Opinion
A170848
09-05-2024
M.B, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SONOMA COUNTY, Respondent; SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT et al., Real Parties in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Sonoma County Super. Ct. Nos. 23JD00050, 23JD00051, 23JD00052, 23JD00053)
SIMONS, J.
The four young children in this dependency case were removed from the care of their father, M.B. (father), when their mother suffered a traumatic brain injury and died under circumstances indicating she was a victim of spousal abuse. Father petitions this court for extraordinary relief, challenging the dependency court's decision to deny him reunification services based on its determination that he had a mental disorder that made it unlikely he would benefit from such services. (See Welf. &Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd. (b)(2)). He also requests a stay of proceedings in the dependency court. Because his challenges lack merit, we deny both the petition and stay request.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Background
A.
When a child is removed from a home, the court ordinarily must order the parent or guardian to participate in family reunification services-social services intended to address the problems that led to the child's removal. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); see In re Allison J. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1112 (Allison J.); see also In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236 (K.C.).) The provision of reunification services aims to preserve the family whenever possible. (K.C., at p. 236; Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 744 (Renee J.); Allison J., at p. 1112.)
Welfare and Institutions code section 361.5, subdivision (b), however, provides that reunification services need not be provided in enumerated circumstances in which such services would be fruitless. (Renee J., at p. 744; Allison J., at p. 1112.) One such circumstance, relevant here, is where the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that "the parent or guardian is suffering from a mental disability . . . that renders the parent or guardian incapable of utilizing those services." (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd. (b)(2); see Curtis F. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 470, 473 (Curtis F.).) Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2) defines "mental disability" by reference to the Family Code, which in turn defines" '[m]entally disabled'" to "mean[] that a parent or parents suffer a mental incapacity or disorder that renders the parent or parents unable to care for and control the child adequately." (Fam. Code, § 7827, subd. (a); see In re C.C. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 76, 83 (C.C.).)
In determining whether reunification services would be successful, the court may consider factors including "[t]he failure of the parent to respond to previous services, the fact that the child was abused while the parent was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, a past history of violent behavior, or testimony by a competent professional that the parent's behavior is unlikely to be changed by services." (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(4).) The court must obtain reports from two qualified experts before issuing a finding under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2). (See C.C., at pp. 83-84.)
Further, "[w]hen it is alleged, pursuant to [section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2)], that the parent is incapable of utilizing services due to mental disability, the court shall order reunification services unless competent evidence from mental health professionals establishes that, even with the provision of services, the parent is unlikely to be capable of adequately caring for the child within the [applicable] time limits." (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(1).) Where a sibling group includes a child who was under three years of age on the date the children were removed from the parent's custody, the applicable time frame for reunification services is six months. (§ 361.5, subds. (a)(1)(B)-(C); M.C. v. Superior Ct. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 838, 848, fn. 3.)
B.
The children in this case, V.B., H.B., P.B., and I.B. (collectively children), were removed from father's custody in December 2023, after he dropped their mother (mother) off at a hospital with a head injury. Mother had to be wheeled into the hospital and was incoherent. The children resided in an R.V. with both parents. Father brought them to the hospital, dropped off mother, and left 10 minutes later. Mother had suffered blunt force trauma to her brain, had a brain bleed, and died in surgery two days later. The hospital reported the circumstances to the police, who opened a criminal investigation into father's potential role in mother's death.
At the time, V.B. was seven, H.B. was five, P.B. was four, and I.B. was 13 months. The family had had seven prior contacts with the Sonoma County Human Services Department (Department) involving allegations of general neglect of the children. Father had a criminal record that included convictions for possession of a stolen vehicle; resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer; driving under the influence of alcohol; driving with a suspended license; and failure to appear for a criminal charge. He also had a juvenile petty theft offense and was arrested on numerous other occasions for crimes ranging from hit and run to burglary to sexual assault to felony domestic violence with visible injury.
Shortly after mother's death, the Department filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging that the children had suffered or were at risk of suffering serious physical and emotional harm due to father's violent acts, negligence, and mental illness, under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c).
The petition alleged that there were "several documented incidents" of violent conduct by father when the children were present or nearby, including "allegedly sexually assaulting the mother, allegedly tying the mother up and torturing her, allegedly causing the mother to sustain multiple concussions, grabbing the mother violently and throwing her against the family's RV, threatening to kill the mother or maternal grandparents if the mother left him, [and] mistreating the family dog." The petition cited the suspicious circumstances of mother's death, noting that the medics who treated her reported that her injuries were consistent with abuse, she had" 'several severe bruises to her brain,'" and" 'a brain bleed and brain swelling.'" According to the petition, V.B. disclosed to a forensic interviewer that "her [father] hurt her mother" and that "she saw her mother's head bleeding and that her skull was cracked to her brain." The petition also cited an incident in which father reportedly shouted at I.B., who was four months old at the time, to" 'shut the fuck up,'" causing I.B. to cry.
The petition further alleged that the children "have suffered from a pattern of chronic neglect" posing a substantial risk to their wellbeing. The family was reportedly "chronically unhoused for six years," during which time they stayed temporarily with family or friends and lived in a car, an R.V., hotels, and a shelter. The children were reportedly living at times in" 'extremely unsanitary'" conditions, amidst garbage, dirty diapers, and "dog feces and urine on the floor and other surfaces" of the family's R.V., with limited food, running water, or refrigeration. V.B. reportedly attended school "smelling of urine and feces" and wearing the same clothes on multiple days. The children had repeated lice infestations and school attendance by the two oldest, V.B. and H.B., was inconsistent.
The petition alleged that father reportedly appeared to have "untreated mental health concerns," exhibited "unpredictable and disrespectful behavior toward others," and suffered from "mood fluctuations and uncontrolled anger . . . that was directed at others through 'blaming, shaming, and degrading.' "
The court concluded that allowing the children to remain in father's home would be contrary to their welfare and ordered the children detained. Subsequently, the court sustained the petition, found true the allegations of the petition, and adjudged the children dependents of the court.
C.
Prior to the disposition hearing, and pursuant to a court order, father participated in two psychological evaluations.
Dr. David Anglada-Figueroa, Psy.D., a licensed clinical psychologist, conducted the first evaluation, which entailed a clinical interview of father, a review of the Department's jurisdiction report, and a number of psychological tests. Dr. Anglada-Figueroa ultimately diagnosed father with Unspecified
Personality Disorder, concluding that father's history and test results indicated "antisocial, narcissistic and perhaps histrionic personality traits." Dr. Anglada-Figueroa explained that "the results obtained from this evaluation [were] insufficient for determining [which] one of these specific personality disorders" was applicable.
Elsewhere in his report, Dr. Anglada-Figueroa suggested that there was a "significant probability" that father was not entirely truthful in his test responses, given that father gave a "very favorable self-description" in an apparent effort to convey a positive impression of himself. Father was "careful in describing any problematic symptoms or behaviors," reflecting either intentional defensiveness or self-deception.
Dr. Salma Khan, M.D., a psychiatrist, evaluated father based on an extensive interview and personal history, psychological testing, and a review of his records. Dr. Khan observed that father "does not have a major mental health disorder except for likely cannabis use disorder and alcohol use disorder." In light of his history, interview, and test results, Dr. Khan nonetheless diagnosed father with "[m]ixed personality disorder with dependent, antisocial, and narcissistic traits."
Consistent with Dr. Anglada-Figueroa's observations, Dr. Khan noted that father "tried to portray himself in the best possible light" and was "defensive" and "guarded throughout the interview."
Both evaluations indicated that without insight into or acknowledgement of his mental health condition, father's prognosis for changing his personality disorder was "poor."
D.
At the contested disposition hearing, the Department presented evidence via the disposition report, authored by social worker Christina Cowell, as well as the two psychological evaluations attached to the report. The disposition report repeated allegations contained in the petition and provided information from interviews with father and the children's paternal and maternal relatives as well as from the children's service providers.
As recounted in the disposition report, father "consistently" denied the spousal abuse allegations. He also denied ever harming the children or family dog and denied having mental health problems. Father's denials were consistent with statements from two of his relatives that they had never seen signs that mother had been abused. Mother had shared with the children's maternal grandmother, however, that father had been physically and verbally abusing her and threatened to kill her if she called the police; mother later recanted to the police. The maternal grandmother was concerned for the children's safety given that father "had historically threatened to kill her daughter and the children if [mother] ever left him." The maternal grandfather asserted that father had thrown I.B, an infant at the time, into her playpen, causing I.B. to hit the wall, and on another occasion, father "threw the dog out a car window into traffic."
The disposition report also included information about the children's circumstances and mental status. According to the disposition report, all the children had delayed language development. Further, because both V.B. and H.B. had "significant gaps in the[ir] . . . foundational knowledge," their teachers recommended that they repeat their current grade levels in school.
According to the disposition report, during therapy sessions, V.B. "acts afraid to speak about her father." When asked about her father, V.B. does not answer. V.B. reacts fearfully to male figures during pretend play and assesses them as dangerous. During play therapy, V.B. always assigns villain or" 'bad'" roles to male figures and pretends the "female characters are hiding and trying to get away." When playing with sand during her therapy sessions, V.B. often buries figures in the sand" 'to keep them safe.'" In addition, V.B. "re-enacts her mother's death over and over again" in role-play with the therapist. V.B." 'lay[s] dead,'" asks the therapist to play her mom," 'pretends that there is blood everywhere and then puts a blanket over her [m]om to indicate she is dead' "; this has happened in several sessions. The therapist also observed that V.B. exhibits hypervigilance, a trauma symptom, such that when V.B. hears a noise, she tells her therapist to lock the door and hide. V.B. has also begun displaying sexualized behaviors during her therapy sessions.
During H.B.'s play therapy sessions, "he does a lot of anger and violence related scenarios." In addition, he "separates the girls and boys from each other" and treats the girls differently.
Addressing a virtual visitation session father had with each child, the disposition report related that immediately after her visit, V.B. started crying and complained about having chest pain for several hours afterward. H.B.'s behavior changed dramatically and his non-compliance behaviors increased after his visit with father. Immediately afterward, H.B. "was crying and kicking [V.B.'s] seat and pulling [V.B.'s] hair"; threw things at his caregiver; and had diarrhea that evening and into the night. During P.B.'s visit, P.B. smiled but did not talk much to her father. During I.B.'s visit, "she squatted in a corner and would not look at her father (who was on the computer) during the visit."
The disposition report also described father's voluntary participation in services, including a domestic violence education program and random drug testing, in which he tested positive for cannabis. The service provider for his domestic violence education program indicated that father was "engaged" and attending the program regularly. The service provider reported that father "struggles to take full responsibility for his behaviors," apparently referring to his denial of the domestic violence allegations. He "does take accountability for yelling, cursing, blaming and arguing with his children's mother. He . . . regret[s] [that] these behaviors occur[ed] in front of his children and can acknowledge how these behaviors have likely impacted his children. He has also admitted that he has had trouble with having a bad temper." Father was willing to participate in parenting classes and individual therapy and the social worker was working on identifying service providers.
Based on Cowell's analysis of the psychological evaluations, the disposition report recommended that the court bypass reunification services due to father's mental disorder.
Father called Cowell as the only witness at the disposition hearing. Cowell had 12 years of clinical experience in trauma-informed care and was experienced in conducting psychosocial evaluations from her work as a therapist. Over father's objection, the court designated Cowell an expert for purposes of interpreting and making recommendations as to the two psychological evaluations. Consistent with the disposition report, she opined that, based on the psychological evaluations, "the prognosis is poor for [father] to be able to do the amount of meaningful change that's necessary in six months . . . to address . . . the traits that are identified."
In this writ proceeding, father does not challenge Cowell's expert designation.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the dependency court "adjudge[d] the children dependents of the court due to their exposure to long-term domestic violence by [f]ather against their mother, who is now deceased by reason thereof, as well as the chronic neglect of the children by both parents" and other circumstances stated in the petition and social worker's reports.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the children have suffered or are at substantial risk of suffering serious physical and emotional harm under section 361, subdivisions (c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3) as a result of father's conduct. The court concluded that allowing the children to continue in father's home "is contrary to the children's welfare," and therefore removed the children from father's physical custody. The court further determined that "placement of the children with [f]ather would be and is detrimental to their safety, protection, and to their physical and emotional well-being." And the court denied reunification services to father based on its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that as a result of his mental disorder "it is unlikely [f]ather will be capable of safely and adequately caring for the children within the statutory time limit" pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2). The court denied visitation to father and set a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26 for October 10, 2024.
Discussion
A.
Father contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he has a mental disability rendering him incapable of benefiting from reunification services. We disagree.
Our review of the dependency court's reunification bypass order is for substantial evidence. (Curtis F., supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 474.) Under that standard, we view the record in the light most favorable to the court's determination, drawing all inferences that can reasonably be drawn to support it, and keeping in mind that the court's bypass order must be based on clear and convincing evidence. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633; Curtis F., at p. 474.)
First, the record contains considerable evidence that father suffered from a mental disorder that negatively affected his ability to safely or adequately parent the children. Both psychological evaluations concluded that father had a personality disorder characterized by antisocial and narcissistic traits. Dr. Anglada-Figueroa diagnosed father with Unspecified Personality Disorder, based on father's history and test results indicating "antisocial, narcissistic and perhaps histrionic personality traits." Dr. Anglada-Figueroa elaborated that father's history was consistent with conduct disorder and antisocial personality traits, given his "documented past criminal and other behaviors associated with violation/disregard of others' rights," including sexual and physical abuse of others. Dr. Anglada-Figueroa's testing also indicated that because father "has limited psychological resources on which to draw" when faced with situation-related stress, "he is at risk for becoming acutely upset," has "impair[ed] . . . capacities for self-control," and is "highly vulnerable to impulsiveness in what he thinks, says, and/or does" in stressful situations. Father "exerts less control over his feelings than most adults," indicating either that "he is unable to exert self-control and keep his emotions in check" or "that he chooses not to do so." In addition, Dr. Anglada-Figueroa noted that father's test results reflected "narcissistic features," consistent with someone who is "not easily influenced by customs or conventions" and exhibits "narcissistic insensitivity."
Dr. Khan diagnosed father with "[m]ixed personality disorder with dependent, antisocial, and narcissistic traits." In support of the diagnosis, Dr. Khan noted that father had been arrested, was accused of rape, and reportedly committed domestic violence. In addition, father "did not show any signs of empathy," reportedly neglected his children, and "seemed to make enemies and had been evicted multiple times." Dr. Khan's report also noted that during their interview, father "raised his voice and became angry" at times, although at other points he was calm and appeared to be in control of his emotions.
The psychological evaluations also supported a reasonable inference that father's past behavior of neglect and shocking violence was related to his personality disorder. The evaluations were based in part on the jurisdiction report, which contained allegations concerning father's past conduct identical to those in the petition sustained by the dependency court. Father does not dispute in this writ proceeding the dependency court's jurisdiction and disposition findings that his extreme violent behavior and neglect placed the children in substantial risk of serious physical and emotional harm. The court found true the jurisdictional allegations that father physically assaulted the children's mother, including tying her up, torturing, and raping her in the family R.V. on at least one occasion and violently throwing her against the wall of their R.V. while the children were present on another. The court also found true the jurisdictional allegations that father dropped mother off at the hospital with several severe bruises to her brain, a brain bleed, and brain swelling; she had suffered blunt force trauma to her brain and her injuries indicated she had been abused. In addition, the court found true the jurisdictional allegations that father subjected the children to a pattern of chronic neglect, causing them to have poor hygiene and wear soiled clothing; repeatedly contract lice; inconsistently attend school; and reside in unstable and extremely unsanitary housing. At the disposition hearing, based on these same circumstances as well as additional evidence in the disposition report and hearing testimony, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that father exposed the children to his long-term domestic violence against mother, who died as a result of his violence, and subjected them to chronic neglect. Further, the court ruled that residing with father was contrary to the children's "safety, protection, and . . . physical and emotional well-being."
Second, the evaluations and other evidence also support the court's determination that as a result of father's personality disorder, he was unlikely to benefit sufficiently from reunification services to be able to safely or adequately care for the children within a six-month period. (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(1).) Dr. Khan explained that "[i]t requires a considerable amount of effort to change long-standing personality traits" because an individual's personality "is set in the late teens or early 20s" and "typically does not change dramatically over time." For change to occur, "[a] person needs some level of insight and discomfort to engage in psychotherapy to change long-standing foundational behaviors and ways of interacting with the world." But given that father "denied having any mental health problems" and "does not have insight into his mental health condition," "[t]he prognosis here is poor." Dr. Khan opined: "In this case, there is no medication or specific treatment that would be likely to change his underlying personality disorder in any significant way."
Dr. Anglada-Figueroa's report agreed that due to father's lack of insight, his prognosis for improvement was "poor." Dr. Anglada-Figueroa stated that, although father's defensiveness made it difficult to determine how beneficial longer-term therapy would be, "[a]t present, his prognosis for that would be poor" because, at the time of the report, father failed to take responsibility for his actions, both with respect to domestic violence as well as general neglect of the children. Dr. Anglada-Figueroa also noted that even though short-term interventions could be attempted, if fathers' psychopathology is "significant . . ., his prognosis is very poor." (Italics added.)
Cowell, the social worker whom the court designated an expert for purposes of interpreting the psychological evaluations, opined based in part on those evaluations that father was unlikely to be able to safely parent the children within a sixmonth timeframe. Cowell testified that personality disorders "are one of the hardest things to manage and treat." She explained that "people with . . . narcissistic traits don't see anything wrong with them[selves]" and "if you don't think there's anything wrong with your behavior . . ., it's difficult to engage in change." Cowell noted that father "has consistently denied that any of the documented intimate partner violence ever occurred, or that he ever harmed the children." Because father "is both unwilling and unable to tell the truth and . . . tak[e] responsibility for his actions so that he can move towards meaningful change," father would be unlikely to benefit from services within a six-month period.
In challenging the court's conclusion that he was unable to benefit from reunification services within six months, father relies on the fact that Dr. Anglada-Figueroa recommended two parenting programs and individual therapy. But the parenting recommendations were conditional and did not address father's ability to benefit: Dr. Anglada-Figueroa stated that "if these children will be reunified with [father], then the following [parenting] recommendations are important for the benefit of the children." (Italics added.) As for the recommendation of individual psychotherapy, Dr. Anglada-Figueroa's report indicated that father needed therapy to even begin to acknowledge his problematic behaviors: "Initially, short term individual psychotherapy/counseling is recommended for [father] for the purpose of focusing on the behaviors that led [to] his . . . treatment (and [the Department's] involvement) will be most beneficial until he is more willing to engage in a necessary long term therapeutic process." Dr. Anglada-Figueroa's recommendation thus makes clear that, due to his level of defensiveness and denial, father was not at that time able to benefit from the long-term therapy necessary to address his personality disorder.
Contrary to father's contention, the fact that he had participated in some voluntary services did not negate the evidence of his defensiveness or otherwise render unreasonable the court's determination that reunification services would be fruitless within a six-month period. For example, although father had exhibited "accountability for screaming and blaming," in his domestic violence education classes, as Cowell testified, he had not acknowledged his responsibility for his extreme violence, often witnessed by his children. The class provider reported after 12 classes that father "struggles to take full responsibility for his behaviors" and "does not acknowledge in any way that his behaviors had anything to do with" the children's mother's death. Despite acknowledging an anger problem, father continued to deny that he exposed his children to domestic violence.
We therefore conclude that the court's bypass finding was supported by substantial evidence. (See Curtis F., supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 474.)
B.
Finally, father argues that even if the dependency court correctly determined that he has a mental disorder justifying bypass of reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), the court should have nonetheless ordered reunification services because doing so is in the children's best interest. Even assuming the court had discretion to order services based on the children's best interest, father's contention falls woefully short.
Apart from claiming generally that "services will allow [him] to be better equipped to be a father and care for all four minors," father's argument omits any discussion of the children's specific circumstances or their safety, health, emotional wellbeing, educational, or other needs. Father does not square his argument with the finding, which we have upheld, that providing him services would be fruitless. Most egregiously, father does not even attempt to address or dispute the court's finding that the children witnessed him torture and brutally beat their mother over a long time period, eventually killing her.
Disposition
The petition and request for a stay are denied.
BURNS, J. WE CONCUR: JACKSON, P.J.