No. 05-09-00176-CR
Opinion issued July 30, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F04-01514-RH.
Before Justices MORRIS, MOSELEY, and LANG.
Opinion By Justice MOSELEY.
Ronnie Phillip McAfee appeals from the adjudication of his guilt for aggravated sexual assault of a child. In a single issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's decision to adjudicate guilt. We affirm.
Background
Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years of age. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i) (Vernon Supp. 2009). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt, placed appellant on ten years' community supervision, and assessed a $1500 fine. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt, alleging appellant violated the terms of his community supervision by failing to register as a sex offender. In a hearing on the motion, appellant pleaded not true to the allegation. The trial court found the allegation true, adjudicated appellant guilty, and assessed punishment at fifteen years' imprisonment. Legal Insufficiency
Appellant contends the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court's decision to adjudicate guilt because due to the limited hours of the registration office, and other mandatory requirements of his probation, it was not possible for appellant to register as required. Appellant asserts that although he was required to give notice of his intended change of address at least seven days before moving, he was unable to report his change of address due to the Thanksgiving holiday and the reduced operating hours of the registration office. Appellant argues the evidence showed it was impossible for him to comply with the registration requirement without violating another condition of probation. The State responds that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court's ruling. Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In determining questions concerning sufficiency of the evidence in revocation cases, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. An order revoking community supervision must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of community supervision. Id. at 763-64. In order to prevail, appellant must successfully challenge all of the findings that support the revocation order. See Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). In a revocation proceeding, the trial judge is the sole trier of the facts, and determines the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the testimony. See Lee v. State, 952 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.). The record shows that during a hearing on the motion to adjudicate, the trial court heard testimony from five witnesses, including two detectives in the Sexual Offender Apprehension unit of the Dallas Police Department, appellant's probation officer, and appellant. Appellant's testimony corroborated that of the officers in that he admitted he moved from one location to another without registering the address. The detectives established that the registration office's operating times were Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. Sex offenders who lived at a homeless shelter were required to come into the office and register on a weekly basis. The sex offenders were required to register between three days before their scheduled due date and up to three days after their scheduled due date. Moreover, if a sex offender stays at a location for more than two days, that constitutes a move and he must notify the registration office of the address. The detectives stated appellant lived at two different motels during November 2008 without registering their addresses. Appellant rented a room at the Cole Manor Motel on November 15th and lived there with a woman. He moved out on November 29th. On that same day, appellant and the woman went to the Miramar Motel, rented a room, and paid for it through December 6th. Appellant offered several reasons why he did not register. Appellant testified he lived at a homeless shelter and reported to the registration office for his weekly scheduled appointment on Thursday, November 13th. His next scheduled appointment to register was Thursday, November 20th. However, appellant had a psychological evaluation on November 20th that began at 9:00 a.m. and ended at 12:00 p.m. Appellant obtained a note from the doctor who performed the evaluation that verified he was at his office during those hours. Before leaving the doctor's office, appellant called his probation officer because he had missed the registration appointment. The probation officer told appellant he needed to make sure he did not miss his next registration appointment. On the following Tuesday, November 25th, appellant walked to the doctor's office for his sex offender class, but could not walk back soon enough to make it to the registration office before it closed. On Wednesday, November 26th, the registration office was closed for Thanksgiving, and on Saturday, November 29th, appellant was arrested for failing to register. Appellant explained that the room at the Cole Manor was rented in his name only because the woman, who paid for the room, had no identification. Appellant used his identification to get her the room. He stayed at the motel with the woman for two days, then he went back to the shelter. Appellant said his mother gave him the money to pay for the room at the Miramar only because he had a job offer. When appellant rented the room, he had planned to register the address on the following Tuesday, but he was arrested on Saturday, November 29th. Although appellant blamed his failure to register on the limited operating hours of the registration office, conflicting appointments for an evaluation and a class, and the Thanksgiving holiday, it was the trial court's role, as the fact finder in this case, to reconcile any conflicts in the evidence and judge the witnesses' credibility. See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 897. Because the evidence is sufficient to prove appellant violated a condition of his community supervision, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision and adjudicating his guilt. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763-64; Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). We resolve appellant's sole issue against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt.