Accordingly, this issue was not preserved, and this Court cannot review this argument. See McAllister v. State, 325 Ga. App. 583, 586 (2) (754 SE2d 376) (2014) (failure to obtain a distinct ruling on a constitutional issue presents nothing for this Court to review when enumerated as error on appeal); Bain v. State, 258 Ga. App. 440, 445-446 (3) (574 SE2d 590) (2002) (same). Compare with Rouse v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 271 Ga. 726, 727-728 (1) (524 SE2d 455) (1999).
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 31–27–2.9(a), inserted by R.I. St. 2009, c. 09-210, § 2; McAllister v. State, 325 Ga. App. 583, 585, 754 S.E.2d 376 (2014), citing Ga. Code Ann. § 40-5-67.1(d.1). Alaska enacted a new statute allowing for chemical testing absent consent if a defendant were arrested for OUI after an accident resulting in death or physical injury to another.
Even if the mother had raised this constitutional issue below, her failure to obtain a ruling from the juvenile court precludes appellate review. See McAllister v. State , 325 Ga. App. 583, 586 (2), 754 S.E.2d 376 (2014). 5.
Id. at 556(6), 690 S.E.2d 145. See also McAllister v. State, 325 Ga.App. 583, 586(2), 754 S.E.2d 376 (2014) (failure to obtain distinct ruling on constitutional challenge to a statute precludes appellate review).--------
The decision in Collier was abrogated by the Georgia Legislature the following year by an amendment to Georgia's implied-consent statute. See McAllister v. State, 325 Ga.App. 583, 754 S.E.2d 376 (2014).Courts in other jurisdictions whose statutes contain comparable language have reached the opposite result.
Brooks v. State, 285 Ga.App. 624, 626, 647 S.E.2d 328 (2007).McAllister v. State, 325 Ga.App. 583, 583, 754 S.E.2d 376 (2014).State v. Fulghum, 261 Ga.App. 594, 594 (1), 583 S.E.2d 278 (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted).
1 makes clear that, if the driver refuses the arresting officer's request to submit to chemical testing pursuant to OCGA § 40–5–55, nothing in the code section precludes the officer from otherwise obtaining evidence of a violation of OCGA § 40–6–391 “by voluntary consent or a search warrant....” Because Massey refused the officer's request to submit to chemical testing pursuant to OCGA § 40–5–55(a), the officer properly sought and obtained a search warrant to forcibly take blood from Massey for the purpose of testing the blood by gas chromatography at the State Crime Lab pursuant to OCGA § 40–6–392(a)(1)(A) for evidence of an alcohol concentration in violation of OCGA § 40–6–391. McAllister v. State, 325 Ga.App. 583, 585, 754 S.E.2d 376 (2014). The discovery provisions of OCGA § 40–6–392(a)(4), broadly grant access to “full information concerning the test,” for alcohol or drugs in a person's blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance, and are “consistent with the broad right of cross-examination embodied in [OCGA § 24–6–611(b) ].” Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222, 224, 498 S.E.2d 262 (1998).