535 U.S. at 808; see also McGuire, 873 F.2d at 980. Numerous courts, following Gisbrecht's lead, have also noted the importance of contingency agreements: Reindl, 2012 WL 4754737, at *2 (contingent fee agreements allow claimants who cannot afford hourly rates to obtain counsel and benefit the system by encouraging lawyers to be discerning in evaluating cases); Koester, 482 F.Supp.2d at 1082 (same); McCarthy v. Astrue, 2008 WL 4539959, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 2008) (same); Kirby, 2017 WL 5891059, at *2 (same).
In Gisbrecht, the Supreme Court explicitly approved the Seventh Circuit's method of evaluating reasonableness, namely that courts should defer to the parties' reasonable intentions in analyzing attorney fees. 535 at 808; see also McGuire v. Sullivan, 873 F.2d 974, 980 (7th Cir. 1989). Numerous courts, following Gisbrecht's lead, have also noted the importance of contingency agreements: Reindl v. Astrue, No. 09 CV 2695, 2012 WL 4754737, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2012) (contingent fee agreements allow claimants who cannot afford hourly rates to obtain counsel and benefit the system by encouraging lawyers to be discerning in evaluating cases); Koester, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 1082 (same); McCarthy v. Astrue, No. 2:04 cv 369, 2008 WL 4539959, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 2008) (same); Kirby, 2017 WL 5891059, at *2 (same). With that framework in mind, the Supreme Court provided three examples of situations where an attorney's requested fee might be unreasonable: (1) the character of and results achieved from attorney representation do not justify the amount; (2) the attorney is responsible for delay such that he or she would profit from the accumulation of benefits; or (3) the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case.
McGuire, 873 F.2d at 980-81. ("In addition, when an attorney and client have entered into a contingency agreement, due deference should be given to this expression of the intentions of the parties."); see also McCarthy v. Astrue, 2008 WL 4539959, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 2008). As noted above, the Commissioner does not dispute the successful result counsel achieved in this case and the award of significant benefits to Claimant on remand before the Agency.