McCabe v. Arcidy

30 Citing cases

  1. Sommers v. Sommers

    143 N.H. 686 (N.H. 1999)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that language in a divorce decree "creat[ed] an immediate property interest" in a vehicle

    "Findings of fact by a trial court are binding on us unless they are not supported by the evidence or are erroneous as a matter of law." McCabe v. Arcidy, 138 N.H. 20, 24, 635 A.2d 446, 449 (1993). We find in this case insufficient evidence to support the trial court's determination that the parties had agreed that the defendant would pay two-thirds of the second mortgage, and reverse the court's order to the extent it obligates the defendant to pay that mortgage.

  2. Fleet Bank — N.H. v. Christy's Table

    141 N.H. 285 (N.H. 1996)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that defendants, who were not parties to contract in question, therefore could not be bound by its terms

    We agree with Fleet that contingency fee arrangements are not per se unreasonable and may be imposed on a third party pursuant to an agreement to pay reasonable attorney's fees when adequately supported by the evidence. Cf. McCabe v. Arcidy, 138 N.H. 20, 29-30, 635 A.2d 446, 452-53 (1993) (no "rigid, precise measure" for determining reasonableness of attorney's fees; calculation based on hourly rates not the sole method). In determining reasonableness, the trial court may consider whether the contingency fee is reasonably related to the total amount of work, both before and after judgment, likely to be required of the attorney.

  3. Salisbury v. Lowe

    663 A.2d 611 (N.H. 1995)   Cited 7 times

    It is within the trier of fact's province, however, to determine the weight to be accorded the evidence presented. E.g., McCabe v. Arcidy, 138 N.H. 20, 24, 635 A.2d 446, 449 (1993). "[I]nquiry into the weight of evidence is treated as [a] matter of fact," Wisutskie, 88 N.H. at 243, 186 A. at 769, and "[f]indings of fact by a trial court are binding on us unless they are not supported by the evidence or are erroneous as a matter of law."

  4. Weber v. Sanborn

    526 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D. Mass. 2007)   Cited 8 times
    Granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to present evidence of a false statement

    In its motion for partial summary judgment, PL P avers that Weber (1) cannot establish the existence of an attorney-client relationship between he and PL P; (2) cannot demonstrate that PL P breached any duty it owed to him; and (3) cannot prove that any damage he suffered was the result of PL P's alleged breach. Despite PL P's assertions that there are no issues of disputed material fact related to this count, plaintiff and his expert disagree. PL P draws the attention of this Court to McCabe v. Arcidy, 138 N.H. 20, 635 A.2d 446 (1993), to support its argument that, when a lawyer represents a corporation, he does not represent its officers or shareholders absent an express agreement. Id. at 25, 635 A.2d 446.

  5. Pike Industries v. Hiltz Construction

    143 N.H. 1 (N.H. 1998)   Cited 8 times
    Construing the term “obligation” in New Hampshire's contribution statute and affirming finding that the obligation subject to apportionment in that case was $250,000, rather than the $175,000 settlement because the reduced settlement amount took into account the 30% of the fault attributable to the original plaintiff

    In reviewing the record, we defer to the trial court's judgment regarding such issues as the weight given the evidence. See McCabe v. Arcidy, 138 N.H. 20, 24, 635 A.2d 446, 449 (1993). First, with respect to the failure to recognize the difficulty in entering the dump site and implementing a plan for dealing with it, the court did hear evidence on this point.

  6. J.G.M.C.J. v. Sears, Roebuck Company

    391 F.3d 364 (1st Cir. 2004)   Cited 15 times
    Applying New Hampshire law

    However, just as a surety is discharged by material changes in a contract, an original lessee can be discharged by material changes in the lease negotiated between the assignee and the lessor. See McCabe v. Arcidy, 138 N.H. 20, 635 A.2d 446, 453 (1993) (noting that material alteration in principal contract without consent of guarantor discharges guarantor if the material alteration injures the interest of the guarantor). B. J.G.M.C.J.'s Remaining Common Law and Statutory Claims

  7. Bailey v. Buskey

    Case No. 12-cv-396-SM (D.N.H. Jul. 15, 2014)

    "Whether an attorney-client relationship exists is a question of law that 'is predicated on the circumstances of each case.'" In re Mullen, 2007 WL 2712957, at *6 (Bankr. D.N.H. Sept. 14, 2007) (citing McCabe v. Arcidy, 138 N.H. 20 (N.H. 1993)). The motion for summary judgment turns on defendants' contention that Buskey and McCarthy were not Chase Bailey's estate planning attorneys, as alleged, and therefore cannot be liable for malpractice (at least not in that capacity).

  8. Ansys, Inc. v. Computational Dynamics North America

    Civil No. 09-cv-284-SM, Opinion No. 2011 DNH 025 (D.N.H. Feb. 10, 2011)   Cited 2 times

    If they can show that ANSYS acted in bad faith, defendants must then also establish the reasonableness of: (1) the time billed by their attorneys for various tasks related to this case; and (2) the rates charged for those legal services.See, e.g., McCabe v. Arcidy, 138 N.H. 20, 29 (1993) (noting that relevant factors for the court to weigh when considering a fee award are: the nature, novelty, and difficulty of the litigation; the attorney's skill and reputation in the area; the amount of time he or she reasonably devoted to the matter; the customary fees in the area; the extent to which the attorney prevailed; and the benefit thereby bestowed on his or her clients). See also Coutin v. Young Rubicam Puerto Rico, Inc., 124 F.3d 331, 337 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that, in this circuit, the "starting point in constructing a fee award" is the "lodestar method," by which "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation [are] multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.") (citation and internal punctuation omitted).

  9. Moore v. Medeva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

    Civil No. 01-311-M, Opinion No. 2003 DNH 060 (D.N.H. Apr. 9, 2003)

    As the party asserting that the opinion letter is protected by the attorney-client privilege, CPI bears the burden of demonstrating that the privilege actually applies and, if so, that it has not been waived. See generally State v. Gordon, 141 N.H. 703, 705 (1997); McCabe v. Arcidy, 138 N.H. 20, 25 (1993). On this record, CPI has failed to carry that burden.

  10. In re Mullen

    Bk. No. 03-11963-MWV, Adv. No. 05-1113-MWV (Bankr. D.N.H. Sep. 14, 2007)   Cited 1 times
    Holding that rules of professional conduct "provide an instructive backdrop" to a substantive request for relief

    Whether an attorney-client relationship exists is a question of law that "is predicated on the circumstances of each case." McCabe v. Arcidy, 635 A.2d 446, 449 (N.H. 1993). The party alleging the existence of the relationship bears the burden of proving its existence.Id. "An attorney-client relationship is created when (1) a person seeks advice or assistance from an attorney, (2) the advice or assistance sought pertains to matters within the attorney's professional competence, and (3) the attorney expressly or impliedly agrees to give or actually gives the desired advice or assistance."