. Godiva, 979 F.3d 917, 924 (11th Cir. 2020). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered an injury in fact that is traceable to the conduct of the Defendants. As a result, Plaintiff fails to allege standing, and this action must be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice and CLOSED for administrative purposes. All pending motions are DENIED as MOOT.
DONE AND ORDERED