Opinion
H047772
03-27-2020
M.B., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, Respondent, SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JD025598)
I. INTRODUCTION
M.B., the mother of the child at issue in this juvenile dependency matter, has filed a petition for extraordinary writ challenging the juvenile court's order terminating family reunification services and setting the matter for a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency planning hearing.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
For reasons that we will explain, we will deny the writ petition.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children's Services has requested that we take judicial notice of this court's records in case No. H046959, which involved the mother's appeal from the juvenile court's disposition order. We hereby grant the request. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) We rely on the record in case No. H046959 for some of the factual and procedural background provided here.
A. Procedural Background
On January 31, 2019, the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children's Services (the Department) filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (c), and (g) on behalf of the minor J.P., then age 14, alleging that the minor's father was physically and emotionally abusive. The petition stated that the father was arrested for child abuse on January 21, 2019, and consented to the minor's placement in protective custody. The petition alleged that the father was unwilling to have the minor returned to his care and that on January 29, 2019, the minor was placed into protective custody. The petition also alleged that the mother had not had physical custody of the minor since 2005 and had not taken steps to ensure the minor's physical safety or emotional well-being.
On April 30, 2019, the juvenile court adjudged the minor a dependent of the court. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that removal of the minor from the father's custody was necessary to protect the minor's physical and emotional health and that the father had waived family reunification services. The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that placing the minor with the mother would be detrimental to the minor's safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. The court ordered reunification services for the mother and ordered her to participate in a parent orientation program, a parenting class, and individual and family therapy. The mother's visitation was ordered to occur at least once a week for two hours per visit, unsupervised.
The mother appealed from the disposition order. The mother's attorney found no appealable issues, and this court dismissed the appeal for failure to raise an arguable issue.
In its October 28, 2019 six-month status review report, the Department recommended that the juvenile court continue the mother's reunification services for another six months. However, that same date, the Department alerted the court and the mother that it might change its recommendation.
On November 13, 2019, the Department filed a petition pursuant to section 388 requesting that the juvenile court terminate the mother's reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. The Department alleged in the section 388 petition that the mother refused to communicate with the Department, did not respond to the Department's efforts to refer her to reunification services, and did not appear to be participating in services. The Department also alleged that the mother refused to visit the minor unless the visits were unsupervised and indicated that the minor expressed fear and anxiety over the prospect of returning to the mother's care. The Department concluded that the mother's conduct had created a substantial likelihood that reunification would not occur and explained that "[t]he requested order would be better for [the minor] as it would alleviate him of the anxiety he feels around being placed with his mother, and it would also expedite the process by which a new placement can be established for him," which would provide the minor "with mental and emotional relief as well as residential stability."
Section 388, subdivision (c)(1)(B) permits a party to petition the juvenile court to terminate reunification services at the six-month status review if "[t]he action or inaction of the parent or guardian creates a substantial likelihood that reunification will not occur, including, but not limited to, the parent's or guardian's failure to visit the child, or the failure of the parent or guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan."
On December 11, 2019, the Department filed two addendum reports to its six-month status report, one dated November 15, 2019 and the other dated December 11, 2019. Because the information contained in the reports is generally duplicative of the evidence admitted at the hearing on the Department's six-month status review and section 388 petition, we do not summarize the addendum reports here.
B. Contested Hearing on the Six-Month Status Review and Section 388 Petition
The juvenile court held a two-day hearing on the Department's six-month status review report and section 388 petition in December 2019.
1. The Department's Case
The social worker responsible for providing access to services for the mother and coordinating visitation between the mother and the minor testified for the Department as an expert in risk assessment and the provision of family reunification services. The following factual summary is based on the social worker's testimony.
The social worker took various steps to arrange individual therapy services, a parent orientation, and a parenting class for the mother, but the mother did not respond to his emails, letter, or voicemail regarding the services and did not attend the parent orientation class she was referred to. The social worker offered to meet with the mother in person four or five times but she was not receptive.
The social worker learned from the mother's counsel that the mother had moved to Humboldt County at some point. The social worker attempted to set up parenting classes for the mother there and emailed the mother with a list of local services, including individual therapy services. The mother did not respond to the social worker's email. The social worker followed up with the mother, asking if she needed help accessing services. The mother did not respond. To the social worker's knowledge, at the time of the hearing the mother was not participating in individual therapy.
The social worker also attempted to set up visitation for the mother with the minor. When the social worker told the minor that the court had ordered unsupervised visits with the mother, the minor stated he was unwilling to participate in visitation. The Department does not force a child to participate in visits against his or her will. However, in June 2019, the minor was willing to participate in a supervised visit. When the social worker contacted the mother to schedule a supervised visit, the mother did not demonstrate any interest in seeing the minor under supervised conditions and she did not provide the social worker with her availability. Nonetheless, the social worker scheduled a supervised visit and informed the mother of the date. The mother did not respond and the visit did not occur. There were no visits between the mother and the minor post-February 8, 2019.
The social worker also spoke with the minor's therapist regarding family therapy for the mother and the minor. The therapist told the social worker that she would need to assess the mother to determine whether family therapy would be beneficial. The social worker emailed the mother to schedule an assessment. In response, the mother indicated that she was terrified of the social worker but did not address whether she would meet with the minor's therapist for an assessment.
On June 7, 2019, the Department held a child and family team meeting in order to enroll the minor in his local school district. The minor, the social worker, several other individuals from the Department, and the mother attended the meeting. Before the meeting began, the mother stated that she was going to record the meeting. When the mother was informed that recording was not allowed, she responded that it was her federal right to record her interactions. Eventually she was escorted out of the meeting by security. The minor appeared passive and slightly embarrassed by the mother's conduct, and he did not engage with the mother. After the meeting, the minor told the social worker "something along the lines of, 'This is what it's normally like.' " It appeared to the social worker that the minor appreciated having other adults present at the meeting to serve as a buffer between him and the mother.
The social worker continued to regularly email the mother to try to coordinate services for her. When the mother responded, she made various accusations and other tangential statements, but did not directly address whether she had enrolled in a service or whether she was willing to participate in supervised visits with the minor. The mother never inquired about the minor's welfare, other than asking for information regarding his school and doctor. She showed no recognition that participation in court-ordered services might help her reunify with the minor or that her behavior affects the minor.
The social worker had never had a substantive discussion with the mother regarding her case plan. The mother's tone had grown increasingly hostile and it was increasingly difficult for the social worker to communicate with her. In an email dated June 6, 2019 that was attached to the October 28, 2019 status review report, the mother called the social worker "cold hearted," "unprofessional," and "cruel," and accused him of lying. The social worker found the mother's email significant because it demonstrated that the mother's focus was not on reunifying with the minor. In a November 13, 2019 email, the mother stated that she was "terrified" of the social worker and accused him of sending her threatening emails. To the social worker's knowledge, the mother had not tried to communicate with anyone else at the Department. In a December 6, 2019 email, the mother stated that the social worker's emails would be made available to law enforcement and called the social worker "a[n] alleged perpetrator in several crimes against [her] and a minor." In the social worker's opinion, the mother's comments indicated a hostility toward the Department and unwillingness to reach a compromise or look for a solution.
The minor told the social worker that he needed emotional space to make peace with the physical and emotional abuse he had experienced before he could build a foundation for an emotionally safe relationship with the mother. The social worker felt that the minor's statement showed "a lot of insight," and that "[g]iven space, therapy, and . . . some time to heal, [the minor] may be willing in the future to re-establish" his relationship with the mother, but the minor was not currently in a place where he could do that. The social worker agreed with the minor's assessment of the situation.
Based on the social worker's training and experience, he recommended that the court terminate the mother's reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing.
2. The Mother's Case
The mother testified that she did not agree with the Department's recommendation to terminate reunification services. The mother requested that the minor be returned to her care. The following factual summary is based on her testimony.
The mother was currently living with her daughter Emma and another family member in Arcata. If the court returned the minor to the mother's care, the mother, the minor, and Emma would stay with the minor's maternal grandmother until the mother got her own place.
The social worker told the mother the parent orientation class was "absolutely optional." The social worker scheduled a class for the mother on July 1, 2019, despite his knowledge that she was out of town. The social worker indicated that he would apply for funding for the mother to attend services but she never heard back from him. The Department never made any class referrals for the mother, but she did receive an email regarding Humboldt County's mental health services. The mother had no way to pay for the services.
The mother took an online parenting class and paid for it herself because the social worker never answered her questions about services. The mother received a certificate of completion for the class. In August or September, the mother emailed the social worker to ask about classes but he did not respond. She also asked about "the accusations that everybody is saying that [she is] dangerous to [her] kid," but the social worker did not respond.
The mother would like to engage in family therapy with the minor to work through the issues of abuse and trauma the minor suffered because of his father and to address the minor's memories of her alcoholism. As of the hearing date, the mother had been sober for four years. When she drank in the past she was arrested for her outbursts, which was extremely traumatizing for her children.
The mother is scared of the social worker because he has hurt her and Emma. On the day of the child and family team meeting, the social worker was verbally abusive, calling Emma the minor's "half sister" when they had asked him not to use that term, calling the mother names, and "circling around [them]." The social worker kept trying to put his hand in the mother's face and made fun of her for being dyslexic. The mother wanted to record the meeting because she feared for her life. The people at the meeting "were going to have [her] arrested for false charges" and "threatened to have [her] held down and restrained while they waited for somebody to charge [her] with those false allegations." The social worker told the mother she would never see Emma again, that he would take Emma away from her, and that she would never see any of her kids.
The minor told the mother at the child and family team meeting that he was not allowed to speak to her. The mother observed that in response to the social worker's actions, the minor was fearful and shrunk down, behaving in the same way he did around his abusive father. The mother believed she had nothing to do with the minor's behavior at the meeting.
The mother did not feel comfortable attending visits with the minor under the social worker's supervision because no one had taken any steps to ensure her safety. She would be willing to have someone else from the Department supervise the visits. The last visit she had with the minor was in February 2019 and it was supervised by the Department.
The mother has consistently inquired about the minor's well-being and is concerned about him and his depression. The mother was not in therapy because her health insurance did not cover it, but she would be willing to engage in individual therapy if funding were located. She took an online parenting class although she did not feel that she needed it.
The mother did not believe her actions were responsible for the minor preferring not to be returned to her custody. The mother feels the minor has been influenced by his father and things other people have told him. The mother acknowledged that the minor's feelings were important, but stated that the minor had "no clue what it would be like to live with [her]" and that "he need[ed] to be encouraged to know that things are safe." The mother would not force the minor to visit with her or live with her. She was just asking for a fair chance to reunite with him.
3. Rebuttal Evidence
The social worker testified that he learned from counsel that the mother had taken an online parenting course called "Course For Parents." The class was not approved by the Department. The social worker emailed the mother asking if she was willing to discuss any insight she gained from the class. The mother did not respond.
The mother was not told at the child and family team meeting that she would be arrested or that Emma would be taken away from her. The mother was not held down or restrained. The social worker denied threatening the mother.
On July 8, 2019, the social worker secured funding for the mother to access services. After that, funding was not a barrier to the Department's ability to provide the mother with access to services.
On July 16, 2019, the social worker received a letter from the minor's therapist stating that the minor finds the mother stressful, family reunification services add to the minor's stress, and the minor "wants time for things to calm down before working on his relationship with [the mother]." The social worker observed that the minor does not appear to be physically afraid of the mother but has "deeply rooted emotional fear of [the mother's] reactions or overreactions." The minor is fearful of the mother's response to his feelings.
C. Juvenile Court's Findings and Writ Proceedings
The juvenile court found by a preponderance of the evidence that returning the minor to the mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to the minor's mental well-being. The court determined that the mother's failure to participate regularly and meaningfully in the case plan and to make progress constituted prima facie evidence that returning the minor to the mother would be detrimental.
Regarding whether reunification services for the mother should continue, the juvenile court identified two themes in the case: (1) visitation and the minor's refusal to visit with the mother, and (2) the mother's fear of the Department.
The juvenile court acknowledged that it could not force the minor to participate in visitation with the mother and noted that it had attempted to promote visitation when it denied permission for the minor to participate in some requested travel until he visited with the mother. The court stated that the minor had been in court a couple of times and had impressed the court as being "communicative, articulate, kind[, and] engaged in school." The court observed that the minor was "a good, good kid" and found that he was not trying to be difficult or to interfere with the reunification process by refusing to participate in visitation. The court found that when the Department asked the minor if there were any circumstances where he would participate in visitation, the minor indicated he would engage in supervised visits and the Department attempted to arrange supervised visits but the mother was unwilling. The court determined that the Department's efforts to accommodate the minor so that he would participate in visitation were reasonable.
The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the Department provided reasonable services to the mother. The court determined that the mother's fear of the social worker as well as other individuals at the Department was genuine but not reasonable. The court stated that it had observed the social worker's demeanor in court and had read his emails to the mother. The court found the emails were brief, did not contain inflammatory language or implied threats, and had a neutral tone. The court found that the social worker made reasonable efforts to reach the mother, but the mother was unwilling to respond to him. The court found that the social worker provided service referrals to the mother, but she refused to respond and communicate with him.
Regarding the Department's request to terminate reunification services, the juvenile court determined by clear and convincing evidence that the mother's actions and inactions had created a substantial likelihood that reunification would not occur. The court found that the mother lacked insight into the minor's needs and that individual therapy would have been helpful, but the mother did not engage in therapy despite the social worker's efforts to refer her. The court also found that the mother chose not to visit the minor once the minor indicated he was willing to participate in supervised visits and the Department attempted to schedule them. The mother's refusal to visit with the minor in a supervised setting indicated to the court that the mother lacked insight into the minor's needs. For those reasons, the court granted the Department's section 388 petition, terminated reunification services, and set the matter for a permanency planning hearing.
The juvenile court ordered the Department to continue to schedule visitation because the court felt the mother's relationship with the minor could be salvaged. The court asked the mother to "meet [the minor] where he is" based on the minor's willingness to participate in supervised visits. The court observed that it was very clear the mother loves the minor, but stated that the mother's demeanor and presentation might be overwhelming for the minor and that the mother had difficulty understanding "how her behaviors and actions land on [the minor]." The mother's extreme desire to have a relationship with the minor appeared to push the minor away, and the mother was unable to perceive the minor's needs. The court ordered supervised visits with the discretion to schedule unsupervised visits if the minor felt comfortable.
The mother timely filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition on January 15, 2020. On February 18, 2020, the mother filed a petition for extraordinary writ, in propria persona.
III. DISCUSSION
The mother's petition for extraordinary writ challenges the juvenile court's order setting a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. The Department contends that the mother's petition should be dismissed because it is facially deficient and argues that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's findings.
The mother's petition also states that she seeks relief from an order "designating a specific placement after a placement order under . . . section 366.28." However, the juvenile court has not issued a placement order pursuant to section 366.28. A placement order occurs only in the event that parental rights have been terminated. (§ 366.28, subd. (b)(1).) We therefore reject this claim as unripe. (See In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1019, disapproved on another ground in In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 537, fn. 5.)
A. Adequacy of the Writ Petition
The Department contends that we should summarily deny the mother's writ petition as facially insufficient because the petition fails to meet the threshold statutory requirements and the requirements of the Rules of Court.
A writ petition seeking review of a juvenile court's order terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing must include a summary of the grounds of the petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(a)(1)(D).) The petition "must be accompanied by a memorandum." (Rule 8.452(a)(3).) "The memorandum must provide a summary of the significant facts, limited to matters in the record." (Rule 8.452(b)(1).) "The memorandum must state each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point and support each point by argument and citation of authority." (Rule 8.452(b)(2).) "The memorandum must support any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the record. The memorandum should explain the significance of any cited portion of the record and note any disputed aspects of the record." (Rule 8.452(b)(3).)
All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
Where a writ petition is procedurally deficient, a reviewing court may summarily deny it. (See Anthony D. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 149, 157.) However, a writ petition "must be liberally construed" by the appellate court. (Rule 8.452(a)(1).)
The mother's writ petition is conclusory and unclear. For example, the mother contends that the judicial officer was biased and gives a citation to the record, but she does not explain the basis of her allegation. The petition is also unaccompanied by a memorandum. However, because of the importance of the mother's rights affected by the challenged order, we will decline to summarily deny or dismiss her petition. (See Nahid H. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1056.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court's Orders
1. Legal Principles
At a six-month review hearing, the juvenile court "shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).)
Section 361.5, subdivision (a) generally mandates reunification services be provided whenever a child is removed from a parent's or guardian's custody. (See In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 678 (Luke L.).) Reunification services may last up to 18 months from the date of removal if the juvenile court finds a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian within that extended time period or that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent or guardian. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3).)
A parent, however, has no entitlement "to a prescribed minimum period of services." (In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1243, fn. omitted.) Instead, the juvenile court has discretion to determine whether continued services are in the best interests of the minor or whether services should be terminated at some point before the applicable statutory period has expired. (Ibid.) Any party to a dependency proceeding may petition the court to terminate reunification services early under certain circumstances, such as when the action or inaction of the parent creates a substantial likelihood that reunification will not occur because the parent has failed to visit the child or participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan. (§ 388, subd. (c)(1)(B); see § 361.5, subd. (a)(2); rule 5.570(e)(5); In re Y.M. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 892, 917.)
"Only where there is clear and convincing evidence the [Department] has provided or offered reasonable services may the court order a section 366.26 [permanency planning] hearing." (Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1165 (Robin V.).) "Reunification services must be 'designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court's finding that the child is a person described by Section 300.' (§ 362, subd. (c).) Accordingly, a reunification plan must be appropriately based on the particular family's 'unique facts.' [Citation.]" (In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 696 (T.G.).) " ' "[T]he record should show that the [Department] identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult. . . ." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 697.)
In addition, "the reunification plan must include visitation. (§ 362.1.) That visitation must be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the minor. (Ibid.)" (Luke L., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 679; § 362.1, subd. (a)(1).) However, "[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child." (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).)
"The adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of the [Department's] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case." (Robin V., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164; Amanda H. v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1345.) That additional services might have been possible, or that the services provided were not the services the parent thought were best for the family, does not render the services offered or provided inadequate. " 'The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.' " (T.G., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 697.)
On appeal, the applicable standard of review is sufficiency of the evidence. (Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 688 (Kevin R.).) "In making this determination, we review the record in the light most favorable to the court's determinations and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders." (Id. at pp. 688-689.) "We have no power to judge the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to consider the credibility of witnesses or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from that evidence." (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53.)
2. Substantial Evidence That Return to the Mother Would Create a Substantial Risk of Detriment to the Minor
There is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's determination that returning the minor to the mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to the minor's mental well-being. (See § 366.21, subd. (e)(1).)
When the juvenile court adjudged the minor a dependent of the court on April 30, 2019, the court ordered the mother to participate in a parent orientation program, a parenting class, and individual and family therapy. Although the mother took an online parenting class that was not approved by the Department, she did not participate in any approved parenting classes or attend a parent orientation or individual or family therapy. "The failure of the parent or legal guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental." (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).) Moreover, between April 30, 2019 and mid-December 2019, when the hearing on the six-month status review report and the section 388 petition was held, the mother did not participate in any visitation with the minor.
The social worker testified that the minor stated he needed emotional space before he could develop an emotionally safe relationship with the mother and that the minor's assessment was insightful. The social worker opined that the minor needed therapy and time to heal and that the minor was not currently in a place where he was willing to reestablish his relationship with the mother.
The mother declined to take responsibility for the state of her relationship with the minor, testifying that she did not believe her actions were responsible for the minor's desire for space. She stated that she would be willing to participate in visits supervised by someone other than the assigned social worker, but there is no evidence in the record that she ever contacted the Department to make such a request. The mother testified that she would like to participate in family therapy with the minor and that she would be willing to engage in individual therapy, but she did not respond to the social worker's attempts to provide these services for her or reach out to someone else at the Department to do so.
For these reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court's finding that returning the minor to the mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to the minor's mental well-being is supported by substantial evidence in the record. (See Kevin R., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 688.)
3. Substantial Evidence Reasonable Services Were Offered to Mother
There is also substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that the Department provided or offered reasonable services to the mother. (See Robin V., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165.)
The Department identified the problems regarding the placement of the minor with the mother, offered services designed to remedy those problems, and when compliance proved difficult, made reasonable efforts to assist the mother. (See T.G., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 697.) The Department also maintained reasonable contact with the mother throughout the reunification process. (See ibid.) Specifically, the social worker assigned to the case referred the mother to a parent orientation and tried to provide access to a parenting class, individual therapy, and family therapy. The social worker emailed the mother, wrote the mother, and called the mother, but the mother was generally nonresponsive. The social worker also offered to meet with the mother several times but she was not receptive to an in-person meeting. After the mother moved to Humboldt County, the social worker attempted to set up parenting classes for the mother there and emailed the mother with a list of local services. The mother did not respond to the email. The social worker continued to follow up with the mother by emailing her to ask if she needed help accessing services. The mother did not respond.
The Department's reunification plan also included visitation as required under section 362.1. Based on the minor's refusal to participate in unsupervised visits but willingness to visit with the mother in a supervised setting, the Department attempted to schedule a supervised visit, but the mother did not indicate any interest in seeing the minor under supervised conditions. The Department went so far as to schedule a supervised visit and inform the mother of the date, but the mother did not respond and the visit did not occur. By the time of the hearing in mid-December 2019, there had been no visitation between the minor and the mother post-February 8, 2019.
Based on this record, we determine substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that the Department offered reasonable services to the mother. (See Kevin R., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 688.)
4. Substantial Evidence Reunification Would Not Occur
We also conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to support the juvenile court's finding that the mother's actions or inactions created a substantial likelihood that reunification would not occur within 18 months of the minor's entry into foster care. (See § 388, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
Section 388, subdivision (c)(1)(B) allows termination of reunification services based on "[t]he action or inaction of the parent," which includes "the parent's . . . failure to visit the child, or . . . to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan." Both of those circumstances were present here.
Reunification services were ordered on April 30, 2019. When the Department's six-month status review report and section 388 petition were heard in mid-December 2019, the mother had made no progress on reunification, failing to avail herself of any of the services provided or offered by the Department or to participate in supervised visitation with the minor. The mother had not visited with the minor since February 2019. Moreover, the mother's testimony at the mid-December hearing demonstrated a lack of insight into the minor's needs and a failure to take responsibility for her actions.
Based on the record, we agree with the juvenile court's finding that the mother clearly loves the minor. However, under these circumstances, we conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to support the juvenile court's finding that reunification would not occur within 18 months of the minor's entry into foster care. (See Kevin R., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 688.)
5. The Mother's Claims
In her petition for extraordinary writ, the mother lists several reasons for her challenge to the juvenile court's orders. We address the mother's claims to the extent they can be discerned.
First, the mother asserts the juvenile court committed a "Federal constitutional error of [her] 6th amendment." However, the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution does not apply in juvenile dependency proceedings. (In re Angel W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1080.) Thus, we must reject the mother's Sixth Amendment claim.
Second, the mother contends that the judicial officer was biased and references the transcript of a hearing where the court explained its visitation ruling to the minor. The mother's allegation of bias is procedurally barred, however, because the mother did not claim during the six-month status review and section 388 hearing that "the judge should recuse [her]self or that [her] constitutional rights were violated because of judicial bias. 'It is too late to raise the issue for the first time on appeal.' " (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1111, overruled on another ground in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.) The mother's claim also fails on the merits, as there is no evidence in the record that "any judicial . . . bias was so prejudicial that it deprived [the mother] of ' "a fair . . . trial." ' " (Id. at p. 1112.)
Third, the mother alleges that the juvenile court considered evidence outside the record and references the court's statement that there were two themes present in the case: (1) the minor's refusal to visit with the mother, and (2) the mother's fear of the Department. The social worker testified that the minor was not willing to participate in unsupervised visits with the mother. The mother testified that she was scared of the social worker. Thus, we find no basis for the mother's contention that the juvenile court considered facts not in evidence.
Fourth, the mother raises that the minor and Emma did not testify, but the mother does not state a claim regarding that fact. The mother therefore fails to establish how the parties' decision not to call the minor or Emma as witnesses rendered the juvenile court's orders invalid. Moreover, as the Department points out, the court received a letter from Emma into evidence so that Emma would "have the feeling that her voice [was] heard." The court was also made aware of the minor's position regarding reunification with the mother through the social worker's testimony and the Department's reports received into evidence.
For all of these reasons, we determine that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's orders and that the juvenile court properly terminated reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing.
IV. DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ relief is denied.
/s/_________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
GREENWOOD, P.J. /s/_________
GROVER, J.