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Mayo v. U.S.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division
Nov 2, 2006
Nos. C06-2075-LRR, CR02-2041-LRR (N.D. Iowa Nov. 2, 2006)

Opinion

Nos. C06-2075-LRR, CR02-2041-LRR.

November 2, 2006


ORDER


This matter comes before the court on Richard Lee Mayo's motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence (Docket No. 1). Richard Lee Mayo ("the movant") filed his motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the following reasons, the movant's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion shall be denied. In addition, a certificate of appealability shall be denied.

If a prisoner is in custody pursuant to a sentence imposed by a federal court and such prisoner claims "that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, [the prisoner] may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see also Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 377, 121 S. Ct. 1578, 149 L. Ed. 2d 590 (2001).

No response from the government is required because the motion and file make clear that the movant is not entitled to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. Similarly, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary. See id.; see also Engelen v. United States, 68 F.3d 238, 240-41 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that district court may summarily dismiss a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 without an evidentiary hearing "if (1) the . . . allegations, accepted as true, would not entitle the [movant] to relief, or (2) the allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact"); United States v. Oldham, 787 F.2d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that district court is given discretion in determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255).

I. BACKGROUND

On November 22, 2002, the grand jury returned and the government filed an indictment against the movant. On January 29, 2003, the grand jury returned and the government filed a superseding indictment against the movant. On January 31, 2003, the movant appeared before Chief Magistrate Judge John A. Jarvey for a change of plea hearing. At such hearing, the movant pleaded guilty to count one and count two of the November 22, 2002 indictment. On the same date, Chief Magistrate Judge John A. Jarvey entered a report and recommendation that a United States District Court Judge accept the movant's plea of guilty. On February 3, 2003, Chief Magistrate Judge John A. Jarvey filed an amended report and recommendation. On February 12, 2003, the court entered an order adopting the report and recommendation pertaining to the movant's guilty plea. On August 19, 2003, the court sentenced the movant to 180 months imprisonment (96 months for count one, 84 months for count two, terms to run consecutively, term on count one to run concurrently with sentence imposed in Iowa District Court in and for Cerro Gordo County) and 5 years supervised release. On August 20, 2003, judgment entered against the movant. On August 29, 2003, the movant filed a notice of appeal. On October 16, 2003, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the movant's motion and dismissed his appeal.

On September 8, 2005, the government filed a motion pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. On November 2, 2005, the court held a hearing regarding such motion. Pursuant to such hearing and motion, the court reduced the movant's sentence to a term of 144 months imprisonment (60 months for count one, 84 months for count two, terms to run consecutively, term on count one to run concurrently with sentence imposed in Iowa District Court in and for Cerro Gordo County). The court also recommended that the Bureau of Prisons award the movant credit against his federal sentence for the time he served on the sentence imposed in the Iowa District Court in and for Cerro Gordo County. On the same day, amended judgment entered against the movant.

On October 30, 2006, the movant filed the instant motion. In his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, the movant challenges the amount of credit that the Bureau of Prisons awarded him for the time he served on the sentence imposed in the Iowa District Court in and for Cerro Gordo County. The movant relies on 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) and U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c).

The court now turns to consider the movant's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.

II. ANALYSIS A. Standards Applicable to Motion Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255

28 U.S.C. § 2255 allows a prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court to move the sentencing court to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence. To obtain relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner must establish: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255).

Although it appears to be broad, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 does not provide a remedy for "all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing." United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185, 99 S. Ct. 2235, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805 (1979). Rather, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is intended to redress only "fundamental defect[s] which inherently [result] in a complete miscarriage of justice" and "omission[s] inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." Hill, 368 U.S. at 428; see also United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised for the first time on direct appeal and, if uncorrected, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice.") (citing Poor Thunder v. United States, 810 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1987)). A collateral challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is not interchangeable or substitutable for a direct appeal. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982) (making clear a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 will not be allowed to do service for an appeal). Consequently, "[a]n error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In addition, movants ordinarily are precluded from asserting claims they failed to raise on direct appeal. See McNeal v. United States, 249 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 2001). "A [movant] who has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review may raise the claim in a [ 28 U.S.C. §] 2255 proceeding only by demonstrating cause for the default and prejudice or actual innocence." Id. (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998)); see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 155 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2003) ("[T]he general rule [is] that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review unless the [movant] shows cause and prejudice."). "`[C]ause' under the cause and prejudice test must be something external to the [movant], something that cannot be fairly attributed to him." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991) (emphasis in original). If a movant fails to show cause, a court need not consider whether actual prejudice exists. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 501, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1991). Actual innocence under the actual innocence test "means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-24; see also McNeal, 249 F.3d at 749 ("[A movant] must show factual innocence, not simply legal insufficiency of evidence to support a conviction.").

The procedural default rule applies to a conviction obtained through trial or through the entry of a guilty plea. See United States v. Cain, 134 F.3d 1345, 1352 (8th Cir. 1998); Walker v. United States, 115 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 1997); Matthews v. United States, 114 F.3d 112, 113 (8th Cir. 1997); Thomas v. United States, 112 F.3d 365, 366 (8th Cir. 1997); Reid v. United States, 976 F.2d 446, 448 (8th Cir. 1992).

B. Timeliness Under the AEDPA and 28 U.S.C. § 2255

The AEDPA contains a one year period of limitation during which a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion must be filed. The statute of limitation begins to run from the latest of four circumstances. The first of these circumstances is the date on which the judgment of conviction became final. Here, the movant's conviction became "final" on January 11, 2004 — the last day he could have timely filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S. Ct. 1072, 155 L. Ed. 2d 88 (2003) ("Finality attaches when [the United States Supreme Court] affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires."). Given such date, the movant needed to file the instant motion by no later than January 11, 2005. The movant did not file his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion until October 30, 2006, which is well beyond the last day it properly could have been filed. Further, the movant's situation does not fall under any of the remaining three timeliness provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions. United States v. Martin, 408 F.3d 1089, 1092-93 (8th Cir. 2005). However, equitable tolling only applies "where `extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control prevent timely filing." Id. at 1093 (citing Jihad v. Hvass, 267 F.3d 803, 805 (8th Cir. 2001), Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 2000), and Paige v. United States, 171 F.3d 559, 561 (8th Cir. 1999)). "Ineffective assistance of counsel, where it is due to an attorney's negligence or mistake, has not generally been considered an extraordinary circumstance in this regard." Id. (citing Beery v. Ault, 312 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 2002), and Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2003)); see also Kreutzer, 231 F.3d at 463 (holding "counsel's confusion about the applicable statute of limitations does not warrant equitable tolling"). The movant does not offer any valid excuse for failing to timely file his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Therefore, the court finds that the movant's situation does not fall within the limitation period allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

With respect to the reduction of sentence and the amended judgment that followed, equitable tolling is unavailable to the movant. See Nolan v. United States, 358 F.3d 480, 484-85 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing O'Connor, 133 F.3d at 551, for the proposition that "the one-year statute of limitations for [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 motions under AEDPA is not tolled pending resolution of any other post-trial motions that aim to upset a [movant's] conviction"); Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1040-42 (11th Cir. 2002) (addressing equitable tolling argument and citing other circuits which have held that pending motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure will not toll the one year limitation period for a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion); Trenkler v. United States, 268 F.3d 16, 22-26 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating "the fact that a statute of limitations creates certain inefficiencies or inconveniences hardly qualifies as an `extraordinary circumstance' that `prevents' a litigant from complying with the strictures of the applicable limitations period"); United States v. Prescott, 221 F.3d 686, 688-89 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluding that a movant's "current predicament originated not in his decision to request a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure], but his inattention to the limitation period of [28 U.S.C.] § 2255").

In sum, all of the claims that the movant asserts could have been asserted before a judgment of conviction was entered, on direct appeal or in a timely 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. "`The one year period provided him with reasonable opportunity to file for relief; and if that time period has expired, it is the result of his own doing and not due to any inadequacy in the statute.'" United States v. Lurie, 207 F.3d 1075, 1078 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 755 (6th Cir. 1999)). Although this may be a harsh rule, it is the law. Accordingly, the movant's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion shall be denied.

With respect to the merits of the movant's claim, the court notes the following:

[T]he Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons, has the responsibility for computing a sentencing credit under [ 18 U.S.C. §] 3585(b). United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334-35, 112 S. Ct. 1351, 117 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1992). . . . The Bureau of Prisons is responsible for computing the sentence credit after the [prisoner] has begun serving his sentence. Wilson, 503 U.S. at 335; see also United States v. Moore, 978 F.2d 1029, 1031 (8th Cir. 1992). Prisoners are entitled to administrative review of the computation of their credits, 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.16, and, after properly exhausting these administrative remedies, an inmate may seek judicial review through filing a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Wilson, 503 U.S. at 335; United States v. Pardue, 363 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2004). These are the proper avenues through which [a prisoner] may resolve any dispute about the length of his time in state custody.
United States v. Tindall, 455 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir. 2006).

C. Certificate of Appealability

In a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding before a district judge, the final order is subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A district court possesses the authority to issue certificates of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and Fed.R.App.P. 22(b). See Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability may issue only if a movant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003); Garrett v. United States, 211 F.3d 1075, 1076-77 (8th Cir. 2000); Carter v. Hopkins, 151 F.3d 872, 873-74 (8th Cir. 1998); Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997); Tiedeman, 122 F.3d at 523. To make such a showing, the issues must be debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently, or the issues deserve further proceedings. Cox, 133 F.3d at 569 (citing Flieger v. Delo, 16 F.3d 878, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 335-36 (reiterating standard).

Courts reject constitutional claims either on the merits or on procedural grounds. "`[W]here a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy [28 U.S.C.] § 2253(c) is straightforward: the [movant] must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.'" Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000)). When a federal habeas petition is dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claim, "the [movant must show], at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.

Having thoroughly reviewed the record in this case, the court finds that the movant failed to make the requisite "substantial showing" with respect to the claim he raised in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed.R.App.P. 22(b). Because he does not present questions of substance for appellate review, there is no reason to grant a certificate of appealability. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability shall be denied. If he desires further review of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, the movant may request issuance of the certificate of appealability by a circuit judge of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in accordance with Tiedeman, 122 F.3d at 520-22.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) The movant's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion (Docket No. 1) is DENIED.

2) A certificate of appealability is DENIED.


Summaries of

Mayo v. U.S.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division
Nov 2, 2006
Nos. C06-2075-LRR, CR02-2041-LRR (N.D. Iowa Nov. 2, 2006)
Case details for

Mayo v. U.S.

Case Details

Full title:RICHARD LEE MAYO, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant

Court:United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division

Date published: Nov 2, 2006

Citations

Nos. C06-2075-LRR, CR02-2041-LRR (N.D. Iowa Nov. 2, 2006)