Summary
In San Jose v. Trimble, 41 Cal. 536, which is relied upon here, it is intimated that a grantee may be barred by the statute as to the right he has before the patent, and that he may acquire a new right by the patent; and the intimation is, that in such case the new right is not barred.
Summary of this case from Anzar v. MillerOpinion
[Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] 41 Cal. 536 at 543.
Original Opinion of July, 1871, Reported at: 41 Cal. 536.
JUDGES: Rhodes, C. J.
OPINION
RHODES J
[The foregoing opinion was rendered at the December term, 1870. A rehearing was granted, and the following opinion was delivered at the July term, 1871.--Reporter.]
We have carefully considered the question in this case, arising upon the construction of the sixth section of the Act of 1863, amendatory of the statute of limitations of 1850, and in our investigations we have had the aid of very elaborate arguments of several counsel who are interested in the question. The reexamination of the question has strengthened our conviction, that the conclusion announced in our former opinion is correct. We deem it unnecessary to discuss the question at any length at this time. It is proper, however, to say that in our opinion, it is clear that the Act of 1855 was repealed by the Act of 1863. The principal purpose of the Act of 1863 was to place all title, all rights of entry, and all rights of action, on the same footing, so far as respects the statute of limitations; to require every person, whatever may be the source or nature of his title, to whom a cause of action accrues for the recovery of the possession of lands against a person in the adverse possession thereof, to commence his action within the period mentioned in the Act, or be forever barred of his remedy.
To avoid certain misapprehensions which, from the arguments of some of the counsel, seem to exist, it should be stated that we do not hold that where, for any cause, a party has no right of entry, or cannot maintain an action, the statute will run against him. Nor do we hold that if a party acquires a second right of entry, or right of action, that he may not maintain his action within the time limited by the Act, although his remedy under his former right of entry may have become barred. It is unnecessary to express any opinion as to whether a person, while holding one right of entry, can acquire a second, nor whether such second right of entry accrues in the case of a confirmation survey or patent of a " sobrante grant" or a Spanish or Mexican grant of any character.
Judgment affirmed.