Mazzola v. County of Suffolk

Full title: ERNEST MAZZOLA, Respondent, v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK et al., Appellants

Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Oct 11, 1988

143 A.D.2d 734 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)

Opinion

October 11, 1988

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Fierro, J.).

Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.

It is the primary rule of construction of contracts in this State that "when the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties must be found therein" (Nichols v Nichols, 306 N.Y. 490, 496). The words and phrases used in an agreement must be given their plain meaning so as to define the rights of the parties (see, Laba v Carey, 29 N.Y.2d 302; Levine v Shell Oil Co., 28 N.Y.2d 205), and in this regard, it is common practice for the courts of this State to refer to the dictionary to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of words to a contract (see, Allied Chem. Corp. v Alpha Portland Indus., 58 A.D.2d 975). At bar, the trial court properly determined that the contractual language is clear and unambiguous, and that the ordinary dictionary definitions for the terms "condemned" and "condemnation", as used in paragraph 15, operate to trigger the plaintiff's entitlement to a refund of his down payment under the circumstances of this case. Inasmuch as it is a well-established rule of contract law that a contract must be construed most strongly against the party who prepared it (see, 22 N.Y. Jur 2d, Contracts, § 228; McRory v Craft Architectural Metals Corp., 112 A.D.2d 358; Diodato v Eastchester Dev. Corp., 111 A.D.2d 303), there can be no doubt that if the defendants herein intended a more specific, limited, or narrower meaning for the terms used, then the burden was upon them, as drafters of the contract, to so specify, and their failure to do so must not operate to the plaintiff's detriment.

We have reviewed the defendants' remaining contentions, and agree with the trial court that no issues of fact were raised which would preclude the granting of summary judgment. Mangano, J.P., Bracken, Spatt and Harwood, JJ., concur.