Mayor Council of the City of Flemington v. Boatwright

4 Citing cases

  1. Georgia Department of Human Resources v. Poss

    263 Ga. 347 (Ga. 1993)   Cited 34 times

    In their complaint, appellees alleged the department was negligent in failing to train and supervise its staff; in failing to establish rules, regulations, and procedures designed to protect seriously ill patients; and in failing to provide adequate facilities to carry out such care. Citing Price v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 535 ( 361 S.E.2d 146) (1987), and Mayor c. of Flemington v. Boatwright, 259 Ga. 175 ( 377 S.E.2d 843) (1989), DHR asserted that appellees' claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals distinguished Price on the ground that it involved a derivative liability claim and, after recognizing that the presence of liability insurance protection constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity (see 1983 Ga. Const., Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX), held that DHR was not entitled to summary judgment as it had not shown the non-existence of insurance coverage.

  2. Poss v. Department of Human Resources

    206 Ga. App. 890 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 6 times
    In Poss v. Dept. of Human Resources, 206 Ga. App. 890, 895 (426 S.E.2d 635) (1992), we held in Division 1 that the court did not err in granting the department's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' derivative negligence claim, but we held in Divisions 2 through 6 that the court erred in granting the department's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' direct negligence claim.

    In its supporting brief, the department argued that the determination in the federal action that Dr. Azar is immune from liability precludes the present action against the department. The department also argued that under Price v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 535 ( 361 S.E.2d 146) (1987), as well as Mayor c. of Flemington v. Boatwright, 259 Ga. 175 ( 377 S.E.2d 843) (1989), a waiver of sovereign immunity depends upon the presence of a governmental employee for whom liability insurance protection has been provided; in this case the only defendant is the department itself. The department also filed a counterclaim under Yost v. Torok, 256 Ga. 92 ( 344 S.E.2d 414) (1986), and OCGA § 9-15-14 for frivolous litigation in view of the disposition of the federal suit.

  3. Boatwright v. Mayor Council of Flemington

    383 S.E.2d 908 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)

    SOGNIER, Judge. In Mayor Council of Flemington v. Boatwright, 259 Ga. 175 ( 377 S.E.2d 843) (1989), the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this court in Boatwright v. Mayor Council of Flemington, 189 Ga. App. 676 ( 377 S.E.2d 1) (1988). Accordingly, our judgment in that case is vacated, the judgment of the Supreme Court is made the judgment of this court, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

  4. Calloway v. City of Warner Robins

    783 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 5 times

    As the trial court correctly found, a municipality's “issuance of a permit or license is a governmental function[.]” Boatwright v. Flemington, 189 Ga.App. 676, 677(3), 377 S.E.2d 1 (1988), reversed on other grounds by Flemington v. Boatwright, 259 Ga. 175, 377 S.E.2d 843 (1989). See also City of Thomson v. Davis, 92 Ga.App. 216, 218–219(1), 88 S.E.2d 300 (1955) (municipality's act of granting or revoking a business license constitutes a governmental function).