Mayo v. State

9 Citing cases

  1. Sterling v. State

    267 Ga. 209 (Ga. 1996)   Cited 53 times
    Holding that the prosecutor improperly argued matters outside of the evidence by stating in closing that the defendant's question in voir dire regarding whether venire persons believed that sometimes the guilty must go free was a concession of guilt, but holding that the remark was harmless

    That rationale is not present in a case where the jury decides only the guilt-innocence of the defendant. See, e.g., Prather v. State, 247 Ga. 789 ( 279 S.E.2d 697) (1981), Mayo v. State. 139 Ga. App. 520 ( 229 S.E.2d 16) (1976), and Smith v. State, 146 Ga. App. 428 ( 246 S.E.2d 442) (1978). Nonetheless, we held in Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236 ( 416 S.E.2d 516) (1992), that a trial court properly allowed a prosecutor to argue future dangerousness in the guilt-innocence stage of a non-capital case.

  2. Perez v. State

    254 Ga. App. 872 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 12 times
    Concluding that the statements of a police informant during a phone call to a co-conspirator, which was recorded by the police, were admissible under OCGA § 24–3–5, the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, because, at the time, the conspiracy between the parties to the call was on-going

    Vogleson v. State, supra at 564 (3) (Eldridge, J., dissenting) citing Green v. State, 206 Ga. App. 539, 541 (2) ( 426 S.E.2d 65) (1992).Bellamy v. State, 272 Ga. 157, 159 (4) ( 527 S.E.2d 867) (2000); Harris v. State, 234 Ga. 871, 873 ( 218 S.E.2d 583) (1975); Ford v. State, 232 Ga. 511, 518 (14) ( 207 S.E.2d 494) (1974); Moore v. State, 228 Ga. 662, 665 (5) ( 187 S.E.2d 277) accord Fletcher v. State, 197 Ga. App. 112, 113 (3) ( 397 S.E.2d 605) (1990); Lewis v. State, 158 Ga. App. 575 ( 281 S.E.2d 318) (1981); Evans v. State, 146 Ga. App. 480 (2) ( 246 S.E.2d 482) (1978); Hill v. State, 144 Ga. App. 259 (2) ( 241 S.E.2d 44) (1977); Mayo v. State, 139 Ga. App. 520 (1) ( 229 S.E.2d 16) (1976). Because Vogleson represents a stark abandonment of stare decisis, it should be overruled.

  3. Spivey v. State

    243 Ga. App. 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 6 times
    Finding no error when trial court refused to charge jury on abandonment where, despite defendant’s own conflicting testimony, some evidence showed that defendant was promised payment to drive others to and from a planned robbery, but that after parking the car, she refused to serve as getaway driver

    Rolland v. State, 235 Ga. 808, 811 ( 221 S.E.2d 582) (1976). See Maddox v. State, 152 Ga. App. 384 (1) ( 262 S.E.2d 636) (1979); Mayo v. State, 139 Ga. App. 520 (3) ( 229 S.E.2d 16) (1976). The trial court did not err in denying the request to charge.

  4. Fletcher v. State

    397 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 21 times
    In Fletcher, the court instructed the jury that the lesser included offense was a misdemeanor, whereas the primary charge was a felony, and the defendant was convicted of the felony.

    We find nothing in the emphasized language of the above charge which pertains to possible sentences for the crime charged. Compare, "Mayo v. State, 139 Ga. App. 520 (1) ( 229 S.E.2d 16), wherein it was held: `It is error to instruct the jury as to a possible sentence in a felony case before the jury has determined the question of guilt or innocence. Ford v. State, 232 Ga. 511, 518 (14) ( 207 S.E.2d 494); Moore v. State, 228 Ga. 662, 665 (5) ( 187 S.E.2d 277); Harris v. State, 234 Ga. 871, 873 ( 218 S.E.2d 583).' Accord, Hill v. State, 144 Ga. App. 259 (2) ( 241 S.E.2d 44); Evans v. State, 146 Ga. App. 480 (2) ( 246 S.E.2d 482)." Lewis v. State, 158 Ga. App. 575 ( 281 S.E.2d 318).

  5. Lewis v. State

    281 S.E.2d 318 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 3 times

    The judge, not the jury, determines the sentence (Code Ann. § 27-2503; Ga. L. 1974, pp. 352, 357) and the failure to give a charge with regard to sentencing matters is not error. Smokes v. State, 136 Ga. App. 8 (5) ( 220 S.E.2d 39); Stanley v. State, 136 Ga. App. 385 (2) ( 221 S.E.2d 242). See Mayo v. State, 139 Ga. App. 520 (1) ( 229 S.E.2d 16), wherein it was held: "It is error to instruct the jury as to a possible sentence in a felony case before the jury has determined the question of guilt or innocence. Ford v. State, 232 Ga. 511, 518 (14) ( 207 S.E.2d 494); Moore v. State, 228 Ga. 662, 665 (5) ( 187 S.E.2d 277); Harris v. State, 234 Ga. 871, 873 ( 218 S.E.2d 583)." Accord, Hill v. State, 144 Ga. App. 259 (2) ( 241 S.E.2d 44); Evans v. State, 146 Ga. App. 480 (2) ( 246 S.E.2d 482).

  6. Moon v. State

    275 S.E.2d 813 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 4 times

    Sustaining the state's objection, the trial court instructed defense counsel not to go into punishment. The court acted properly in so ruling. See, e.g., Mayo v. State, 139 Ga. App. 520 (1) ( 229 S.E.2d 16). Finding no error for any reason assigned, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

  7. Dollar v. State

    253 S.E.2d 461 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 9 times

    Accordingly, they are deemed abandoned. Mayo v. State, 139 Ga. App. 520 (4) ( 229 S.E.2d 16). Judgment affirmed. Quillian, P. J., and Birdsong, J., concur.

  8. Evans v. State

    146 Ga. App. 480 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that it was reversible error when, despite defense counsel’s request for a jury charge on a lesser-included offense, the trial court "absolutely refused to rule" on it, "[f]orcing counsel to make his closing argument under such conditions reduces such arguments to a game of roulette imposed on counsel by the court"

    "Criminal trials are conducted in a bifurcated or two-step procedure... The first phase determines guilt or innocence and the second phase, upon return of a guilty verdict, determines the sentence to be imposed as required by Code Ann. § 27-2503 (Ga. L. 1974, pp. 352, 357). It is error to instruct the jury as to a possible sentence in a felony case before the jury has determined the question of guilt or innocence. [Cits.]." Mayo v. State, 139 Ga. App. 520 ( 229 S.E.2d 16) (1976). The court is not permitted to instruct the jury that a defendant can be punished for a misdemeanor on a lesser included offense.

  9. Hill v. State

    241 S.E.2d 44 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 4 times

    "It is error to instruct the jury as to a possible sentence in a felony case before the jury has determined the question of guilt or innocence." Mayo v. State, 139 Ga. App. 520 (1) ( 229 S.E.2d 16) and cits. There is no merit in this complaint. 3. Appellant complains that the trial court erroneously charged the jury as to appellant's plea of "not guilty by reason of mental incompetence."