Opinion
No. 05-15-01299-CR
03-14-2017
JEREMY LEONARD MAYS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1 Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-0671504-H
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Fillmore, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Fillmore
A jury convicted Jeremy Leonard Mays of murder and assessed punishment of fifty-five years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. In his first three points of error, Mays asserts the trial court erred by overruling his objections to (1) testimony during the guilt phase of the trial about an extraneous offense, (2) improper argument at the close of the guilt phase by the prosecutor, and (3) a nonresponsive answer by a witness during the punishment phase of the trial. In his final point of error, Mays argues the destruction of certain trial exhibits prevented him from bringing a meaningful appeal. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
Because Mays has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, we recite only those facts necessary to address his complaints on appeal.
On October 12, 2006, Mays and his cousin, James Charles, smoked phencyclidine and then got into an argument in a bedroom in Charles's apartment. According to Mays, the argument started when Charles claimed some "X" pills were missing and that Mays would have to pay for the pills. The argument became physical, and Mays shot Charles at least five times, with four of the shots hitting Charles in the back of his arm and body after he turned to run from the room. Charles died from the multiple gunshot wounds.
Four fired bullets were recovered from the apartment and one bullet was recovered from Charles's body during the autopsy. Charles's body had six bullet wounds, but it was possible one bullet caused multiple wounds.
Mays was indicted for Charles's murder. At trial, Mays admitted he shot Charles, but testified he was in fear for his life at the time because he thought Charles was reaching for a gun. The jury rejected Mays's claim of self-defense, found him guilty of Charles's murder, and assessed punishment of fifty-years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.
Meaningful Appeal
In his fourth point of error, Mays asserts he is entitled to a new trial because, through no fault of his own, a portion of the record has been destroyed and that portion of the record is necessary to the resolution of the appeal and cannot be replaced by agreement of the parties. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(f). Mays specifically argues the record on appeal does not contain State's Exhibits 50 through 53, which were documents relating to some of Mays's prior convictions, and without those exhibits, he "cannot show that trial counsel was ineffective" by failing to object to the admission of the exhibits at trial.
Applicable Facts
The jury rendered its verdict on November 2, 2007, and the trial court signed a judgment of conviction reflecting that verdict on November 5, 2007. Mays failed to timely appeal the conviction and, on July 11, 2008, we dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Mays v. State, No. 05-08-00891-CR, 2008 WL 2699776 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 11, 2008, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Mays sought relief from the court of criminal appeals by filing three applications for writ of habeas corpus. As relevant to this appeal, in his third application, Mays asserted his trial counsel was deficient by failing to timely file a notice of appeal. See Ex parte Mays, No. WR-72,154-03, 2015 WL 1342941 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2015) (per curiam). On March 18, 2015, the court of criminal appeals found Mays was entitled to the opportunity to file an out-of-time appeal. See id. Mays then filed this appeal and requested the preparation of the clerk's and reporter's records.
The court reporter notified the parties that some of the exhibits could not be located. The parties filed a joint motion to abate the appeal to allow the trial court to determine if an accurate reporter's record could be assembled. We abated the appeal and ordered the trial court to make findings regarding (1) the dates of every hearing conducted in this case; (2) whether the notes of those hearings were available and could be transcribed; (3) whether each and every exhibit admitted into evidence at each and every hearing conducted could be located for inclusion in the record; (4) if the notes of any hearing or if any exhibit cannot be located, whether Mays was at fault for the loss or destruction of the notes or exhibits; and (5) whether the parties could agree on a substituted record of any missing hearing or exhibits.
The trial court conducted a hearing over three days and found that all but three of the exhibits admitted into evidence at trial had been destroyed pursuant to the Dallas County District Clerk's Office's retention and destruction policy and statutory authority. Karen Coston, the Dallas County Felony Evidence Registrar, designated the exhibits for destruction after confirming this Court's mandate had issued in the first appeal. Coston, however, failed to confirm that no post-conviction writs were pending prior to designating the exhibits for destruction. The trial court further found Mays was not responsible for the destruction of the exhibits.
The trial court found the three exhibits retained by Coston had been delivered to the court reporter. The parties also agreed to the substitution of certain exhibits. The State then tendered a number of exhibits that the trial court found with reasonable certainty should be included in the record as substitutes for the original exhibits admitted at trial. Finally, the trial court found State's Exhibits 7, 7-A, 7-B, 8, 9, 10, 12, 21, 23, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, and 53, and Defense Exhibit 1 had been destroyed and the parties were unable to locate substitute exhibits. As to these State's exhibits, testimony during the trial identified Exhibits 7 through 10 as fired bullets recovered from Charles's apartment; Exhibit 7-A as a box of bullets recovered from Charles's apartment; Exhibit 7-B as a paper bag admitted only for record purposes; Exhibit 12 as an in-life photograph of Charles; Exhibit 21 as the Miranda card from which Mays was read his rights; Exhibit 23 as a bullet recovered from Charles's body during the autopsy; Exhibits 43 and 44 as photographs of a bite wound on a police officer's arm inflicted by Mays during a February 2006 incident; Exhibit 45 as a stipulation by Mays that he was the person identified in the prior convictions sought to be admitted by the State; and Exhibits 46 through 53 as documents related to Mays's prior convictions. The record reflected that Defense Exhibit 1 was Mays's medical records from his treatment on the day of the murder following an altercation with police officers after he was detained. State's Exhibits 7 through 10, 12, 21, and 23 and Defense Exhibit 1 were admitted during the guilt phase of the trial. State's Exhibit 43 through 53 were admitted during the punishment phase of the trial.
Although not relevant to Mays's complaints on appeal, the trial court could not determine with reasonable certainty which photograph tendered by the State was a substitute for State's Exhibit 17, and did not admit that exhibit. The trial court also found the record revealed there was no State's Exhibit 19 or 20 and the State did not offer State's Exhibit 42 during the trial.
Analysis
As relevant here, a defendant is entitled to a new trial if (1) he timely requested a reporter's record; (2) without his fault, a significant exhibit has been destroyed; (3) the destroyed exhibit is necessary to the appeal's resolution; and (4) the destroyed exhibit cannot be replaced by agreement of the parties or with a copy determined by the trial court to accurately duplicate with reasonable certainty the original exhibit. TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(f). An incomplete record, however, does not result in an automatic reversal. Issac v. State, 989 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Coulter v. State, No. 01-15-00018-CR, 2016 WL 7369197, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 15, 2016, no pet.). Rather, the requirement in the rule that the defendant show the missing portion of the record is necessary to his appeal "is itself a harm analysis." Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also Routier v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). If the missing portion of the record is not necessary to the appeal's resolution, then the loss of that portion of the record is harmless and a new trial is not required. Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 306; Routier, 112 S.W.3d at 572.
The only specific complaint Mays raises on appeal about the incomplete record is that, without copies of State's Exhibits 50 through 53, he is unable to present a claim on appeal that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the admission of those exhibits. An appellant has the burden to prove a claim of ineffective assistance by a preponderance of the evidence. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). To successfully assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant must show (1) trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 691-92 (1984); see also Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an ineffective assistance claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
In determining whether an appellant has met his burden, we consider the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. We strongly presume counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and do not judge counsel's actions in hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. The fact that another attorney might pursue a different strategy at trial is not sufficient to prove counsel was ineffective. Scheanette v. State, 144 S.W.3d 503, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also Frangias v. State, 450 S.W.3d 125, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Our review of counsel's performance is highly deferential and begins with the assumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Andrews, 159 S.W.3d at 101. "This means that, unless there is a record sufficient to demonstrate that counsel's conduct was not the product of an informed strategic or tactical decision, a reviewing court should presume that trial counsel's performance was constitutionally adequate, 'unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.'" Frangias, 450 S.W.3d at 136 (quoting Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Generally, a silent record that provides no explanation for counsel's actions will not overcome the strong presumption of reasonable assistance. Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
The record reflects that at the beginning of the punishment phase of the trial, the parties submitted to the trial court a stipulation of evidence. Under questioning by the trial court, Mays affirmed he had reviewed the stipulation with his counsel and understood that, pursuant to the stipulation, he was admitting he was the "same person convicted in those [prior] cases," and was "allowing the State to not have to call a witness to prove that [he was] the same person in those convictions." Mays further affirmed that was what he "want[ed] to do." The trial court approved the stipulation. The State offered Exhibit 45, the stipulation, as well as Exhibits 46 through 53, into evidence. Mays's counsel indicated he had no objection, and the trial court admitted the exhibits into evidence.
The prosecutor read the stipulation of evidence to the jury. He then read to the jury information contained in State's Exhibits 46 through 49 relating to the adjudication of Mays for a number of offenses by the juvenile courts. The prosecutor further stated State's Exhibit 50 was an adjudication of probation violations and judgment of disposition by the juvenile court pursuant to which Mays was placed into the custody of the Texas Youth Commission. Finally, the prosecutor described State's Exhibits 51 through 53 as convictions of Mays from the "adult courts" for possession of a controlled substance, resisting arrest, and possession of marijuana in a drug free zone. State's Exhibit 54, a poster board which remained in Coston's possession and was delivered to the court reporter, contained a summary of these convictions as well as charges pending against Mays for resisting arrest and aggravated assault of a public servant.
The record reflects trial counsel, after consulting with Mays, apparently made a strategic decision that Mays would accept responsibility for his past conduct. Any objection to Exhibits 50 through 53 would have been inconsistent with that strategy. Accordingly, even if there was a valid objection to any of those exhibits, trial counsel would not necessarily have been ineffective by failing to assert that objection. See Ex parte Davis, 866 S.W.2d 234, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (per curiam) (applicant failed to overcome presumption counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment in not seeking to introduce evidence at punishment stage of trial that was potentially inconsistent with strategy to have defendant accept responsibility for his conduct).
See also Minor v. State, No. 02-13-00369-CR, 2014 WL 3778273, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 31, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ("Counsel could have rationally concluded that stipulating to prior convictions supported the notion that appellant accepted responsibility and wanted to change. This type of defense strategy was reasonable under the circumstances; we cannot classify it as deficient.").
Mays did not complain in a motion for new trial or in any other manner in the trial court that his counsel was ineffective by failing to object to Exhibits 50 through 53. Thus, there was no evidentiary record developed as to trial counsel's strategies or reasons for the allegedly deficient conduct. In such a case, the trial record will generally not be sufficient to support an ineffective assistance claim, see Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 308 (appellant complaining that missing portion of record could deprive him of viable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed to establish deficient performance based on silent record), and the claim is more appropriately urged in a hearing on an application for writ of habeas corpus. See Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 143; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814 & n.6. We conclude Mays has failed to show State's Exhibits 50 through 53 are necessary to the resolution of this appeal. Accordingly, we resolve Mays's fourth point of error against him.
See also Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813-14 ("In the majority of instances, the record on direct appeal is simply undeveloped and cannot adequately reflect the failings of trial counsel.").
Mays also asserts in one sentence that "this argument applies to all of the Exhibits destroyed, both during the trial on the merits and the punishment hearing." Mays fails to distinguish between exhibits that the trial court found could be replaced with reasonable certainty and exhibits for which there was no replacement. Further, even assuming the argument is directed at only those exhibits for which there was no replacement, Mays's brief contains no substantive argument as to any specific exhibit. Mays, therefore, has waived any argument as to any exhibits other than State's Exhibits 50 through 53 due to inadequate briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h) (appellant's brief must contain succinct, clear, and accurate statement of arguments made); Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (appellant waived argument that federal constitutional rights were violated due to inadequate briefing).
Admission of Evidence
In his first and third points of error, Mays contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of an extraneous offense and by overruling his objection that a witness's answer was not responsive to the question. We review the trial court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 82-83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 83.
Extraneous Offense
During the guilt phase of the trial, Officer Edward Parker testified he was involved in searching for Mays after the shooting and was at Mays's mother's apartment complex when Mays was apprehended. Mays was placed into the backseat of a police car to be transported to Charles's apartment for possible identification by Charles's girlfriend, who had witnessed the shooting. Parker got into the backseat of the car with Mays. According to Parker, although Mays initially fell asleep, as they approached Charles's apartment complex, he "jumped up and said, 'I got to get out of here.' And then he kind of leaned back, and then he kicked at me." Mays's counsel requested to approach the bench and, after an unrecorded bench conference, "object[ed] to the testimony." The trial court overruled the objection. Parker then testified about an altercation during which Mays was combative, was shocked with a taser multiple times, kicked a police officer, and attempted to bite another officer.
Officer Andy Caceres subsequently testified he was driving the police car that was transporting Mays. According to Caceres, Mays initially fell asleep in the police car. Caceres then testified without objection that Mays's demeanor changed "like from day to night," and Mays began kicking and trying to get out of the car, was difficult to restrain, was shocked with a taser at least twice, and attempted to bite one of Caceres's legs.
On appeal, Mays complains that Parker's testimony about the altercation was inadmissible under rule of evidence 404(b). Generally, to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must make a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the desired ruling, if those grounds are not apparent from the context, and must obtain a ruling. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Douds v. State, 472 S.W.3d 670, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1461 (2016). A party must object each time the objectionable evidence is offered or obtain a running objection to the evidence. Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). "An error [if any] in the admission of evidence is cured where the same evidence comes in elsewhere without objection." Id. (quoting Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)); see also Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 302 n.29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (noting any error was harmless in light of "very similar" evidence admitted without objection).
Texas rule of evidence 404(b) provides that "[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character." TEX. R. EVID 404(b).
Mays failed to object when Caceres testified about Mays's altercation with the police officers following his apprehension. Accordingly, he failed to preserve any error by the trial court in admitting Parker's testimony about the same incident. We resolve Mays's first point of error against him.
Nonresponsive Objection
In his third point of error, Mays contends the trial court erred by overruling his objection that a witness's answer was not responsive to the question. During the punishment phase of the trial, the State called Danny Davis, the manager of a Walgreen's store where Mays was arrested in February 2006 for resisting arrest and aggravated assault of a public servant. Davis was unable to identify Mays as the man in the store, but stated "I imagine it's him sitting there but I don't remember him." Davis testified it had "been over a year, and I can say he's got a hair cut [sic] and he doesn't look - if that's him, he doesn't look the same." The following exchange then occurred:
Prosecutor: This person who was acting this way, that was causing customers to come to you one after another, did you come into contact with him?
Davis: Yes.The trial court overruled the objection, and Davis continued:
Prosecutor: And how would you personally describe him? What did he look like to you?
Davis: A killer. I felt - I feared -
Defense: Your Honor, I object to that response as being not - one, nonresponsive.
That's what I thought. I mean, that's what I thought then and that's what I thought - that's what I think now. That's - I don't know another way to explain it. That's what I thought. That's what - I felt fear. I felt in danger. I kept distance - where he kept getting too close, he invaded my space. I stepped back constantly to keep space from him. He was in - I don't know a word to describe what I saw.
We first note Davis's answer described what Mays "looked like" to him in February 2006, and appears to be responsive to the prosecutor's question. However, even if the testimony is considered to be nonresponsive,
Not every nonresponsive answer should be stricken. It is only when the unresponsive answer is also inadmissible that it should be stricken . . . . A "nonresponsive" objection alone, however, merely informs the trial court why the objection was not made prior to the answer being given. Even after the "nonresponsive" portion of the objection is made, there remains the question of the testimony's admissibility. In this context, in order to properly exclude evidence or obtain an instruction to disregard, a party must address in its objection both the nonresponsiveness and the inadmissibility of the answer.Smith v. State, 763 S.W.2d 836, 841 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, pet. ref'd); see also Jackson v. State, 889 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd).
See also Nash v. State, No. 05-15-01070-CR, 2017 WL 491256, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 7, 2017, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
On appeal, Mays complains Davis's testimony was not relevant and stated an opinion that was not rationally based on any legitimate perception. At trial, however, Mays did not argue that Davis's testimony was inadmissible on either of these bases. Accordingly, he waived any complaint about the trial court's decision to overrule his objection. See Jackson, 889 S.W.2d at 617 (holding that appellant's general complaint, which the trial court understood to challenge the responsiveness of the answer, failed to preserve any complaint about the trial court's failure to instruct the jury to disregard). We resolve Mays's third point of error against him.
See also Nash, 2017 WL 491256, at *3 ("Because appellant failed to argue on what basis the detective's statement was inadmissible, we hold that appellant waived any complaint about the trial court's decisions to overrule appellant's objection [that the testimony was nonresponsive] and to deny appellant's motion for mistrial.").
Improper Jury Argument
In his second point of error, Mays asserts the trial court erred by overruling his objection to improper jury argument by the prosecutor. We review a trial court's ruling on an objection to jury argument for abuse of discretion. Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Relevant Facts
During the State's initial closing argument in the guilt phase of the trial, the prosecutor argued "this was not a justified killing." She then stated the defense "had a chance to say a lot of things about a dead man," and she anticipated defense counsel would ask the jury "to speculate." The prosecutor asserted the only thing before the jury was self-defense, and the evidence did not establish Mays acted in self-defense.
Mays's counsel argued the apartment was a "drug house," and in the apartment were drugs, guns, and gang members. Mays's counsel then pointed to Mays's testimony that he and Charles were arguing about missing drugs and money when Charles approached Mays. Mays pushed Charles away and saw Charles reach for something. Mays's counsel argued:
Now that may not be important for any of you; but, in a drug house where there's weapons kept and you are arguing over money and drugs, he felt like his life was in jeopardy because he felt like that guy was reaching for a gun.Counsel then attempted to explain why Mays, in the statement he gave to the police immediately after the shooting, failed to say he thought Charles was reaching for a gun.
Mays's counsel discussed the law of self-defense and argued the evidence established Mays acted in self-defense:
Where was he? He was in a drug house with a drug dealer. Weapons are kept there. Had he been in church and pulled out a gun, that may not have been reasonable to a reasonable person in that situation. But what they do - with what they do on a daily basis, in that situation and circumstance, was that reasonable?He continued by arguing that Mays was entitled to defend himself if he reasonably believed he was going to be attacked, and summarized:
He knew that this was a drug house. Yeah, did he have a gun on him? Of course, he had a gun on him. They sold drugs out of a drug house. He had a gun on him. He had a gun on him. They kept guns there. They kept an assault rifle for God's sake where the detective told you where they kept a stack of drugs in the ceiling. Yeah, this is what it is. No way to make it any different. No way to make it any different.According to counsel, the issue was whether Mays was "justified at that point in that time in his mind, not on PCP, but in his mind based on the circumstances as they were at that time being in a drug house."
The prosecutor began the State's final closing argument by stating "murder is murder," and "it doesn't matter who the victim is." The prosecutor then argued:
He's going to get up here and say, you know what, excuse this killer. The guy he killed, he lived in a drug house. He had guns. Well, I guess according to [defense counsel], that means he deserves to die.Mays's counsel objected "to that as being improper argument." The trial court overruled the objection. The prosecutor summarized the evidence, argued Mays was not credible, and that Mays had not shot Charles in self-defense.
Analysis
Mays contends the trial court erred by overruling his objection because the prosecutor's argument improperly struck at Mays over the shoulder of his counsel. Proper jury argument consists of (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deductions from the evidence; (3) answer to argument of opposing counsel; and (4) a plea for law enforcement. Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Comments that appear to cast aspersions on the character of defense counsel, and as a result, strike over counsel's shoulder at the defendant, are not proper jury argument. Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Moseley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ("[A] prosecutor runs a risk of improperly striking at a defendant over the shoulder of counsel when the argument is made in terms of defense counsel personally and when the argument explicitly impugns defense counsel's character."). However, a proper objection must still be made to the argument. Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see also Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Cornwell v. State, 445 S.W.3d 488, 492-93 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014), aff'd, 471 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
See also Hougham v. State, 659 S.W.2d 410, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1983) ("A proper objection would have been that the argument was outside the record, was not a reasonable deduction from the evidence, was not an answer to argument of opposing counsel, and was not a plea for law enforcement.").
To preserve error, a party's objection must be sufficiently specific "to 'let the trial [court] know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled to it, and do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial court is in a proper position to do something about it." Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 312-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). Mays's objection to the State's argument on grounds of "improper argument" was not specific and did not preserve error. Hougham v. State, 659 S.W.2d 410, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1983) (objection to "this line of argument" not specific enough to preserve error); Vasquez v. State, 501 S.W.3d 691, 705 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd) (defendant's objection of "improper argument" was insufficient to preserve error because objection was general, rather than specific). Accordingly, we resolve his second point of error against him.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
/Robert M. Fillmore/
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47 151299F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F-0671504-H.
Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore, Justices Lang and Schenck participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 14th day of March, 2017.