Opinion
2022 CA 1121
04-14-2023
Joanne MCCARTER v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES
J. Arthur Smith, III, Robert Moseley Schmidt, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Joanne McCarter Jeff Landry, Attorney General, Phyllis E. Glazer, Assistant Attorney General, Jeannie C. Prudhomme, Assistant Attorney General, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services
J. Arthur Smith, III, Robert Moseley Schmidt, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Joanne McCarter
Jeff Landry, Attorney General, Phyllis E. Glazer, Assistant Attorney General, Jeannie C. Prudhomme, Assistant Attorney General, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services
BEFORE: WELCH, PENZATO, AND LANIER, JJ.
LANIER, J.
In this appeal, defendant challenges the district court's judgment finding in favor of plaintiff on her invasion of privacy claim and awarding plaintiff $25,000.00 in damages, plus legal interest and costs. Plaintiff answered the appeal, seeking a modification of the judgment to include an award for lost wages. For the reasons that follow, we reverse in part and deny the answer to the appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, Joanne McCarter, was an employee of defendant, the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS"), beginning in 2002. At the time of her resignation in 2016, Ms. McCarter was a permanent, classified civil service employee working as a social services analyst supervisor. As supervisor, Ms. McCarter was responsible for monitoring approximately eight workers, at any given time, to ensure that cases being evaluated for eligibility in the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program ("SNAP") were handled properly. As part of her employment with DCFS, Ms. McCarter signed the DCFS Staff Confidentiality Agreement (hereafter referred to as "the DCFS Confidentiality policy") on January 23, 2015, and signed the Acknowledgment of Agreement to Comply with DCFS Policy Regarding Prohibited Activities and Employees Working on Cases of Relatives, Friends, and/or Acquaintances (hereafter referred to as "the DCFS Prohibited Activities policy") on January 7, 2015. These agreements informed Ms. McCarter that any violations may be grounds for disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment.
See La. Civil Service Rules 1.34 and 4.1(b).
After receiving complaints of alleged misconduct concerning Ms. McCarter and Charlene Manzella, a DCFS employee under the direct supervision of Ms. McCarter, DCFS initiated an investigation through its Fraud and Recovery Unit. Ms. McCarter was interviewed on March 2, 2016, by DCFS Fraud and Recovery Unit investigators, Rhonda Brown and Robyn Glaude. During the interview, Ms. McCarter signed a written statement admitting to misconduct involving the SNAP case record of her daughter, K.B., as well as the SNAP applications for Ms. Manzella's grandchildren.
Ms. McCarter's alleged misconduct included a complaint from her daughter, K.B.
According to the record, the March 2, 2016 statement was handwritten by Ms. Brown and given to Ms. McCarter to review for corrections before Ms. McCarter voluntarily signed the statement.
The only allegation Ms. McCarter disputed was the complaint by K.B. that Ms. McCarter had unlawfully used K.B.'s EBT card (SNAP benefit card) without her permission. However, because it was learned during the investigation that Ms. McCarter and K.B. were living together at the time of the alleged misuse of the EBT card, there was not enough evidence to prove that Ms. McCarter had used the EBT card without K.B.'s permission.
Ms. Brown's April 28, 2016 administrative report (hereinafter referred to as "the fraud report") concluded that Ms. McCarter violated the DCFS Confidentiality policy by accessing K.B.'s SNAP case record and violated the DCFS Prohibited Activities policy by forging the signature of F.W., by completing and forging the SNAP applications of P.W., and by forging K.B.'s simplified report. Ms. Brown noted further that while F.W. and P.W. "appear to be eligible" for the SNAP benefits received, P.W. "never submitted an application, nor was she interviewed for the SNAP benefits, which resulted in an overpayment of $459.00." When the investigation was completed, Ms. Brown provided the fraud report, along with twenty-three exhibits, to her supervisor, Jesse Wright, who in turn forwarded the information on April 28, 2016, to Guy Sylvester. At the time, Mr. Sylvester was the executive program director of the Fraud and Recovery Unit, and he reported directly to Samuel Guillory, the DCFS Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Division of Family Support.
F.W. and P.W. are Ms. Manzella's grandchildren.
On March 20, 2016, Ms. McCarter signed a condition of employment with the Louisiana Department of Hospitals ("LDH"). Thereafter, on April 20, 2016, Ms. McCarter gave her two-weeks' notice at DCFS. Ms. McCarter's last day at DCFS was May 6, 2016. She began her employment with LDH on May 9, 2016, as a probationary employee.
Pursuant to an annual, mandatory legislative audit, DCFS Fraud and Recovery Unit provided its 2016 findings concerning known or potential fraud related to the SNAP program. Included in an August 11, 2016 letter from Jesse Wright to Benjamin Foster, Audit Director of DCFS Bureau of Audit & Compliance Services ("DCFS Audit Unit"), were the details of the Fraud and Recovery Unit's investigation into Ms. McCarter. Mr. Foster was then responsible for compiling all audit information from DCFS internally and submitting it to the legislative auditor. The legislative auditor published a Financial Audit Services Management Letter ("Legislative Auditor's Report") on December 19, 2016, wherein the following "Improper Employee Activity in Federal Program" was noted:
According to the record, the annual DCFS audit report may also include information from other units such as management and finance or child welfare, as well as any other supporting documents requested by the DCFS Audit Unit.
One former employee falsified applications for a family member and for family members of a fellow employee and took action on a case involving a family member in violation of department policy. In May 2016, the employee resigned from DCFS and then accepted a position in the Louisiana Department of Health's Medicaid Eligibility Section.
The employee was not identified by name in the Legislative Auditor's Report.
Following the release of the Legislative Auditor's Report, Melissa Moore from the television station WBRZ sent an email to LDH on December 21, 2016, inquiring why LDH would hire an employee who had "resigned from DCFS after falsifying multiple applications." Ms. Moore's request was forwarded to Robert Johannessen, LDH Communications Director, who asked Ms. Moore for the name of the individual so that LDH could provide further information. In a subsequent email, Ms. Moore replied, "I don't know the name because it's not in the audit. I suspect it will be easier for you to get it from DCFS than for me to." On December 22, 2016, Mr. Johannessen responded to Ms. Moore, in part:
At the time of hire, we were unaware of any wrongdoing by this employee at DCFS or of the audit that was underway. We are now reviewing the hiring. ... Nonetheless, because this individual is a probationary hire at LDH Medicaid, we are now working with our Human Resources office to determine the appropriate next steps.
According to the record, the email chain was ultimately forwarded to Terri Ricks, DCFS Executive Counsel. Subsequently, on February 9, 2017, Ms. Ricks received an email from Stephen Russo, LDH Executive Counsel, requesting information about Ms. McCarter. Ms. Ricks testified that although Mr. Russo had identified Ms. McCarter by name, Ms. Ricks had not, at any time prior to February 9, 2017, authorized the release of Ms. McCarter's name to LDH. After speaking with Mr. Russo, Ms. Ricks authorized Mr. Guillory to release the fraud report to LDH. Ms. Ricks noted that she had always believed that the state of Louisiana was one employer. Ms. Ricks indicated that she would not have authorized the release of the information if she thought it was prohibited by law, adding that it was one state agency questioning "employee conduct for an employee-related" matter at another state agency.
At the time of the trial of this matter, Ms. Ricks had been promoted to DCFS Deputy Secretary, a position she had been in for approximately five years.
On March 2, 2017, Ms. McCarter's probationary appointment at LDH was terminated, effective immediately. Ms. McCarter testified that she was not given any reasons for her termination, and the record does not contain any evidence to support a finding that Ms. McCarter's termination was based on LDH's receipt of the fraud report from DCFS.
Subsequently, in July 2017, Ms. McCarter filed suit against DCFS alleging that DCFS had violated her right to privacy under Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution by communicating to officials at LDH "the personal and private information concerning [DCFS's] investigation of [Ms. McCarter] while she was an employee of [DCFS]." Ms. McCarter sought damages for lost wages and for the emotional and mental distress she allegedly suffered as a result of her inability to become gainfully re-employed. In response to the petition, DCFS filed an exception raising an objection of no cause of action, arguing that as a public employee, Ms. McCarter did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the public documents allegedly disclosed by DCFS. Following a hearing on DCFS's exception, the district court sustained the exception, granting Ms. McCarter ten days to amend her petition to state a cause of action.
Thereafter, Ms. McCarter filed an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the accusations by her daughter were false and that DCFS should have known that her daughter was a "patently unreliable informant." Ms. McCarter asserted that the investigation was never completed and that any information in possession of DCFS related to the investigation "would necessarily consist almost entirely of unsubstantiated allegations by [her] severely mentally ill daughter." Ms. McCarter further added claims of defamation and false light invasion of privacy.
The matter proceeded to a three-day bench trial, at which time several witnesses testified and numerous documents were introduced into the record. On February 23, 2022, the district court rendered judgment in favor of Ms. McCarter on her claim of invasion of privacy, awarding $25,000.00 in damages against DCFS. All other claims by Ms. McCarter were denied, with prejudice. The judgment awarded "legal interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from March 1, 2017 until the date of the signing of this judgment and thereafter at the rate of four per cent per annum until this judgment is paid in accordance with law." DCFS filed a timely motion for new trial, arguing that legal interest against the state is controlled by La. R.S. 13:5112(C) and that the judgment should be amended accordingly. The district court granted the motion for new trial, which was unopposed, and signed an amended judgment on March 30, 2022, awarding legal interest in accordance with La. R.S. 13:5112(C). In all other respects, the judgment remained the same. It is from this judgment that DCFS has appealed, assigning the following specifications of error for our review:
1. The [district] court erred in finding that [Ms. McCarter] established an actionable claim of invasion of privacy, where [Ms. McCarter] did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, her misconduct as an employee of a state agency tasked with administering a fiscal program was a matter of public concern, and DCFS's course of action was reasonable.
2. The [district] court erred in awarding [Ms. McCarter] damages for mental and emotional anguish, where [Ms. McCarter] testified that her alleged mental and emotional distress resulted from the termination of her probationary employment by LDH but she did not prove that her termination from LDH resulted from DCFS's actions, and thus, did not establish that her embarrassment from the termination was caused by DCFS.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Right of Privacy
The right to privacy, as recognized in Louisiana, has been held to embrace the following four interests: (1) appropriation of individual's name or likeness for the use or benefit of the defendant; (2) unreasonable intrusion by the defendant upon the plaintiffs physical solitude or seclusion; (3) publicity that unreasonably places plaintiff in false light before public; and (4) unreasonable public disclosure of embarrassing private facts. Frigon v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 2017-0993 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/21/18), 255 So.3d 591, 599, writ denied, 2018-1868 (La. 1/18/19), 262 So.3d 896 ( citing Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal Inc., 375 So.2d 1386, 1388 (La. 1979) ).
In the instant case, the district court found that DCFS violated Ms. McCarter's right to privacy by unreasonably and improperly disclosing private facts pertaining to the DCFS 2016 investigation into Ms. McCarter's actions while employed at DCFS. The district court found that the unreasonable and improper disclosure by DCFS occurred in three distinct ways; 1) by releasing the 2016 incomplete investigation and the fraud report to LDH; 2) by providing investigation information and documentation to the legislative auditor without safeguarding Ms. McCarter's identity; and 3) by placing the fraud report and attachments in Ms. McCarter's personnel file.
Because we ultimately conclude herein that Ms. McCarter had no privacy interest in the results of the investigation into her actions as supervisor for the state's SNAP program and that the district court erred in finding that DCFS's disclosure of the fraud report to LDH was an unreasonable and improper invasion of her privacy, our discussion stops short of addressing the district court's other findings concerning the legislative auditor and Ms. McCarter's personnel file. Nonetheless, we note that the record is clear that Ms. McCarter was not identified by name in the report that was prepared by the DCFS Audit Unit and forwarded to the legislative auditor. Moreover, although Ms. McCarter's personnel file and the fraud report, along with its twenty-three exhibits, were produced in response to a public records request by Ms. McCarter's counsel, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that these documents were released to anyone other than Ms. McCarter's counsel or that, as suggested by Ms. McCarter, the fraud report and exhibits were not maintained in a confidential manner. We note that Ms. McCarter's counsel requested her "complete personnel file" as well as "[a]ny and all other files maintained by [DCFS] ... on [Ms.] McCarter, including ... any and all supervisory files, administrative files and any other files, however they are titled." Furthermore, Wanda Dee Everett, Ms. McCarter's witness who was accepted as an expert in the area of human resources for state agencies, testified that when she reviewed Ms. McCarter's personnel file, the fraud report was not in the file.
The right to privacy in Louisiana has been described as the right to be "let alone" and to be free from "unnecessary public scrutiny." DeSalvo v. State, 624 So.2d 897, 901 (La. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1117, 114 S.Ct. 1067, 127 L.Ed.2d 386 (1994). The right of privacy protects varied interests from invasion. Among the interests protected is the individual's right to be free from unreasonable intrusion into his seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs. However, the right to privacy, like other personal rights, may be lost in many ways, such as by express or implied waiver or consent, or by a course of conduct which prevents its assertion. Moreover, the right is not absolute; it is qualified by the rights of others. The right is also limited by society's right to be informed about legitimate subjects of public interest. Capital City Press v. East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council, 96-1979 (La. 7/1/97), 696 So.2d 562, 566 ( citing Parish Nat. Bank v. Lane, 397 So.2d 1282, 1286 (La. 1981).
Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution applies only where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the matter sought to be protected. Shane v. Parish of Jefferson, 2014-2225 (La. 12/8/15), 209 So.3d 726, 741. In ascertaining whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy that is constitutionally protected, a court must determine not only whether the individual has an actual or subjective expectation of privacy, but also whether that expectation is of a type that society at large is prepared to recognize as being reasonable. Angelo Iafrate Const., LLC v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. and Development, 2003-0892 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/14/04), 879 So.2d 250, 255, writ denied, 2004-1442 (La. 9/24/04), 882 So.2d 1131.
On appeal, DCFS asserts that Ms. McCarter did not have a privacy interest in the investigation into her employment-related misconduct. DCFS further alleges that because the state of Louisiana is considered one employer, DCFS was not unreasonable in sharing the results of its investigation into Ms. McCarter with LDH, another state agency. Ms. McCarter argues that DCFS unreasonably disclosed embarrassing, private facts pertaining to an incomplete investigation. She maintains that it is not until the pre-deprivation due process has been completed and a final agency decision is made to discipline an employee that such an investigation should become public. We find no merit to Ms. McCarter's arguments and agree with DCFS that Ms. McCarter had no expectation of privacy concerning the results of the investigation into her employment-related misconduct.
As previously noted, Ms. McCarter was in a supervisory position at DCFS, monitoring employees who were responsible for distributing funds through the state's SNAP program. SNAP benefits are completely federally funded, such that if the agency fails to adequately provide oversight of the funds, the agency would be required to repay the funds to the federal government.
During the investigation by the DCFS Fraud and Recovery Unit, Ms. McCarter signed a voluntary statement containing the following admissions:
On the case of [F.W.], [Ms. Manzella] brought me the application and I signed [F.W.’s] name on the application. I know this is forgery but I was trying to help [Ms. Manzella] out as [F.W.] is on drugs. [F.W.] was eligible for the benefits and I thought I was helping them out of a bad situation.
On the case of [P.W.], I completed and signed [P.W.'s] name on the application after talking with [Ms. Manzella]. I entered the case ... and assigned it .... I was unaware that she was not interviewed.
On the case of [P.W.], she did come into the office and was interviewed.
On the case of [K.B.], I completed and signed the simplified report. My daughter was living in my home at the time and I was helping her out. She suffers from mental illness. I did view her case on Onbase, which I know is a violation of policy.
I understand my actions were wrong but I did not intend to give benefits to anyone that was not entitled.
Although I do know about confidentiality policy on cases I did not think working on the cases was a violation because I do not know them personally. (Response to [Ms. Manzella's] grandchildren)
Ms. McCarter signed the statement on March 2, 2016. Thereafter, claiming that she was never given an opportunity to rebut the allegations of misconduct, Ms. McCarter contacted human resources and attempted to file a grievance, but was denied. It was then that Ms. McCarter began looking for other employment, noting that the environment at DCFS was "very uncomfortable" and that she was embarrassed. Ms. McCarter signed a condition of employment with LDH on March 20, 2016, and her last day at DCFS was May 6, 2016.
We note that Ms. McCarter also admitted to these allegations during her trial testimony below. However, Ms. McCarter added that she did not believe her actions were in violation of any DCFS policies.
Article XII, Section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be denied the right to ... examine public documents, except in cases established by law." By enacting the Public Records Law, La. R.S. 44:1, et seq. , the legislature sought to guarantee, in the most expansive and unrestricted way possible, the right of the public to inspect and reproduce those records which the laws deem to be public. Shane, 209 So.3d at 734. "Certainly, the management (or possible mismanagement) of a public agency is a matter of concern to the public." Johnson v. Purpera, 2020-01175 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So.3d 374, 390. See also Fitzgerald v. Tucker, 98-2313 (La. 6/29/99), 737 So.2d 706, 720 (mismanagement by the Louisiana State Board for the Certification of Substance Abuse Counselors that resulted in the issuance of unnumbered and improperly executed certificates and the issuance of those certificates were matters of public concern). It logically follows, therefore, that the fraud report concerning Ms. McCarter's violation of DCFS policies related to the handling of SNAP benefits would be subject to disclosure under the Louisiana Public Records Law. Our jurisprudence supports this conclusion.
At all times pertinent hereto, La. R.S. 44:1(A)(2)(a) defined "[p]ublic records" as:
All books, records, writings, accounts, letters and letter books, maps, drawings, photographs, cards, tapes, recordings, memoranda, and papers, and all copies, duplicates, photographs, including microfilm, or other reproductions thereof, or any other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, including information contained in electronic data processing equipment, having been used, being in use, or prepared, possessed, or retained for use in the conduct, transaction, or performance of any business, transaction, work, duty, or function which was conducted, transacted, or performed by or under the authority of the constitution or laws of this state, or by or under the authority of any ordinance, regulation, mandate, or order of any public body or concerning the receipt or payment of any money received or paid by or under the authority of the constitution or the laws of this state, ... except as otherwise provided in this Chapter or the Constitution of Louisiana.
The statute was amended by 2022 La. Acts No. 770, eff. Aug. 1, 2022, to include "electronically stored information or information contained in databases" in the definition.
In Hilbun v. State ex rel. Div. of Admin., 98-1993 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/5/99), 745 So.2d 1189, this court analyzed whether an investigative report concerning a public employee's alleged inappropriate behavior while working for the State was subject to public disclosure. Noting that a public employee has no reason to expect that investigative records pertaining to misconduct would be concealed from the public, this court determined (1) the investigative report was not subject to any specific exemption, and (2) the facts concerning the daily operation of the agency were not protected by law, as they were not private in nature. Hilbun, 745 So.2d at 1190.
In City of Baton Rouge/Parish of E. Baton Rouge v. Capital City Press, L.L.C., 2007-1088 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/10/08), 4 So.3d 807, the issue of whether investigative files concerning police officers were exempt from the Public Records Law was considered. This court concluded:
[W]e do not find any legitimate reasonable expectations of privacy on behalf of any of the police officers who were investigated. These investigations were not related to private facts; the investigations concerned public employees' alleged improper activities in the workplace. On the other hand, the public has a strong, legitimate interest in disclosure. One of the purposes of the Public Records Act is to insure that public business is subject to public scrutiny. The public has an interest in learning about the operations of a public agency, the work-related conduct of public employees, in gaining information to evaluate the expenditure of public funds, and in having information openly available to them so that they can be confident in the operation of their government.
Capital City Press, L.L.C., 4 So.3d at 821 (citation and footnote omitted).
As a state employee who was in a position of authority with respect to the administration of public funds and admitted to forging at least two different SNAP applications, conduct that could have resulted in criminal charges being filed, Ms. McCarter had no right to privacy in the records pertaining to her employment-related misconduct. Thus, we conclude that the district court erred in finding that Ms. McCarter had an expectation of privacy and in awarding $25,000.00 in special damages for what the court erroneously found was the "unreasonable disclosure and public harm and humiliation which resulted in mental and emotional anguish."
See La. R.S. 14:72.
Pre-Deprivation Due Process
Ms. McCarter argued below that because DCFS's investigation into her alleged misconduct was incomplete and no disciplinary action was taken against her, DCFS was precluded from disclosing any information regarding the investigation. She further asserted that pre-deprivation notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard in response to the allegations were constitutionally required. We disagree.
In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), the Supreme Court discussed the pre-deprivation due process that is required before a person can be deprived of life, liberty or property:
An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property "be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." We have described "the root requirement" of the Due Process Clause as being "that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest." This principle requires "some kind of a hearing" prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment. [Emphasis in original.]
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 105 S.Ct. at 1493 (citations omitted).
However, Civil Service Rule 12.7 makes it clear that such notice and opportunity to respond does not apply to cases in which a permanent civil service employee voluntarily resigns as Ms. McCarter did in this case. Rather it is only when the appointing authority "proposes to discipline or remove" a permanent employee that "the employee must be given oral or written notice of the proposed action, the factual basis for and a description of the evidence supporting the proposed action, and a reasonable opportunity to respond." Because an employee's Loudermill rights are designed to protect her property right in continued employment, the employee relinquishes those rights when she voluntarily resigns or retires. Russell v. Mosquito Control Bd., 2006-0346 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/27/06), 941 So.2d 634, 640 ( citing Abel v. Auglaize County Highway Dept., 276 F.Supp.2d 724, 738 (N.D.Ohio 2003) (finding that an employee's resignation renders Loudermill inapplicable)). Ms. McCarter's own expert witness even agreed, as evidenced by the following colloquy:
[Counsel for DCFS] Ms. McCarter resigned. What are the due process rights of a person who's resigned?
[Wanda Dee Everett] There is no due process in a voluntary resignation. There is resignation to avoid discipline which comes post pre-deprivation if the employee resigns post- Loudermill then the actual record shows the resignation to avoid discipline. That was not the case.
[Counsel for DCFS] And that was not the case here. Ms. McCarter did not resign in lieu of investigation or termination; right?
[Wanda Dee Everett] That's correct.
Accordingly, we find no merit to Ms. McCarter's argument that pre-deprivation notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard were constitutionally required in this case before DCFS could disclose the information about her misconduct to the legislative auditor or LDH.
ANSWER TO APPEAL
Jn her answer to the appeal, Ms. McCarter prays for a modification of the judgment to include an award for lost wages. Considering our reversal of the district court's judgment in favor of Ms. McCarter, we deny Ms. McCarter's answer to appeal.
DECREE
For the above and foregoing reasons, we reverse that portion of the district court's March 30, 2022 judgment that found in favor of Joanne McCarter on her invasion of privacy claim and awarded $25,000.00 in damages, plus legal interest and costs, against the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services, We deny Joanne McCarter's answer to the appeal. All costs associated with this appeal are assessed against plaintiff/appellee, Joanne McCarter.
The portions of the March 30, 2022 judgment that denied Joanne McCarter's defamation and false light invasion of privacy causes of action are not before us in the instant appeal.
REVERSED IN PART; ANSWER TO APPEAL DENIED.
Penzato, J., concurs.