From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Mbadike-Obiora v. Cent. E. Bay IPA Med. Grp.

California Court of Appeals, First District, Third Division
Aug 8, 2023
No. A168200 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2023)

Opinion

A168200

08-08-2023

MAUREEN MBADIKE-OBIORA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CENTRAL EAST BAY IPA MEDICAL GROUP, INC. et al., Defendants and Respondents.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

(Contra Costa County Case No. MSC19-02076)

PETROU, J.

Plaintiff and appellant Dr. Maureen Mbadike-Obiora appeals from an order granting in part a motion to strike three of six causes of action in her operative complaint. Respondents have moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the order appealed from is an interlocutory, nonappealable order over which we lack jurisdiction. We dismiss the appeal.

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant, a family practice physician, sued her medical group defendants Central East Bay IPA Medical Group, Inc., doing business as Muir Medical Group IPA (IPA), along with individual IPA officers or directors - Dr. Kenneth Bowers, Ute Burness, Alice Kugler, and Dr. Steven Kaplan (all defendants but Kaplan are referred to as respondents) -generally alleging that she was damaged by respondents' mismanagement of her medical billings. Her fourth amended complaint, the operative pleading as of this appeal, asserted six cause of action: (1) breach of contract, (2) accounting, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, (4) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (5) intentional and negligent misrepresentation, and (6) declaratory relief. The breach of contract, accounting, and intentional and negligent misrepresentations causes of action were asserted against IPA, Burness, and Kugler. The remaining causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and declaratory relief were asserted against IPA, Bowers, Burness, Kugler, and Kaplan.

Respondents moved to strike appellant's fourth amended complaint on the grounds that it contained extensive amendments that went far beyond the leave to amend that had previously been granted to appellant. The trial court granted in part and denied in part respondents' motion to strike. It denied respondents' request to strike the complaint in its entirety but granted the request to strike appellant's causes of action for breach of contract, accounting, and intentional and negligent misrepresentation. Appellant's counsel represents that on the same day the court ruled on the motion to strike, it issued a separate order sustaining a demurrer respondents filed to the three other causes of action (breach of fiduciary duty, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and declaratory relief) but granted appellant leave to amend those causes of action.

Appellant noticed an appeal of the court's order on the motion to strike. Before the filing of the record or any opening brief in the appeal, respondents have moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Discussion

Respondents argue appellant's appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it has been taken from a nonappealable order. We agree.

"The right to appeal is purely statutory." (Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Co. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 482, 483.) "The existence of an appealable judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal." (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126.)

Code of Civil Procedure, section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1) provides that an appeal may be taken "[f]rom a judgment, except an interlocutory judgment." (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(1).) "A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties." (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 697.) "In general, an adverse ruling in a judicial proceeding is appealable once the trial court renders a final judgment." (Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1115.) This "one final judgment rule" bars an appeal from an intermediate order and requires there first be a judgment that completely decides the matter in controversy. (Griset, at p. 697; Dhillon, at p. 1115 ["[A] judgment is final, and therefore appealable, '" 'when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.'"' "].) "Under the 'one final judgment' rule, an order or judgment that fails to dispose of all claims between the litigants is not appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)." (Nguyen v. Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 436-437.) "Generally, an order granting a motion to strike is not an appealable order." (Walnut Producers of California v. Diamond Foods, Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 634, 641 (Walnut Producers); Richards v. Miller (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13, 14, fn. 1 (Richards) ["An order granting or denying a motion to strike a pleading or a part thereof is a nonappeable order."].)

However, the law is also well settled that a plaintiff may appeal from a judgment that is final as to one party in a case even if the case involves multiple defendants. (E.g., Millsap v. Federal Express Corp. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 425, 430 [" 'It is settled that the rule [that an appeal may not be taken from an 'interlocutory' judgment] does not apply when the case involves multiple parties and a judgment is entered which leaves no issue to be determined as to one party' "].) In certain limited circumstances where the granting of the motion has the effect of fully determining the issues between the parties, the granting of a motion to strike portions of a pleading may be appealable. (Randle v. City and County of San Francisco (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 449, 454 (Randle) ["orders denying leave to amend a complaint, denying substitution of parties, and granting motions to strike parts of a pleading, although ordinarily not appealable, are appealable where the orders 'have the effect of eliminating issues between a plaintiff and defendant so that nothing is left to be determined' "].)

Here, appellant appeals from an order which struck three of six causes of action in her operative complaint but which did not definitively determine all the issues between the parties. As such, the order is an interlocutory, nonappealable order (Walnut Producers, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 641; Richards, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d Supp. at p. 14, fn. 1), and we dismiss the appeal.

Appellant does not dispute the general point that an order on a motion to strike is generally not appealable. Rather, she avers that the order she is appealing coupled with the order sustaining respondents' demurrer to the other three cause of action "terminate[d] all claims against at least two of the Respondents" named in her fourth amended complaint. She contends the order "definitely adjudicated" the rights and liabilities of respondents IPA and Kugler and is therefore appealable.

While we agree that an order that terminates an entire action with respect to one or more parties may be appealable (see Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, 568 (Justus), overruled on other grounds in Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159, 171), we do not agree, however, that the trial court's order granting respondents motion to strike has terminated the action with respect to any defendant, including the two specifically identified. Appellant's own opposition papers make clear that issues remain to be determined between all the parties, including both IPA and Kugler. Appellant noted that in sustaining the demurrer, the court granted her leave to amend the complaint. Attached to appellant's opposition is her pending motion for leave to amend the fourth amended complaint, scheduled to be heard on August 24, 2023. The brief in support of appellant's request for leave reflects that appellant seeks to reallege or assert causes of action against both IPA and Kugler in an amended pleading. While it is not entirely clear from the existing record and without a proposed amended pleading exactly who appellant intends to sue under each cause of action, there is no doubt she seeks to keep IPA and Kugler as defendants. For example, appellant states she seeks to assert a cause of action for intentional and negligent misrepresentation and a separate cause of action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against Kugler. Appellant also avers she intends to amend her pleading to comply with the court's order to, among other things, allege specific facts to demonstrate an actual controversy between her and IPA under a declaratory relief claim. Given the pending motion for leave to amend and the prospect of an amended pleading in which both IPA and Kugler would remain defendants, the rights and liabilities between the parties have not been definitively adjudicated and issues remain left to be determined between them.

The cases appellant cites do not compel a different result. Unlike here, there is no indication in Wilson v. Sharp (1954) 42 Cal.2d 675, Randle, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d 449, or Justus, supra, 19 Cal.3d 564, of the possibility of a further amended pleading that could have kept the appealing parties in the lawsuits underlying those cases.

Disposition

The appeal is dismissed. Respondents shall recover costs on appeal.

WE CONCUR: Fujisaki, Acting P. J., Rodriguez, J.


Summaries of

Mbadike-Obiora v. Cent. E. Bay IPA Med. Grp.

California Court of Appeals, First District, Third Division
Aug 8, 2023
No. A168200 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2023)
Case details for

Mbadike-Obiora v. Cent. E. Bay IPA Med. Grp.

Case Details

Full title:MAUREEN MBADIKE-OBIORA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CENTRAL EAST BAY IPA…

Court:California Court of Appeals, First District, Third Division

Date published: Aug 8, 2023

Citations

No. A168200 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2023)